creators_name: Harnad, Stevan
editors_name: Brown, Richard
type: confpaper
datestamp: 2011-05-04 01:53:25
lastmod: 2011-05-04 01:53:25
metadata_visibility: show
title: Minds, Brains and Turing
ispublished: pub
subjects: comp-sci-robot
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
keywords: mind, consciousness, cognition, feeling, Turing, Searle, computation
abstract: Turing set the agenda for (what would eventually be called) the cognitive sciences. He said, essentially, that cognition is as cognition does (or, more accurately, as cognition is capable of doing): Explain the causal basis of cognitive capacity and you’ve explained cognition. Test your explanation by designing a machine that can do everything a normal human cognizer can do – and do it so veridically that human cognizers cannot tell its performance apart from a real human cognizer’s – and you really cannot ask for anything more. Or can you? Neither Turing modelling nor any other kind of computational r dynamical modelling will explain how or why cognizers feel.
date: 2011-03
date_type: published
volume: 3
publisher: Consciousness Online
refereed: FALSE
referencetext: Harnad, Stevan (1989) Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 1: 5-25. 

Harnad, Stevan (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem Physica D 42: 335-346.
 
Harnad, Stevan (1992) The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific Criterion. SIGART Bulletin 3(4); 9-10.
 
Harnad, Stevan (1994) Levels of Functional Equivalence in Reverse Bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing Test for Artificial Life. Artificial Life 1(3): 293-301. 

Harnad, Stevan (1996) Computation Is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation: Cognition Isn't. Special Issue on "What Is Computation" Minds and Machines 4: 379-390 

Harnad, Stevan (1995) Why and How We Are Not Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:164-167. 

Harnad, Stevan (2000) Correlation vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind/Body Problem Is Hard. [Invited Commentary of Humphrey, N. "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"] Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(4): 54-61. 

Harnad, Stevan (2000) Minds, Machines, and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. (special issue on "Alan Turing and Artificial Intelligence") Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9(4): 425-445.
 
Harnad, Stevan (2001) Spielberg's AI: Another Cuddly No-Brainer.  

Harnad, Stevan (2002) Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. In: J. Fetzer (ed.) Evolving Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pp. 3-18. 

Harnad, Stevan (2005) What Is Consciousness? New York Review 52 (11) 

Harnad, Stevan (2006) Searle's Chinese Room Argument. In: Borchert, Donald (ed) Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference. Volume 2: 239-242 

Harnad, Stevan (2008) What It Feels Like To Hear Voices: Fond Memories of Julian Jaynes. In: Biennial Julian Jaynes Conference on Consciousness, 7-9 August 2008, University of Prince Edward Island. 

Harnad, Stevan and Scherzer, P. (2008) First, Scale Up to the Robotic Turing Test, Then Worry About Feeling. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 44(2): 83-89 

Harnad, Stevan (2008) The Annotation Game: On Turing (1950) on Computing, Machinery and Intelligence. In: Epstein, Robert & Peters, Grace (Eds.) Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer. Springer 

Harnad, Stevan (2009) Cohabitation: Computation at 70, Cognition at 20, in Dedrick, D., Eds. Cognition, Computation, and Pylyshyn. MIT Press

Harnad, Stevan (2011) Zen and the Art of Explaining the Mind. International Journal of Machine Consciousness (IJMC) 

citation:   Harnad, Stevan  (2011) Minds, Brains and Turing.  [Conference Paper]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/7334/1/MindsBrainsTuring.pdf
document_url: http://cogprints.org/7334/4/CComFIN.html