title: Systematicity: Psychological evidence with connectionist implications
creator: Phillips, S.
creator: Halford, G. S.
subject: Cognitive Psychology
subject: Neural Nets
subject: Philosophy of Mind
description: At root, the systematicity debate over classical versus connectionist explanations for cognitive architecture turns on quantifying the degree to which human cognition is systematic. We introduce into the debate recent psychological data that provides strong support for the purely structure-based generalizations claimed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). We then show, via simulation, that two widely used connectionist models (feedforward and simple recurrent networks) do not capture the same degree of generalization as human subjects. However, we show that this limitation is overcome by tensor networks that support relational processing.
publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Marwah, New Jersey
contributor: Shafto, M. G.
contributor: Langley, P.
date: 1997
type: Conference Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/postscript
identifier: http://cogprints.org/763/2/systempsych.ps
identifier:   Phillips, S. and Halford, G. S.  (1997) Systematicity: Psychological evidence with connectionist implications.  [Conference Paper]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/763/