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%A Chuck Stieg %J Activitas Nervosa Superior: the Journal for Neurocognitive Research %T Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? %X Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. %N 4 %K Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity %P 152-161 %E Dr. Petr Bob %E Miloslav Kukleka %E Marek Susta %V 51 %D 2009 %I Neuroscientia and NC Publishing %L cogprints6765