creators_name: Franceschi, Paul
creators_id: p.franceschi@univ-corse.fr
type: preprint
datestamp: 2014-05-10 00:07:47
lastmod: 2014-05-10 00:07:47
metadata_visibility: show
title: Elements of dialectical contextualism
subjects: phil-logic
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: phil-sci
full_text_status: public
keywords: dialectical contextualism, contextualism, dialectics, one-sidedness bias, cognitive distortion, meta-philosophy, polar contraries, paradox
abstract: In what follows, I strive to present the elements of a philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as dialectical contextualism. I proceed first to define the elements of this doctrine: dualities and polar contraries, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I emphasize then the special importance of this doctrine in one specific field of meta-philosophy: the methodology for solving philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I describe several applications of this methodology on the following paradoxes: Hempel's paradox, the surprise examination paradox and the Doomsday Argument.
date: 2014-03-07
date_type: published
refereed: FALSE
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citation:   Franceschi, Dr Paul  (2014) Elements of dialectical contextualism.  [Preprint]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/9225/1/cxd-en.pdf