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@misc{cogprints6765, volume = {51}, number = {4}, month = {December}, author = {Chuck Stieg}, editor = {Dr. Petr Bob and Miloslav Kukleka and Marek Susta}, title = {Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?}, publisher = {Neuroscientia and NC Publishing}, year = {2009}, journal = {Activitas Nervosa Superior: the Journal for Neurocognitive Research}, pages = {152--161}, keywords = {Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity}, url = {http://cogprints.org/6765/}, abstract = {Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.} }