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TY - GEN ID - cogprints6765 UR - http://cogprints.org/6765/ A1 - Stieg, Chuck Y1 - 2009/12// N2 - Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. PB - Neuroscientia and NC Publishing KW - Consciousness KW - Evolutionary Psychology KW - Function KW - Complexity TI - Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? SP - 152 AV - public EP - 161 ER -