2018-01-17T14:22:39Z EPrints http://cogprints.org/images/sitelogo.gif http://cogprints.org/ 2014-05-10T00:08:42Z 2014-05-10T00:08:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/9229 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/9229 2014-05-10T00:08:42Z

Is Universal Grammar a universal grammar? From Chomsky's hierarchy we deduce that for each grammar there is a Turing machine, and conversely. Following this equivalence, it is immediate to conclude that a universal Turing machine is equivalent to a universal grammar. Meanwhile, in linguistics, Universal Grammar is the human brain circuitry that implements the faculty of language. So the definitive answer is achieved only when we show that the human brain is Turing complete, and that language uses this capability. So yes: Universal Grammar is a universal grammar, because the human brain circuitry that implements the faculty of language is Turing complete.

Ramón Casares papa@ramoncasares.com 2014-03-11T11:55:42Z 2014-05-02T11:51:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/9209 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/9209 2014-03-11T11:55:42Z

The value of syntax is controversial: some see syntax as defining us as species, while for others it just facilitates communication. To assess syntax we investigate its relation to problem resolving. First we define a problem theory from first principles, and then we translate the theory concepts to mathematics, obtaining the requirements that every resolution machine has to implement. Such a resolution machine will be able to execute any possible resolution, that is, any possible way of taking a problem expression and computing the problem solutions. Two main requirements are found: 1) syntax is needed to express problems, that is, separate words are not enough, and 2) the resolution machine has to be as powerful as lambda calculus is, that is, it has to be Turing complete. Noting that every device that can generate any possible syntax, that is, any possible syntactically correct sentence of any possible, natural or artificial, language, has to be Turing complete, we conclude that syntax and problem resolving can use the same components, as, for example, sentences, functions, and conditionals. The implication to human evolution is that syntax and problem resolving should have co-evolved in humans towards Turing completeness.

Ramón Casares papa@ramoncasares.com 2012-11-09T19:41:42Z 2012-11-09T19:41:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/8279 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/8279 2012-11-09T19:41:42Z

Indonesian traditional villagers have a tradition for the sake of their own social and economic security named “nyumbang”. There are wide variations of the traditions across the archipelago, and we revisit an observation to one in Subang, West Java, Indonesia. The paper discusses and employs the evolutionary game theoretic insights to see the process of “gantangan”, of the intertwining social cohesion and economic expectation of the participation within the traditional activities. The current development of the “gantangan” tradition is approached and generalized to propose a view between the economic and social sphere surrounding modern people. The interaction between social and economic sphere might be seen as a kind of Lokta-Volterra’s predator-prey-like interaction, where both are conflicting yet in a great necessity one another for the sustainability of the social life. While some explanations due to the current development of “gantangan” is drawn, some aspects related to traditional views complying the modern life with social and economic expectations is outlined.

Hokky Situngkir Yanu Endar Prasetyo 2012-04-25T12:29:38Z 2012-04-25T12:29:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/8149 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/8149 2012-04-25T12:29:38Z

Metabolic-repair models, or (M,R)-systems were introduced in Relational Biology by Robert Rosen. Subsequently, Rosen represented such (M,R)-systems (or simply MRs) in terms of categories of sets, deliberately selected without any structure other than the discrete topology of sets. Theoreticians of life’s origins postulated that Life on Earth has begun with the simplest possible organism, called the primordial. Mathematicians interested in biology attempted to answer this important question of the minimal living organism by defining the functional relations that would have made life possible in such a minimal system- a grandad and grandma of all living organisms on Earth.

Prof.Dr. I.C. Baianu ibaianu@illinois.edu 2012-04-25T12:30:10Z 2012-04-25T12:30:10Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/8144 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/8144 2012-04-25T12:30:10Z

Previous theoretical or general approaches (Rosen, 1960; Shcherbik and Buchatsky, 2007) to the problems of Quantum Genetics and Molecular Evolution are considered in this article from the point of view of Quantum Automata Theory first published by the author in 1971 (Baianu,1971a, b) , and further developed in several recent articles (Baianu, 1977, 1983, 1987, 2004, 2011).The representation of genomes and Interactome networks in categories of many-valued logic LMn –algebras that are naturally transformed during biological evolution, or evolve through interactions with the environment provide a new insight into the mechanisms of molecular evolution, as well as organismal evolution, in terms of sequences of quantum automata. Phenotypic changes are expressed only when certain environmentally-induced quantum-molecular changes are coupled with an internal re-structuring of major submodules of the genome and Interactome networks related to cell cycling and cell growth. Contrary to the commonly held view of `standard’ Darwinist models of evolution, the evolution of organisms and species occurs through coupled multi-molecular transformations induced not only by the environment but actually realized through internal re-organizations of genome and interactome networks. The biological, evolutionary processes involve certain epigenetic transformations that are responsible for phenotypic expression of the genome and Interactome transformations initiated at the quantum-molecular level. It can thus be said that only quantum genetics can provide correct explanations of evolutionary processes that are initiated at the quantum—multi-molecular levels and propagate to the higher levels of organismal and species evolution. Biological evolution should be therefore regarded as a multi-scale process which is initiated by underlying quantum (coupled) multi-molecular transformations of the genomic and interactomic networks, followed by specific phenotypic transformations at the level of organism and the variable biogroupoids associated with the evolution of species which are essential to the survival of the species. The theoretical framework introduced in this article also paves the way to a Quantitative Biology approach to biological evolution at the quantum-molecular, as well as at the organismal and species levels. This is quite a substantial modification of the `established’ modern Darwinist, and also of several so-called `molecular evolution’ theories.

Professor I.C. Baianu, ibaianu@illinois.edu 2017-02-18T20:23:42Z 2017-02-18T20:23:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/9649 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/9649 2017-02-18T20:23:42Z

Uner Tan syndrome, discovered in 2005 by Dr. Tan, in Southern Turkey, mainly consists of habitual quadrupedal locomotioni impaired intelligence, and dysarthric or no speech, with or without (rarely) cerebello-vermial hypoplasia and mildly simplified cortical gyri. This syndrome may be considered wthin the framework of the nonprogressive autosomal recessive cerebellar ataxias, associated with various genetic mutations (genetic heterogeneity). This is a unique condition among disequilibrium syndrome, Cayman ataxia, and Joubert syndrome. From the viewpoint of dynamical systems theory, there may be not a single factor including a ganetic code that predetermines the emergence of human quıadrupedalism, seen for instance in Uner Tan syndrome. Rather it may involve self-organization process, consisting of many decentralized and local interactions among neuronal, genetic, and environmental subsystems.

Prof. Dr. Uner Tan unertan37@yahoo.com Prof. Dr. Yusuf Tamam Prof. Dr. Sibel Karaca Prof. Dr. Meliha Tan Meliha_Tan@yahoo.com 2011-12-16T00:08:03Z 2011-12-16T00:08:03Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7750 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7750 2011-12-16T00:08:03Z

This review summarises why it is difficult for Darwinian evolutionary theory to explain the existence and function of consciousness. It then evaluates whether Humphrey's book Soul Dust overcomes these problems. According to Humphrey, consciousness is an illusion constructed by the brain to enhance reproductive fitness by motivating creatures that have it to stay alive. Although the review entirely accepts that consciousness gives a first-person meaning to existence, it concludes that Humphrey does not give a convincing account of how this can arise from random variations in the genome. Nor does he demonstrate how first-person experiences might enter into or be reducable to third-person functioning. The review concludes that Humphrey's case is unconvincing, and goes on to suggest that an entirely different, non-reductive approach may be required to understand consciousness.

Prof Max Velmans m.velmans@gold.ac.uk 2011-08-30T04:23:54Z 2011-08-30T04:23:54Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7584 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7584 2011-08-30T04:23:54Z

Humans are cognitive entities. Our behaviors and ongoing interactions with the environment are threaded with creations and usages of meaningful information, be they conscious or unconscious. Animal life is also populated with meaningful information related to the survival of the individual and of the species. The meaningfulness of information managed by artificial agents can also be considered as a reality once we accept that the meanings managed by an artificial agent are derived from what we, the cognitive designers, have built the agent for. This rapid overview brings to consider that cognition, in terms of management of meaningful information, can be looked at as a reality for animal, humans and robots. But it is pretty clear that the corresponding meanings will be very different in nature and content. Free will and selfconsciousness are key drivers in the management of human meanings, but they do not exist for animals or robots. Also, staying alive is a constraint that we share with animals. Robots do not carry that constraint. Such differences in meaningful information and cognition for animal, humans and robots could bring us to believe that the analysis of cognitions for these three types of agents has to be done separately. But if we agree that humans are the result of the evolution of life and that robots are a product of human activities, we can then look at addressing the possibility for an evolutionary approach at cognition based on meaningful information management. A bottom-up path would begin by meaning management within basic living entities, then climb up the ladder of evolution up to us humans, and continue with artificial agents. This is what we propose to present here: address an evolutionary approach for cognition, based on meaning management using a simple systemic tool. We use for that an existing systemic approach on meaning generation where a system submitted to a constraint generates a meaningful information (a meaning) that will initiate an action in order to satisfy the constraint [1,2]. The action can be physical, mental or other. This systemic approach defines a Meaning Generator System (MGS). The simplicity of the MGS makes it available as a building block for meaning management in animals, humans and robots. Contrary to approaches on meaning generation in psychology or linguistics, the MGS approach is not based on human mind. To avoid circularity, an evolutionary approach has to be careful not to include components of human mind in the starting point. The MGS receives information from its environment and compares it with its constraint. The generated meaning is the connection existing between the received information and the constraint. The generated meaning is to trigger an action aimed at satisfying the constraint. The action will modify the environment, and so the generated meaning. Meaning generation links agents to their environments in a dynamic mode. The MGS approach is triadic, Peircean type. The systemic approach allows wide usage of the MGS: a system is a set of elements linked by a set of relations. Any system submitted to a constraint and capable of receiving information from its environment can lead to a MGS. Meaning generation can be applied to many cases, assuming we identify clearly enough the systems and the constraints. Animals, humans and robots are then agents containing MGSs. Similar MGSs carrying different constraints will generate different meanings. Cognition is system dependent. We first apply the MGS approach to animals with “stay alive” and “group life” constraints. Such constraints can bring to model many cases of meaning generation and actions in the organic world. However, it is to be highlighted that even if the functions and characteristics of life are well known, the nature of life is not really understood. Final causes are difficult to integrate in our today science. So analyzing meaning and cognition in living entities will have to take into account our limited understanding about the nature of life. Ongoing research on concepts like autopoiesis could bring a better understanding about the nature of life [3]. We next address meaning generation for humans. The case is the most difficult as the nature of human mind is a mystery for today science and philosophy. The natures of our feelings, free will or self-consciousness are unknown. Human constraints, meanings and cognition are difficult to define. Any usage of the MGS approach for humans will have to take into account the limitations that result from the unknown nature of human mind. We will however present some possible approaches to identify human constraints where the MGS brings some openings in an evolutionary approach [4, 5]. But it is clear that the better human mind will be understood, the more we will be in a position to address meaning management and cognition for humans. Ongoing research activities relative to the nature of human mind cover many scientific and philosophical domains [6]. The case of meaning management and cognition in artificial agents is rather straightforward with the MGS approach as we, the designers, know the agents and the constraints. In addition, our evolutionary approach brings to position notions like artificial constraints, meaning and autonomy as derived from their animal or human source. We next highlight that cognition as management of meaningful information by agents goes beyond information and needs to address representations which belong to the central hypothesis of cognitive sciences. We define the meaningful representation of an item for an agent as being the networks of meanings relative to the item for the agent, with the action scenarios involving the item. Such meaningful representations embed the agents in their environments and are far from the GOFAI type ones [4]. Meanings, representations and cognition exist by and for the agents. We finish by summarizing the points presented and highlight some possible continuations. [1] C. Menant "Information and Meaning" http://cogprints.org/3694/ [2] C. Menant “Introduction to a Systemic Theory of Meaning” (short paper) http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf [3] A. Weber and F. Varela “Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97–125, 2002. [4] C. Menant "Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach" http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/10-Menant.pdf http://crmenant.free.fr/2009BookChapter/C.Menant.211009 [5] C. Menant "Proposal for a shared evolutionary nature of language and consciousness" http://cogprints.org/7067/ [6] Philpapers “philosophy of mind” http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-mind

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2011-10-27T01:33:16Z 2011-10-27T01:33:16Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7676 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7676 2011-10-27T01:33:16Z

Understanding computation as “a process of the dynamic change of information” brings to look at the different types of computation and information. Computation of information does not exist alone by itself but is to be considered as part of a system that uses it for some given purpose. Information can be meaningless like a thunderstorm noise, it can be meaningful like an alert signal, or like the representation of a desired food. A thunderstorm noise participates to the generation of meaningful information about coming rain. An alert signal has a meaning as allowing a safety constraint to be satisfied. The representation of a desired food participates to the satisfaction of some metabolic constraints for the organism. Computations on information and representations will be different in nature and in complexity as the systems that link them have different constraints to satisfy. Animals have survival constraints to satisfy. Humans have many specific constraints coming in addition. And computers will compute what the designer and programmer ask for. We propose to analyze the different relations between information, meaning and representation by taking an evolutionary approach on the systems that link them. Such a bottom-up approach allows starting with simple organisms and avoids an implicit focus on humans, which is the most complex and difficult case. To make available a common background usable for the many different cases, we use a systemic tool that defines the generation of meaningful information by and for a system submitted to a constraint [Menant, 2003]. This systemic tool allows to position information, meaning and representations for systems relatively to environmental entities in an evolutionary perspective. We begin by positioning the notions of information, meaning and representation and recall the characteristics of the Meaning Generator System (MGS) that link a system submitted to a constraint to its environment. We then use the MGS for animals and highlight the network nature of the interrelated meanings about an entity of the environment. This brings us to define the representation of an item for an agent as being the network of meanings relative to the item for the agent. Such meaningful representations embed the agents in their environments and are far from the Good Old Fashion Artificial Intelligence type ones. The MGS approach is then used for humans with a limitation resulting of the unknown nature of human consciousness. Application of the MGS to artificial systems brings to look for compatibilities with different levels of Artificial Intelligence (AI) like embodied-situated AI, the Guidance Theory of Representations, and enactive AI. Concerns relative to different types of autonomy and organic or artificial constraints are highlighted. We finish by summarizing the points addressed and by proposing some continuations.

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2010-10-26T18:22:21Z 2011-03-11T08:57:46Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7067 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7067 2010-10-26T18:22:21Z

It is pretty obvious that language and human consciousness entertain tight relations. We could not really be conscious of ourselves without the possibility to say “I” or “me”. And language is a key contributor in our capability to identify ourselves as conscious entities existing in the environment. But the relations linking language and consciousness are complex and difficult to analyze. Evolutionary origins of language are unknown as no fossil traces have been left by our ancestors. Sciences of consciousness however begin to make available some possible evolutionary scenarios about the nature of human consciousness. We want here to propose a link between language and consciousness by using such an evolutionary scenario and also introduce the usage of a systemic approach to meaning generation. In the first part of the presentation we will use an existing scenario about the evolutionary nature of self-consciousness where the development of language has a role (1). We will highlight this role in order to identify language and self-consciousness as inter-dependant in their nature through a possible common evolutionary origin. Self-consciousness and language could then be considered as tightly inter-dependant through a common build up of human nature during evolution. The scenario presents an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness as resulting of the capability for pre-human primates to identify with their conspecifics (1, 2). The conspecifics are represented as existing in the environment, and such identification brought our pre-human ancestors to consider themselves as also existing in the environment. The scenario takes this event as being a first step for a conscious self-representation within pre-human primates, which progressively evolved toward our today human consciousness (3). But such identification with conspecifics was not for free at times of survival of the fittest. Identifying with conspecifics meant for our pre-human ancestor to also identify with their sufferings or encountered dangers. These came in addition to the dangers or sufferings naturally encountered and created a significant anxiety increase (1). The resulting level of anxiety had to be limited. One possibility for that was to develop psychological or physical tools that could have reduced the risks of occurrences and developments of such dangers and sufferings. Among these tools is the performance of language which can induces significant evolutionary advantages. We will propose a first scheme about how these evolutionary advantages could have reduced the dangers and sufferings encountered by our pre- human ancestors. We will also show how the development of language produced by itself a positive feedback on the development of inter-subjectivity in the evolutionary scenario, and so participated directly to the development of human consciousness. Other evolutionary advantages have existed like the development of imitation and synergy through experience (4). Language played a role there also, and has to be taken into account. The second part of the presentation will propose the usage of an existing systemic approach to meaning generation in terms of constraints satisfaction (5, 6). Constraints for pre-human primates, ranging from a basic “stay alive” to highly elaborated “limit anxiety”, were source of multiple meaning generations in which language has played (and still plays) a key role. Several continuations will be proposed linked to the here above thread on a co-evolutions of language and human consciousness, as based on the evolutionary scenario.

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2010-08-06T11:18:44Z 2011-03-11T08:57:39Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6904 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6904 2010-08-06T11:18:44Z

The integration process between evolutionary approach and conventional economic analysis is very essential for the next development of economic studies, especially in the fundamental concepts of modern economics: supply and demand analysis. In this presentation, we use the concept of meme to explore evolution of demand. This study offers an evolutionary model of demand, which views utility as a function of the distance between the two types of sequences of memes (memeplex), which represent economic product and consumer preference. It is very different from the conventional approach of demand, which only views utility as a function of quantity. This modification provides an opportunity to see innovation and transformation of consumer preferences in the demand perspective. Innovation is seen as a change in sequence of memes in economic products, while the transformation of consumer behavior is defined as a change in the aligning memes of consumer preference. Demand quantity is the result of the selection process. This model produces some interesting characteristics, such as: (i) quantitative and qualitative properties of evolution of demand, (ii) relationship between consumer behavior and properties of evolution of demand that occurred and (iii) power law on the distribution of product lifetime. At the end we show the improvement of utility function, in the concept of meme, might create a new landscape for the further development of economics.

Rolan Mauludy rmd@compsoc.bandungfe.net Hokky Situngkir hs@compsoc.bandungfe.net 2010-07-29T01:44:29Z 2011-03-11T08:57:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6898 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6898 2010-07-29T01:44:29Z

This manuscript has ensued from my past studies in biochemistry (PhD, CUNY 1986) and my current endeavors in graduate study in philosophy and anthropology. The current research project began during my period as a graduate student in biochemistry with a professor of classical genetics comment that DNA was unique in the physical world. The paradox presented to relate this notion to existing natural law lead me to evolve and communicate a view that the world itself is a special case of a general case that has no relevant physical existence. I also hope to have presented a description of a situation that connects history, human behavior, the process and symbolisms of science, cause and effect to a holism of form, philosophy, mathematics, shape, and motion

Dr. Marvin/E. Kirsh kirsh2152000@yahoo.com 2010-06-06T14:33:44Z 2011-03-11T08:57:37Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6849 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6849 2010-06-06T14:33:44Z

The sound producing machinery of change is a viral element in the problems of civilization. A silent relation that is unmoved, as it is unexposed to the power of the discourse of change and a silent logic of volumetric processes, together illustrated to companion empirical nature are employed for the elaboration of historical conceptual paradox involving mind and matter. Mind, conceived as an enduring state of the becoming of energy into a state of matter, and matter as the constantly becoming environment, are tested with criteria of witnessibility for consistency to capture an acceptably reasoned description, from a modern perspective, of cultural evolution. A self-generating friction at the conceptual border of the social and natural sciences, as the recurring source of the problems of civilization, is discussed. The philosophies of logical positivism and post modernism referenced from the elaborated philosophy are determined to reflect a need for a representation of nature that is independent of temporal and physical parameters of perspective. Emergence is discussed within the framework of first witness perspective and a visually based mathematical-physical model of space is elaborated.

Dr. Marvin/E. Kirsh kirsh2152000@yahoo.com 2010-05-04T22:03:25Z 2011-03-11T08:57:36Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6831 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6831 2010-05-04T22:03:25Z

Evolutionary advantages of consciousness and intersubjectivity are part of current philosophical debates on the nature of consciousness. Both are linked and intersubjectivity is sometimes considered as a form of consciousness [1]. Regarding the evolution of consciousness, studies tend to focus on phenomenal consciousness [2]. We would like here to bring the focus on self-consciousness and continue the build up of a corresponding evolutionary scenario. We also propose to introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Our starting point is the evolutionary scenario based on the evolution of intersubjectivity that goes thru the identification with conspecifics at pre-human primate time frame [3, 4, 5]. The scenario considers that such identification with conspecifics brought the non self-conscious auto-representation carried by our prehuman primate ancestors to merge with the representations of conspecifics. The latter transferred to the auto-representation the characteristics of an entity existing in the environment, and by this way introduced some first elements of self-consciousness for our pre-human ancestors. In addition, an anxiety increase coming from the identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics produced an evolutionary engine based on anxiety limitation. We want here to complement this evolutionary approach by introducing the improvement of action programs as a contributor to the evolutionary advantages of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. We look at the possibility for a subject to improve the action programs that conspecifics implement. The performance of identification with conspecifics allows the subject to consider that errors made by conspecifics are potentially her own errors, and consequently allows the subject to correct the errors of conspecifics for her own benefit. We describe the process of non successful action identification from the perspective of an observer and present the synergetic action program improvements with their contribution to the evolution of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. We add this contribution to the existing evolutionary scenario on self-consciousness and introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. We use for that the relation existing between phenomenal consciousness and pre-reflexive self-consciousness [6] and propose to link the latter to the proposed evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. We finish by summarizing the points addressed and by introducing some possible continuations.

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2010-10-18T11:00:45Z 2011-03-11T08:57:45Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7048 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7048 2010-10-18T11:00:45Z

The manuscript describes a new sciencific discipline called Octology, which should unify morphogenetic linguistics and neurobiology to investigate the development of the words, cognition and behavior.

Dr. Andrej Poleev andrejpoleev@yahoo.com 2010-04-04T16:15:28Z 2011-03-11T08:57:36Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6818 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6818 2010-04-04T16:15:28Z

There is an increasing agreement in the cognitive sciences community that our sensations are closely related to our actions. Our actions impact our sensations from the environment and the knowledge we have of it. Cognition is grounded in sensori-motor coordination. In the perspective of implementing such a performance in artificial systems, there is a need for a model of sensori-motor coordination. We propose here such a model as based on the generation of meaningful information by a system submitted to a constraint [1]. Systems and agents have constraints to satisfy which are related to their nature (stay alive for an organism, avoid obstacle for a robot, …). We propose here to use an existing meaning generation process where a system submitted to a constraint generates a meaningful information (a meaning) when it receives an information that has a connection with the constraint [2]. The generated meaning is precisely the connection existing between the received information and the constraint of the system. The generated meaning is used to trigger an action that will satisfy the constraint. The generated meaning links the system to its environment. A Meaning Generator System (MGS) has been introduced as a building block for higher level systems (agents). The MGS allows to link sensation and action through the satisfaction of the constraint of the system/agent. We use the MGS in a model which is based on constraint satisfaction for sensori-motor coordination in agents, be they organic or artificial. The meaning is generated by and for the agent that hosts the MGS. Such approach makes possible an addressing of the concept of autonomy through the intrinsic or artificial nature of the constraint to be satisfied (organisms with intrinsic constraints/autonomy, artificial systems with artificial constraints/autonomy). The systemic nature of the MGS also allows to position the groundings of the generated meaning as being in or out of the MGS, and correspondingly identify the constructivist and objectivist components of the generated meaning. The approach presented here makes available a sensori-motor coordination by meaning generation through constraint satisfaction with groundings of the generated meaning.

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2011-10-27T01:31:46Z 2011-10-27T01:31:46Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7679 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7679 2011-10-27T01:31:46Z

The scientific understanding of cognition and consciousness is currently hampered by the lack of rigorous and universally accepted definitions that permit comparative studies. This paper proposes new functional and un- ambiguous definitions for cognition and consciousness in order to provide clearly defined boundaries within which general theories of cognition and consciousness may be developed. The proposed definitions are built upon the construction and manipulation of reality representation, decision making and learning and are scoped in terms of an underlying logical structure. It is argued that the presentation of reality also necessitates the concept of ab- sence and the capacity to perform transitive inference. Explicit predictions relating to these new definitions, along with possible ways to test them, are also described and discussed.

Dr David Guez david.guez@mac.com 2009-11-14T11:42:22Z 2011-03-11T08:57:30Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6660 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6660 2009-11-14T11:42:22Z

Serial endosymbiosis theory provides a unifying paradigm for examining the interaction of cognitive modules at vastly different scales of biological, social, and cultural organization. A trivial but not unimportant model associates a dual information source with a broad class of cognitive processes, and punctuated phenomena akin to phase transitions in physical systems, and associated coevolutionary processes, emerge as consequences of the homology between information source uncertainty and free energy density. The dynamics, including patterns of punctuation similar to ecosystem resilience transitions, are large dominated by the availability of 'Roman roads' constituting channels for the transmission of information between modules.

Rodrick Wallace wallace@pi.cpmc.columbia.edu 2009-10-15T22:51:21Z 2011-03-11T08:57:29Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6655 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6655 2009-10-15T22:51:21Z

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, the developmental process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition.

John E Stewart jes999@tpg.com.au 2010-04-04T16:15:09Z 2011-03-11T08:57:36Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6820 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6820 2010-04-04T16:15:09Z

An approach to meaning generation that allows groundings of the meaning is used [1]. Considering that meaning generation is key to cognition, such approach goes with grounding of cognition in sensorimotor coordination. Starting point is meaning generation by a system submitted to a constraint when it receives an incident information that has a connection with the constraint. The system generates a meaningful information (a meaning) in order to trigger an action that will satisfy its constraint. The generated meaning is precisely the connection existing between the received information and the constraint[2]. This simple process allows defining a Meaning Generator System (MGS) as well as groundings of the meaning in /out of the MGS. The action modifies the environment and the generated meaning. This provides some coverage for sensorimotor coordination, and also brings on the same picture constructivist and objectivist aspects.

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2009-09-07T10:17:27Z 2011-03-11T08:57:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6605 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6605 2009-09-07T10:17:27Z

Scientists still think that biological evolution is driven by the process named natural selection. Perhaps this 19th century notion was indeed a revolutionary idea at the time when it has been introduced. However, now it seems that natural selection hypothesis most probably is wrong. It does not explain, above all, why biological organization arise in the course of evolution. I show, on a rather abstract level of consideration, that exists another explanation why this intriguing phenomenon - life evolution - take place. Here it is argued that biological organization is solely a product of self-replication.

Mr Dalius Balciunas dbalciunas@post.skynet.lt 2009-07-06T09:43:13Z 2011-03-11T08:57:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6576 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6576 2009-07-06T09:43:13Z

Understanding how systems can be designed to be evolvable is fundamental to research in optimization, evolution, and complex systems science. Many researchers have thus recognized the importance of evolvability, i.e. the ability to find new variants of higher fitness, in the fields of biological evolution and evolutionary computation. Recent studies by Ciliberti et al (Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 2007) and Wagner (Proc. R. Soc. B., 2008) propose a potentially important link between the robustness and the evolvability of a system. In particular, it has been suggested that robustness may actually lead to the emergence of evolvability. Here we study two design principles, redundancy and degeneracy, for achieving robustness and we show that they have a dramatically different impact on the evolvability of the system. In particular, purely redundant systems are found to have very little evolvability while systems with degeneracy, i.e. distributed robustness, can be orders of magnitude more evolvable. These results offer insights into the general principles for achieving evolvability and may prove to be an important step forward in the pursuit of evolvable representations in evolutionary computation.

Dr James M Whitacre jwhitacre79@yahoo.com Dr Axel Bender 2009-07-06T09:42:25Z 2011-03-11T08:57:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6573 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6573 2009-07-06T09:42:25Z

This paper demonstrates that simple yet important characteristics of coevolution can occur in evolutionary algorithms when only a few conditions are met. We find that interaction-based fitness measurements such as fitness (linear) ranking allow for a form of coevolutionary dynamics that is observed when 1) changes are made in what solutions are able to interact during the ranking process and 2) evolution takes place in a multi-objective environment. This research contributes to the study of simulated evolution in a at least two ways. First, it establishes a broader relationship between coevolution and multi-objective optimization than has been previously considered in the literature. Second, it demonstrates that the preconditions for coevolutionary behavior are weaker than previously thought. In particular, our model indicates that direct cooperation or competition between species is not required for coevolution to take place. Moreover, our experiments provide evidence that environmental perturbations can drive coevolutionary processes; a conclusion that mirrors arguments put forth in dual phase evolution theory. In the discussion, we briefly consider how our results may shed light onto this and other recent theories of evolution.

Dr James M Whitacre jwhitacre79@yahoo.com 2009-07-02T01:51:39Z 2011-03-11T08:57:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6551 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6551 2009-07-02T01:51:39Z

This paper develops and integrates major ideas and concepts on complexity and biocomplexity - the connectionist conjecture, universal ontology of complexity, irreducible complexity of totality & inherent randomness, perpetual evolution of information, emergence of criticality and equivalence of symmetry & complexity. This paper introduces the Connectionist Conjecture which states that the one and only representation of Totality is the connectionist one i.e. in terms of nodes and edges. This paper also introduces an idea of Universal Ontology of Complexity and develops concepts in that direction. The paper also develops ideas and concepts on the perpetual evolution of information, irreducibility and computability of totality, all in the context of the Connectionist Conjecture. The paper indicates that the control and communication are the prime functionals that are responsible for the symmetry and complexity of complex phenomenon. The paper takes the stand that the phenomenon of life (including its evolution) is probably the nearest to what we can describe with the term “complexity”. The paper also assumes that signaling and communication within the living world and of the living world with the environment creates the connectionist structure of the biocomplexity. With life and its evolution as the substrate, the paper develops ideas towards the ontology of complexity. The paper introduces new complexity theoretic interpretations of fundamental biomolecular parameters. The paper also develops ideas on the methodology to determine the complexity of “true” complex phenomena.

Mr. Debaprasad Mukherjee biodeb@gmail.com 2009-08-13T20:04:54Z 2011-03-11T08:57:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6591 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6591 2009-08-13T20:04:54Z

Sterelny’s Thought in a Hostile World (2003) presents a complex, systematically structured theory of the evolution of cognition centered on a concept of decoupled representation. Taking Godfrey-Smith’s (1996) analysis of the evolution of behavioral flexibility as a framework, the theory describes increasingly complex grades of representation beginning with simple detection and culminating with decoupled representation, said to be belief-like, and it characterizes selection forces that drive evolutionary transformations in these forms of representation. Sterelny’s ultimate explanatory target is the evolution of human agency. This paper develops a detailed analysis of the main cognitive aspects. It is argued that some of the major claims are not correct: decoupled representation as defined doesn’t capture belief-like representation, and, properly understood, decoupled representation turns out to be ubiquitous amongst multicellular animals. However some of the key ideas are right, or along the right lines, and suggestions are made for modifying and expanding the conceptual framework.

Dr Wayne Christensen wayne.christensen@gmail.com 2009-02-13T01:14:50Z 2011-03-11T08:57:18Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6342 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6342 2009-02-13T01:14:50Z

Systems biology presently suffers the same mereological and sufficiency fallacies that haunt neural network models of high order cognition. Shifting perspective from the massively parallel space of gene matrix interactions to the grammar/syntax of the time series of expressed phenotypes using a cognitive paradigm permits import of techniques from statistical physics via the homology between information source uncertainty and free energy density. This produces a broad spectrum of possible statistical models of development and its pathologies in which epigenetic regulation and the effects of embedding environment are analogous to a tunable enzyme catalyst. A cognitive paradigm naturally incorporates memory, leading directly to models of epigenetic inheritance, as affected by environmental exposures, in the largest sense. Understanding gene expression, development, and their dysfunctions will require data analysis tools considerably more sophisticated than the present crop of simplistic models abducted from neural network studies or stochastic chemical reaction theory.

Rodrick Wallace wallace@pi.cpmc.columbia.edu 2009-01-05T23:52:21Z 2011-03-11T08:57:17Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6314 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6314 2009-01-05T23:52:21Z

Recent work by Ciliberti et al. finds the spinglass model of regulatory gene networks adapted from neural network studies to have a single giant connected component in a metanetwork space of interaction matrices, permitting only gradual evolutionary transition, in conflict with empirical studies of development in sea urchin species that found evidence for punctuated equilibrium evolutionary transition. Shifting perspective from the highly parallel matrix space to the grammar/syntax of the time series of expressed phenotypes via a recently introduced cognitive paradigm permits import of other techniques from statistical physics to the study of gene expression, in particular application of Landau's spontaneous symmetry breaking arguments. This produces a straightforward multi-component model generating punctuated equilibrium in the evolution of development. Analogs to Bennett and Hacker's mereological fallacy and to Krebs' sufficiency failure that haunt neural network models of high order cognition also severely constrain the usefulness of spinglass models in the study of gene expression dynamics. Our methods, by contrast, permit incorporation of epigenetic effects in a highly natural manner, finding them analogous to a tunable enzyme catalyst in a process also subject to phase transition analogs.

Dr. Rodrick Wallace wallace@pi.cpmc.columbia.edu 2009-05-30T15:39:57Z 2011-03-11T08:57:21Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6447 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6447 2009-05-30T15:39:57Z

Using Monte Carlo simulations, we study the evolution of contigent cooperation and ethnocentrism in the one-move game. Interactions and reproduction among computational agents are simulated on undirected and directed Barabási- Albert (BA) networks. We first replicate the Hammond-Axelrod model of in-group favoritism on a square lattice and then generalize this model on undirected and directed BA networks for both asexual and sexual reproduction cases. Our simulations demonstrate that irrespective of the mode of reproduction, ethnocentric strategy becomes common even though cooperation is individually costly and mechanisms such as reciprocity or conformity are absent. Moreover, our results indicate that the spread of favoritism toward similar others highly depends on the network topology and the associated heterogeneity of the studied population.

Francisco W.S. Lima Tarik Hadzibeganovic Dietrich Stauffer 2008-07-13T11:03:39Z 2011-03-11T08:57:09Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6123 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6123 2008-07-13T11:03:39Z

“Evoluzione” è una parola usata ormai frequentemente dall’uomo comune nonché in tutte le discipline, umanistiche e scientifiche. Culturalmente radicata, è diventata una metafora potente. Una definizione corrente è “sviluppo lento e graduale; svolgimento da una forma a un’altra, generalmente più completa e perfetta” (Garzanti). In questi termini non si parla soltanto dell’evoluzione biologica dell’uomo, ma anche dell’evoluzione del linguaggio, della società, della cognizione umana – a prescindere da un’effettiva conoscenza delle teorie evoluzionistiche. L’evoluzione, in quanto teoria biologica, rimanda quasi automaticamente alla teoria di Darwin, il quale, tuttavia, ha usato il termine solo una volta, nel paragrafo finale del suo celeberrimo L’origine delle specie (1859). Nel concetto di evoluzione è comunemente implicato il passaggio da una specie “primitiva” ad una specie “progredita”, più avanzata o sofisticata e strutturalmente più complessa. Nei suoi scritti, Darwin preferiva parlare di “discendenza con modificazioni” anziché di “evoluzione”, termine usato invece da Bonnet (1762) nella sua teoria dell’homunculus, proprio perché portatore della valenza semantica di “progresso”, non presente nella teoria che Darwin proponeva. Infatti, per quest’ultimo “evoluzione” ha più a che fare con il cambiamento (x --> y) che con il progresso (x --> x+1). L’idea che il concetto di evoluzione abbia a che fare con quello di progresso è in realtà posteriore: nell’accezione più comune del termine è presente l’idea di una temporalità lineare, nella quale l’hic et nunc è visto come la massima compiutezza dello sviluppo, della complessità e della “modernità”, e il passato è visto da un punto di vista situato in un setting storico del presente (antropo-, etno-, euro-, ego-centrico etc), in un’opposizione binaria tra “adesso” e “allora”, tra “noi” e “loro”, tra “progredito” e “primitivo”. Eppure l’evoluzione, in senso stretto, non è teleologica e non c’è un “avanti” o un “indietro”, c’è solo un cambiamento causato dall’adattamento nell’ecosistema in cui l’essere storico si trova. Evoluzione non è necessariamente sinonimo di ottimizzazione (chi può dire che la “prossima generazione” sarà migliore?). La mia ipotesi è che questa metafora (linguaggio) influenza il nostro modo di concepire e ragionare circa un oggetto (pensiero). Anticipando qualche dato, mi avvalgo delle discipline linguistiche, nell’ambito delle quali si parla dell’evoluzione non solo del linguaggio, ma anche della lingua. Ad esempio l’idea che una lingua sia meno complessa sintatticamente, come nel caso della lingua dei Pirahã del Sudamerica, ha generato il giudizio di “primitivismo” nei confronti del popolo che la parla da parte soprattutto di alcuni filochomskyiani e altri1. In altre scienze sociali, alcune manifestazioni culturali, come l’arte, vengono intese come “primitive” o “moderne”, oppure si parla di evoluzione di generi letterari. La dimostrazione forse più eclatante di questo antropocentrismo riguarda il problema del genere Homo, in cui l’avvento dell’Uomo Anatomicamente Moderno si fa coincidere con la nascita della cultura, utilizzando un doppio standard di modernità, visto che Neandertal fu probabilmente molto più simile a noi di quanto si tende a pensare2. L’utilizzo dell’idea di evoluzione come metafora può essere estremamente potente nell’ambiente accademico, ma occorre prestare attenzione alle sue possibili implicazioni. Il mio intento è quello di analizzare questa metafora usata comunemente all’interno delle varie discipline dal punto di vista della linguistica cognitiva (frames e metafore concettuali), mettendo in evidenza come il concetto target eredita delle implicazioni che emergono a causa delle qualità proprie del concetto source, per dimostrare che il modo in cui avviene il framing del concetto condiziona sovente la metodologia di studio, nonché la tassonomia applicata all’oggetto studiato.

Vito Evola evola@unipa.it 2008-10-16T13:47:59Z 2011-03-11T08:57:12Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6222 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6222 2008-10-16T13:47:59Z

The paper draws issue on the evolutionary economics that open our mind on seeing economy as growing and living organism with any characters of robustness, self-organization, adaptation, and evolution. This has been recognized, as in global picture, we enter the phase in which information and knowledge acquisition rapidly plays a major role in economy. The discussions is presented by demonstrating some qualitative properties and theoretical explorations on long range historical economic growth and development and thus followed by some highlights on innovation, creativity and elaborations regarding to fitness landscapes incorporating memetics, as works related to social and cultural aspects of social system, while talking about economic system in general. The discussions depicts some important notions on market and product diversifications that have been the source of the economic growth in general.

Hokky Situngkir hs@compsoc.bandungfe.net 2008-07-15T09:53:29Z 2011-03-11T08:57:09Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6120 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6120 2008-07-15T09:53:29Z

First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point is a scenario describing how evolution could have transformed a non self-conscious auto-representation into a conscious self-representation (Menant 2006). The scenario is based on the performance of inter-subjectivity existing among non human primates (Gardenfors 2006). A key item of the scenario is the identification of the auto-representation of a subject with the representations that the subject has of her conspecifics, the latter feeding the former with the meaning: “existing in the environment”. So during evolution, pre-human primates were brought to perceive their auto-representation as existing in the environment. Such process could have generated the initial elements of a conscious self-representation. We take this scenario as providing a possible rooting of human consciousness in evolution. We develop here a part of this scenario by expliciting the inward and outward components of the non self-conscious auto-representation. Inward components are about proprioception and interoception (thirst, pain, …). Outward components cover the sensory information relative to the perception of the body (seen feet, … ) and of its effects on the environment. We consider that the initial elements of a conscious self-representation have been applied to both inward and outward components of the auto-representation. We propose that the application to inward components made possible some first-person information, and that the application to outward components brought up third-person information. Relations between the two perspectives are highlighted. Such approach can root first-person and third-person perspectives in the same slot of human evolution. We conclude by a summary of the above and introduce a possible application of this approach to the concepts of bodily self and of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006).

Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2008-06-27T01:41:21Z 2011-03-11T08:57:08Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6108 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6108 2008-06-27T01:41:21Z

The notions of information, representation and enaction entertain historical and complex relations with cognition. Historical relations because representational structures belong to the central hypothesis of cognitive sciences. Complex relations because cognitive sciences apply the notion of representation to animals, humans and robots, and also because the enactive approach tends to disregard the GOFAI type of representations. In this wide horizon of relations, we propose to look at a systemic approach that could bring up a common denominator for information and representations in the build up of cognition, and also keep a link with the enactive approach. Our purpose is to show that systems submitted to constraints can generate meaningful information to maintain their natures, and consequently build up meaningful representations that have some compatibility with the enactive approach. Such a systemic approach to the notion of meaningful information could then make available a link between enaction and meaningful representations. The first part of the presentation is about reminding that cognition does not exist per se, but is related to the system that builds it. We look at cognition as constituted by dynamic meaningful representations built up by systems that have constraints to satisfy in their environments. Cognition is considered here at the level of the system that builds it and uses it in order to maintain its nature in its environment. Such a systemic approach fits with evolution. Organisms build representations to cope with survival constraints (frogs build representations of moving black dots in order to satisfy food constraints). Humans build representations and cognition to satisfy constraints that are conscious and unconscious. Artificial systems can use representations and cognition to run activities related to constraints implemented by the designers or coming from the environment (a goal to reach being considered as a constraint to satisfy). In the second part of the presentation we define what are a meaningful information and a representation for a system submitted to a constraint in its environment, and we link these to the enactive approach. We define a meaningful information (a meaning) as an information generated by a system submitted to a constraint when it receives an external information that has a connection with the constraint. The meaning is precisely that connection. The meaning belongs to the interactions that link the system to its environment. The function of the meaning is to participate to the determination of an action that will be implemented in order to satisfy the constraint. (Menant, 2003). The satisfaction of the constraint goes with maintaining the nature of the system in its environment. A Meaning Generator System (MGS) is defined correspondingly. It is a building block for higher level systems. We present some characteristics of the MGS (groundings of a meaning, domain of efficiency and transfer of meanings, networking of meanings, evolutionary usage). The MGS approach is close to a simplified version of the Peircean triadic theory of signs (Menant, 2003, 2005 ). We define the representation of an item for a system as being the dynamic set of meaningful information corresponding to the item for the system in its environments (an elementary representation being made of a single meaningful information). These representations link the system to its environment by their meaningful components related to the nature of the system. These representations are different from the GOFAI ones. The possibilities for linking these notions of meaning and representation with the enactive approach come from the structure of the MGS: the need for an action is the cause of the meaning generation by and for the system. The action on the environment is for the system to maintain its nature (its identity). The MGS links together the generation of meaningful representations, the nature of the system, and the interactions with the environment. This can be considered as close to enacting a world by meaning generation (Di Paolo and all 2007), and to the enactive concept of sense making (De Jaegher, Di Paolo 2007). We propose that basing the definition of a representation on the notion of meaningful information generated by a system submitted to a constraint can open a way for making the notion of representation compatible with the enactive approach. In the third part of the presentation, we consider some cases of meaningful information and representations for organisms and for robots. Regarding organisms, the MGS can be used in an evolutionary context by looking at the evolution of the systems and of the constraints. Purpose is to modelize the generation of meanings and of representations in order to make available a tool usable for different levels of evolution, as evolution has a place in cognitive sciences (Proust, 2007). Constraints for basic life are survival constraints (individual and species). Group life constraints are also to be considered. Reaching the level of humans in evolution brings in new constraints that cannot be clearly identified as they have to take into account human consciousness which is today a mystery (the “hard problem”). On an evolutionary standpoint, human constraints come in addition to the ones existing for non human organisms. We can make some hypothesis on the nature of human constraints (Maslow pyramid based constraints, anxiety limitation…). For robots, the MGS is initially based on the design of the robot. The meaning generated within a robot is initially derived from the constraints implemented by the designer and from the environment. But some non calculable or non predictable evolutions of the robot can introduce meanings that look proper to the robot. This last point can be linked to the notion of autonomy in robots. In such examples, the dynamic management of meanings thru the MGSs in their environments keeps the link with the enactive approach. We finish the presentation by summarising the points addressed and by proposing several continuations.

Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2008-04-07T21:06:26Z 2011-03-11T08:57:06Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6008 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6008 2008-04-07T21:06:26Z

Universal Grammar (UG) is a complicated set of grammatical rules that underlies our grammatical capacity. We all follow the rules of UG, but we were never taught them, and we could not have learned them from trial and error experience either (not enough data, or time). So UG must be inborn. But for similar reasons, it seems implausible that UG was “learned” by trial and error evolution either: What was the variation and competition? And what were UG’s adaptive advantages? So this leaves the hard problem of explaining where our brain’s UG capacity came from. Christiansen & Chater (C&C) suggest an answer: Language is an organism, like us, and our brains were not selected for UG capacity; rather, languages were selected for learnability with minimal trial and error experience by our brains. This explanation is circular: Where did our brains’ selective capacity to learn all and only UG-compliant languages come from? Chomsky suggests it might be a combination of optimality and logical necessity.

Stevan Harnad nielsseh@hotmail.com 2009-02-13T01:12:55Z 2011-03-11T08:57:18Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6345 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6345 2009-02-13T01:12:55Z

The “hypervigilance, escape, struggle, tonic immobility” evolutionarily hardwired acute peritraumatic response sequence is important for clinicians to understand. Our commentary supplements the useful article on human tonic immobility (TI) by Marx, Forsyth, Gallup, Fusé and Lexington (2008). A hallmark sign of TI is peritraumatic tachycardia, which others have documented as a major risk factor for subsequent posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). TI is evolutionarily highly conserved (uniform across species) and underscores the need for DSM-V planners to consider the inclusion of evolution theory in the reconceptualization of anxiety and PTSD. We discuss the relevance of evolution theory to the DSM-V reconceptualization of acute dissociativeconversion symptoms and of epidemic sociogenic disorder(epidemic “hysteria”). Both are especially in need of attention in light of the increasing threat of terrorism against civilians. We provide other pertinent examples. Finally, evolution theory is not ideology driven (and makes testable predictions regarding etiology in “both directions”). For instance, it predicted the unexpected finding that some disorders conceptualized in DSM-IV-TR as innate phobias are conditioned responses and thus better conceptualized as mild forms of PTSD. Evolution theory may offer a conceptual framework in DSM-V both for treatment and for research on psychopathology.

Dr. H. Stefan Bracha h.bracha@va.gov Dr. Jack D. Maser jmaser@ucsd.edu 2008-04-07T21:07:07Z 2011-03-11T08:57:06Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6004 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6004 2008-04-07T21:07:07Z

The paper reports a possibilities of musical traditions of ancient civilization who built the sites discovered in Gunung Padang, West Java, Indonesia. Particular group of the stones in the megalithic site happens to have relatively high frequency that might have correspondence with standard western musical scale. From the samples recorded at the site, we do the power spectral analysis to have the dominant frequency within the audio and mapped the result to MIDI numbers. We showed that the obtained four notes interestingly have particular places in modern musical scale.

Rolan Mauludy rmd@compsoc.bandungfe.net Hokky Situngkir hs@compsoc.bandungfe.net 2008-03-10T14:49:08Z 2011-03-11T08:57:04Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5950 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5950 2008-03-10T14:49:08Z

The idea of “hopeful monster” was proposed by Goldschmidt who envisioned that speciation could occur instantaneously via major chromosomal rearrangement in a one-step process; but he could not unravel how similar individual in the opposite sex to appear on the same time and location to generate next generation. This paper provides the answer for the challenge. In this paper, a model of speciation in animals is discussed in detail. Only four steps are needed to generate a new species in sexual animals: fraternal twin zygotes, similar gross mutation on the zygotes, self-splitting of mutated zygotes into two groups of identical zygotes of both sexes, development of zygotes with birth of babies, and inbreeding when they mature. The outcome of these steps is generation of new species with chromosomal homozygosity. Viviparous animals (living young not eggs are produced) are used to explain the model. With slight modifications, other asexual organisms could be accommodated. As the model provides the simplest explanation for speciation in all sexual animals, which plausibly explains many puzzles in biology; such as chicken egg, Cambrian explosion, appearance of new organs, etc. The author presents a few predictions that can be falsified. This model needs only one assumption and it is consistent with many well-known observations.

Dr. Jianyi Zhang jianyi.zhang@gmail.com 2008-01-15T23:56:22Z 2011-03-11T08:57:03Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5903 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5903 2008-01-15T23:56:22Z

We argue, using a mathematical model based on asymptotic limit theorems of probability theory, that mesoscale ecosystem resilience shifts can entrain punctuated events of gene expression and other cognitive phenomena on more rapid time scales, and, in part through such means, slower changes induced by selection pressures, triggering punctuated equilibrium Darwinian evolutionary transitions on geologic time scales. The model reduces ecosystem, cognitive, and Darwinian genetic dynamics to a least common denominator of information sources interacting by crosstalk at markedly different rates. Pettini's 'topological hypothesis', via a homology between information source uncertainty and free energy density, generates a statistical model of sudden coevolutionary phase transition based on the Rate Distortion and Shannon-McMillan Theorems of information theory which links all three levels. Holling's (1992) extended keystone hypothesis regarding the particular role of mesoscale phenomena in entraining both slower and faster dynamical structures produces the result. A main theme is the necessity of a 'cognitive paradigm' for gene expression, mirroring I. Cohen's cognitive paradigm for immune function.

Dr. Rodrick Wallace wallace@pi.cpmc.columbia.edu Dr. Deborah Wallace rdwall@ix.netcom.com 2008-03-10T14:53:52Z 2011-03-11T08:57:05Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5959 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5959 2008-03-10T14:53:52Z

Because human cognition is creative and socially situated, knowledge accumulates, diffuses, and gets applied in new contexts, generating cultural analogs of phenomena observed in population genetics such as adaptation and drift. It is therefore commonly thought that elements of culture evolve through natural selection. However, natural selection was proposed to explain how change accumulates despite lack of inheritance of acquired traits, as occurs with template-mediated replication. It cannot accommodate a process with significant retention of acquired or horizontally (e.g. socially) transmitted traits. Moreover, elements of culture cannot be treated as discrete lineages because they constantly interact and influence one another. It is proposed that what evolves through culture is the mind; ideas and artifacts are merely reflections of its current evolved state. Interacting minds transform (in part) through through a non-Darwinian autopoietic process similar to that by which early life evolved, involving not survival of the fittest but actualization of their potential.

Dr. Liane M. Gabora liane.gabora@ubc.ca 2008-08-10T08:56:48Z 2011-03-11T08:57:10Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6159 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6159 2008-08-10T08:56:48Z

We outline a theory of human agency and communication and discuss the role that the capability to share (that is, intersubjectivity) plays in it. All the notions discussed are cast in a mentalistic and radically constructivist framework. We also introduce and discuss the relevant literature.

Maurizio Tirassa tirassa@psych.unito.it Francesca M. Bosco bosco@psych.unito.it 2008-07-24T09:55:33Z 2011-03-11T08:57:09Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6134 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6134 2008-07-24T09:55:33Z

For most archaeologists the meaning of prehistoric art appears to be grounded upon, if not synonymous with, the notion of representation and symbolism. This paper explores the possibility that the depictions we see already 30,000 years before present, for instance, at the caves of Chauvet and Lascaux, before and beyond representing the world, they first bring forth a new process of acting within this world and at the same time of thinking about it. It is argued that the unique ability of those early depictions to disrupt or question the ways the world is experienced under normal conditions makes possible for the visual apparatus to interrogate itself and thus acquire a sense of perceptual awareness not previously available.

Lambros Malafouris lm243@cam.ac.uk 2009-04-21T02:36:59Z 2011-03-11T08:57:07Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6045 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6045 2009-04-21T02:36:59Z

The question that motivates the central hypothesis advanced in this paper regarding the emergence of early religious thinking is the following: ‘why does religion need material culture?’ What basic functional or symbolic need renders material culture an indispensable and universal component of religion and ritual activity? A common temptation, obvious in a number of recent archaeological and anthropological studies, is to seek an answer in the field of memory (Boyer 1993; 1996; 1998; 2001; McCauley and Lawson 2002; Whitehouse 2000; 2004; Mithen 1998a). This paper argues that material culture does much more than simply offer a symbolic channel for the externalization, communication, and thus successful cultural transmission, of religious ideas. Although the mnemonic significance of the ritual object is not denied, it is proposed that the argument from memory, as traditionally premised, fails to provide a cognitively adequate account of the complex affective ties and multimodal interactions that characterise the distinctive phenomenology of religious experience. Moreover, and from a long-term evolutionary perspective, it is argued that the commonly implied ontological priority of the religious idea, over its material expression, leaves us with no explanation about why,and how, religious concepts emerge in the context of human cognitive evolution. Drawing on the theoretical lines of the Material Engagement approach (Malafouris 2004; Renfrew 2004) I want to advance a different hypothesis that places material culture at the heart of the human capacity for religious thinking (cf. Day 2004).

Dr Lambros Malafouris lm243@cam.ac.uk, l.malafouris@gmail.com 2007-05-08Z 2011-03-11T08:56:50Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5542 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5542 2007-05-08Z

The paper report some experiments on the issue of human mating games and sexual preferences in the perspective of population and some macro-social realms. The notions of love, romance, fidelity, and sexual attractiveness are those comprising the theory to human intra-species evolution but yet still rare to be employed to understand human social, economic, and cultural studies in terms of sociology or economics. The paper did experiments on those issues, on the possible relation between population growth, power-law distribution of wealth, and some other relevant points to our realization of evolutionary theory of sexual selection. The paper expects to open an alternative bridge of our advancement in human evolution and the complexity of the social system.

Hokky Situngkir 2007-05-08Z 2011-03-11T08:56:50Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5509 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5509 2007-05-08Z

The paper brings two motivations to the theoretical explorations of social analysis. The first is to enrich the agent based computational sociology by incorporating the fuzzy set theory in to the computational modeling. This is conducted by showing the importance to include the fuzziness into artificial agent’s considerations and her way acquiring and articulate information. This is continued with the second motives to bring the Darwinian sexual selection theory – as it has been developed broadly in evolutionary psychology – into the analysis of social system including cultural analysis and other broad aspects of sociological fields. The two was combined in one computational model construction showing the fuzziness of mating choice, and how to have computational tools to explain broad fields of social realms. The paper ends with some opened further computer program development.

Hokky Situngkir 2007-06-07Z 2011-03-11T08:56:51Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5584 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5584 2007-06-07Z

The theory of natural selection cannot describe how early life evolved, in part because acquired characteristics are passed on through horizontal exchange. It has been proposed that culture, like life, began with the emergence of autopoietic form, thus its evolution too cannot be described by natural selection. The evolution of autopoietic form can be described using a framework referred to as Context-driven Actualization of Potential (CAP), which grew out of a generalization of the formalisms of quantum mechanics, and encompasses nondeterministic as well as deterministic change of state. The autopoietic structure that evolves through culture is the mind, or more accurately the conceptual network that yields an individual's internal model of the world. A branch of CAP research referred to as the state-context-property (SCOP) formalism provides a mathematical framework for reconciling the stability of conceptual structure with its susceptibility to context-driven change. The combination of two or more concepts (an extreme case of contextual influence), as occurs in insight, is modeled as a state of entanglement. Theoretical and empirical findings are presented that challenge assumptions underlying virtually all of cognitive science, such as the notion of spreading activation and the assumption that cognitive processes can be described with a Kolmogorovian probability model.

Dr. Liane M. Gabora 2008-03-10T14:49:25Z 2011-03-11T08:57:05Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5962 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5962 2008-03-10T14:49:25Z

The argument that heritable epigenetic change plays a distinct role in evolution would be strengthened through recognition that it is what bootstrapped the origin and early evolution of life, and like behavioral and symbolic change, is non-Darwinian. The mathematics of natural selection, a population-level process, is limited to replication with negligible individual-level change, i.e. that uses a self-assembly code.

Dr. L. M. Gabora liane.gabora@ubc.ca 2009-08-13T20:05:15Z 2011-03-11T08:57:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6590 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6590 2009-08-13T20:05:15Z

It appears to be a straightforward implication of distributed cognition principles that there is no integrated executive control system (e.g. Brooks 1991, Clark 1997). If distributed cognition is taken as a credible paradigm for cognitive science this in turn presents a challenge to volition because the concept of volition assumes integrated information processing and action control. For instance the process of forming a goal should integrate information about the available action options. If the goal is acted upon these processes should control motor behavior. If there were no executive system then it would seem that processes of action selection and performance couldn’t be functionally integrated in the right way. The apparently centralized decision and action control processes of volition would be an illusion arising from the competitive and cooperative interaction of many relatively simple cognitive systems. Here I will make a case that this conclusion is not well-founded. Prima facie it is not clear that distributed organization can achieve coherent functional activity when there are many complex interacting systems, there is high potential for interference between systems, and there is a need for focus. Resolving conflict and providing focus are key reasons why executive systems have been proposed (Baddeley 1986, Norman and Shallice 1986, Posner and Raichle 1994). This chapter develops an extended theoretical argument based on this idea, according to which selective pressures operating in the evolution of cognition favor high order control organization with a ‘highest-order’ control system that performs executive functions.

Dr Wayne Christensen wayne.christensen@gmail.com 2007-06-07Z 2011-03-11T08:56:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5585 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5585 2007-06-07Z

A perceived limitation of evolutionary art and design algorithms is that they rely on human intervention; the artist selects the most aesthetically pleasing variants of one generation to produce the next. This paper discusses how computer generated art and design can become more creatively human-like with respect to both process and outcome. As an example of a step in this direction, we present an algorithm that overcomes the above limitation by employing an automatic fitness function. The goal is to evolve abstract portraits of Darwin, using our 2nd generation fitness function which rewards genomes that not just produce a likeness of Darwin but exhibit certain strategies characteristic of human artists. We note that in human creativity, change is less choosing amongst randomly generated variants and more capitalizing on the associative structure of a conceptual network to hone in on a vision. We discuss how to achieve this fluidity algorithmically.

Dr. S. DiPaola Dr. L. Gabora 2007-03-07Z 2011-03-11T08:56:48Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5444 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5444 2007-03-07Z

A large family with six individuals exhibiting the Unertan syndrome (UTS) was identified residing in southern Turkey. All of the individuals had mental impairments and walked on all four extremities. The intra-familial marriages suggested that the UTS is an autosomal recessive disorder. The inferior portions of the cerebellum and vermis were absent as evidenced by MRI and CT scans. The height and head circumference of those affected were within normal ranges. Barany’s test suggested normal vestibular system function. The subjects could not name objects or their close relatives. The males (n = 4) could understand simple questions, answering them with only one or two sounds. The females (n = 2) were superior to the males with respect to language skills and walking, suggesting an association between walking and speaking abilities. One male exhibited three walking patterns at the same time: quadripedal, tiptoe, and scissor walking. Another male used two walking styles: quadripedal and toe-walking. It is emphasized that there are important differences between the UTS and the disequilibrium syndrome (DES). It is suggested that the inability to walk upright in those affected with the UTS may be best explained by a disturbance in lateral-balance mechanisms. An interruption of locomotor development during the transition from quadripedality to bipedality may result in habitual walking on all four extremities and is normal in some children. Since quadripedal gait is an ancestral trait, individuals with the UTS, exhibiting a manifestation of reverse evolution in humans, may be considered an experiment of nature, useful in understanding the mechanisms underlying the transition from quadripedality to bipedality during human evolution. The proposed mutant gene or gene pool playing a role in human quadrupedality may also be responsible for human bipedality at the same time. Herein there is no intent to insult or injure, rather this report is an endeavor to better understand human beings.

Prof. Dr. Uner TAN Dr. Sibel KARACA Assoc. Prof. Meliha TAN Dr. Bekir YILMAZ Dr. Namik Kemal BAGCI Dr. Ayhan OZKUR Assoc. Prof. Sadrettin PENCE 2008-03-10T14:53:07Z 2011-03-11T08:57:05Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5961 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5961 2008-03-10T14:53:07Z

Simonton (2006) makes the unwarranted assumption that nonmonotonicity supports a Darwinian view of creativity. Darwin’s theory of natural selection was motivated by a paradox that has no equivalent in creative thought: the paradox of how change accumulates when acquired traits are not inherited. To describe a process of cumulative change in which acquired traits are retained is outside of the scope of the theory of natural selection. Even the early evolution of life itself (prior to genetically mediated template replication) cannot be described by natural selection. Specifically, natural selection cannot describe change of state that involves horizontal (Lamarckian) exchange, or occurs through interaction with an incompletely specified context. It cannot describe change wherein variants are evaluated sequentially, and wherein this evaluation can itself change the state space and/or fitness function, because no two variants are ever evaluated according to the same selection criterion. Concerns are also raised as to the methodology used in Simonton’s study.

Dr. L. M. Gabora liane.gabora@ubc.ca 2007-08-30Z 2011-03-11T08:56:57Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5689 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5689 2007-08-30Z

This paper discusses the benefits of describing the world as information, especially in the study of the evolution of life and cognition. Traditional studies encounter problems because it is difficult to describe life and cognition in terms of matter and energy, since their laws are valid only at the physical scale. However, if matter and energy, as well as life and cognition, are described in terms of information, evolution can be described consistently as information becoming more complex. The paper presents five tentative laws of information, valid at multiple scales, which are generalizations of Darwinian, cybernetic, thermodynamic, and complexity principles. These are further used to discuss the notions of life and cognition and their evolution.

Dr Carlos Gershenson 2006-12-12Z 2011-03-11T08:56:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5294 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5294 2006-12-12Z

This article uses coordinated database, physics and evolutionary considerations to suggest how the mind stores and processes its data. A) The comparison is made between the capabilities of the mind and those of a modern relational database while conserving phenomenality. The strong structural similarity of the two systems leads to the conclusion that the mind may be profitably described as being a network of “mental databases” (i.e. databases with phenomenal capability). This is the MD hypothesis. The need for bidirectional material-to-mental bridging and addressing indexes is shown. This is the Neural Index (NI) hypothesis. The MD and NI hypotheses taken together constitute the MDNI hypothesis. B) A strength shown by the MDNI theory is that it engenders proposals for answering questions relating to gaps in current knowledge. Among others, examples are: Question 1) How does the brain show such plasticity in repairing injuries? Answer 1) By recreating indexes from protected mental data. Q2) What are the Darwinian advantages of consciousness? A2) Economy of material resources such as brain weight and facilitation of evolution, among others. Q3) Why can’t the NCC of phenomenal events, such as the feeling of pain, be seen through scanning and other brain activity investigation methods? A3) They take place in the mental domain. Q4) Is consciousness causal or epiphenomenal? A4) Causal. C) The MDNI hypothesis is situated in a Penrosian expanded physical environment requiring Darwinian evolutionary continuity, modularity and phenomenality. This last property cannot in principle be generated or even simulated in Turing machines (i.e. all digital computers) modeling the brain, however much complexity, multiprocessing and interconnection takes place. The MDNI hypothesis is shown to contribute to the clarification of other matters concerning the brain/mind, such as its stability, causality and binding capabilities. It is also used to give a new interpretation of Libet’s work. The concept of the progressive “emergence” of consciousness as biological evolution advanced is shown to be false because consciousness must have existed from a relatively early period in brain evolution. D) The question of what neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) between sensorimotor data and instrumented observation one can hope to obtain using current biophysics is investigated. It is deduced that what is seen using the various brain investigation methods reflects only that material part of current activity transactions (e.g. visualizing) which update and interrogate the mind, but not the contents of the integrated mental database which constitutes the mind itself. This approach yields reasons why there is much neural activity in an area to which a conscious function is ascribed (e.g. the amygdala is associated with fear), yet there is no visible part of the brain’s electromagnetic or quantum activity which can be clearly identified as phenomenal.

Mr Ken Brown 2006-08-06Z 2011-03-11T08:56:33Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5046 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5046 2006-08-06Z

n/a

Dr. Stefan Bracha Dr. O. Joseph Bienvenu Dr. Donald A. Person 2006-04-01Z 2011-03-11T08:56:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4811 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4811 2006-04-01Z

The basic philosophy of mainstream biology, the philosophy of materialist realism, assumes the existence of a material world independent of human observation and cognition. The scientific study of cognition in the context of biological evolution (CE) has, however, led to the result, that all our thoughts and cognitions, including the assumption of a material world, are dependent on our cognitive apparatus in its present stage of evolution. I think, this result is in contradiction with the materialist philosophy, and I therefore find, it is impossible to make a contradiction-free account of CE based on this philosophy. An account of natural science, biological evolution, and CE based on an idealist philosophy is offered, and it is argued that this account is free of contradictions. In the idealist philosophy "material objects" are regarded as concepts based on sensory experiences.

Dr. Axel Randrup 2006-04-29Z 2011-03-11T08:54:28Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1171 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1171 2006-04-29Z

Human evolution is a multidisciplinary problem, one of its aspects is the origin and development of distinctively human psychological features. Cognitive properties (language, symbolic thinking) are considered as such features and numerous authors hypothesize its evolution. We suggest that the most important human characteristic is connected with motivation rather than cognition; this is the ability to construct and maintain long-term goal-directed processes having no biological basis. Once emerged, this new ability determined evolution. Human language arose from the need to subserve group activities directed at achieving long-term goals. Abstract thinking resulted from the extraction of nonperceptual features through the regular and purposive usage of various objects. The comparison of this hypothesis against other evolutionary models is discussed.

Pavel N. Prudkov 2006-12-12Z 2011-03-11T08:56:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5296 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5296 2006-12-12Z

In the human sciences, cultural evolution is often viewed as an autonomous process free of genetic influence. A question that follows is, If culture is not influenced by genes, can it take any path? Employing a simple mathematical model of cultural transmission in which individuals may copy each other's traits, we show that cultural evolution favors individuals who are weakly influenced by others and able to influence others. The model suggests that the cultural evolution of rules of cultural transmission tends to create populations that evolve rapidly toward conservatism, and that bias in cultural transmission may result purely from cultural dynamics. Freedom from genetic influence is not freedom to take any direction.

Stefano Ghirlanda Magnus Enquist Mayuko Nakamaru 2006-08-01Z 2011-03-11T08:56:32Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5017 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5017 2006-08-01Z

The creative re-use of existing cognitive capacities may have played a significant role in the evolutionary development of the brain. There are obvious evolutionary advantages to such redeployment, and the data presented here confirm three important empirical predictions of this account of the development of cognition: (1) a typical brain area will be utilized by many cognitive functions in diverse task categories, (2) evolutionarily older brain areas will be deployed in more cognitive functions and (3) more recent cognitive functions will utilize more, and more widely scattered brain areas. These findings have implications not just for our understanding of the evolutionary origins of cognitive function, but also for the practice of both clinical and experimental neuroscience.

Prof. Michael L. Anderson 2006-07-03Z 2011-03-11T08:56:28Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4957 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4957 2006-07-03Z

It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about elements of the environment including conspecifics, and can also represent parts of the subject without refering to a notion of self (we introduce the notion of "auto-representation" that does not carry the notion of self-representation). Next step uses the performance of intersubjectivity (mirror neurons level in evolution) where a subject has the capability to mentally simulate the observed action of a conspecific (Gallese 2001). We propose that this intersubjectivity allows the subject to identify his auto-representation with the representations of his conspecifics, and so to consider his auto-representation as existing in the environment. We show how this evolutionary stage can introduce a notion of self-representation for a subject, opening a road to self-conciousness and to self. This evolutionary approach to the self via self- representation is close to the current theory of the self linked to representations and simulations (Metzinger 2003). We use a scenario about how evolution has brought the performance of self-representation to self-consciousness. We develop a process describing how the anxiety increase resulting from identification with endangered or suffering conspecifics may have called for the development of tools to limit this anxiety (empathy, imitation, language), and how these tools have accelerated the evolutionary process through a positive feedback on intersubjectivity (Menant 2004, 2005). We finish by summarizing the points addressed, and propose some possible continuations.

Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2006-04-21Z 2011-03-11T08:56:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4843 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4843 2006-04-21Z

The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an overall presentation, the first part introduces a usage related representation as being an information managed by a system submitted to a constraint that has to be satisfied. We consider that such a system can generate a meaningful information by comparing its constraint to a received information (Menant 2003). We define a representation as being made of the received information and of the meaningful information. Such approach allows groundings in and out for the representation relatively to the system. The second part introduces the two types of representations we want to focus on for living organisms: representations of conspecifics and auto-representation, the latter being defined without using a notion of self-representation. Both types of representations have existed for our pre-human ancestors which can be compared to today great apes.In the third part, we use the performance of intersubjectivity as identified in group life with the presence of mirror neurons in the organisms. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the 90‘s (Rizzolatti & al.1996, Gallese & al.1996). The level of intersubjectivity that can be attributed to non human primates as related to mirror neurons is currently a subject of debate (Decety 2003). We consider that a limited intersubjectivity between pre-human primates made possible a merger of both types of representations. The fourth part proposes that such a merger of representations feeds the auto-representation with the meanings associated to the representations of conspecifics, namely the meanings associated to an entity perceived as existing in the environment. We propose that auto-representation carrying these new meanings makes up the first elements of self-representation. Intersubjectivity has allowed auto-representation to evolve into self-representation, avoiding the homunculus risk. The fifth part is a continuation to other presentations (Menant 2004, 2005) about possible evolution of self-representation into self-consciousness. We propose that identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has increased anxiety, and that the tools used to limit this anxiety (development of empathy, imitation, language and group life) have provided a positive feedback on intersubjectivity and created an evolutionary engine for the organism. Other outcomes have also been possible. Such approach roots consciousness in emotions. The evolutionary scenario proposed here does not introduce explicitly the question of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). This question is to be addressed later with the help of this scenario.The conclusion lists the points introduced here with their possible continuations.

Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2007-06-07Z 2011-03-11T08:56:51Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5582 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5582 2007-06-07Z

It is important to be clear as to whether a theory such as evolutionary archaeology pertains to biological evolution, in which acquired change is obliterated at the end of each generation, or cultural change, in which acquired change is retained. In evolutionary archaeology, (1) the population is said to consist of artifacts, yet (2) artifacts are said to be phenotypic. Neither (1) nor (2) is necessarily problematic in and of itself, but the two are inconsistent, as the first pertains to cultural change whereas the second to the biological evolution of humans. A first step to avoiding this problem is to recognize that there is a need for a theory of change specific to human culture. Referring to ongoing work using a related approach to cultural change, it is suggested that the inconsistencies in evolutionary archaeology, though problematic, are not insurmountable.

Dr. Liane M. Gabora 2006-12-03Z 2011-03-11T08:56:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5270 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5270 2006-12-03Z

ABSTRACT. What potential exists for improvements in the functioning of consciousness? The paper addresses this issue using global workspace theory. According to this model, the prime function of consciousness is to develop novel adaptive responses. Consciousness does this by putting together new combinations of knowledge, skills and other disparate resources that are recruited from throughout the brain. The paper’s search for potential improvements in the functioning of consciousness draws on studies of the shift during human development from the use of implicit knowledge to the use of explicit (declarative) knowledge. These studies show that the ability of consciousness to adapt a particular domain improves significantly as the transition to the use of declarative knowledge occurs in that domain. However, this potential for consciousness to enhance adaptability has not yet been realised to any extent in relation to consciousness itself. The paper assesses the potential for adaptability to be improved by the conscious adaptation of key processes that constitute consciousness. A number of sources (including the practices of religious and contemplative traditions) are drawn on to investigate how this potential might be realised.

John E Stewart 2006-07-03Z 2011-03-11T08:56:28Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4952 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4952 2006-07-03Z

The debate over the evolution of an innate language capacity seems to divide into two principle camps. The neo-Darwinian approach generally argues that human psychological modules, including the language faculty, must have arisen gradually and incrementally having been honed by natural selection. Thus Pinker, when theorizing about language evolution, sees ``no reason to doubt that the principle explanation is the same as for any other complex instinct or organ, Darwin's theory of natural selection" (Pinker, 1994, 333). However, as Knight et al. (2000) have pointed out, little attention has been paid by the neo-Darwinian approach to address the causes of the emergence of novelty. The saltationist approach gleans much of its evidence from the archaeological and paleontological record, which is interpreted as unsupportive of the neo-Darwinian paradigm. Jackendoff (1999) accuses those who do not accept that language arose gradually through natural selection as having been ``forced to devalue evolutionary argumentation". Jackendoff's concern seems to stem from the view that there is only one way that evolution can proceed, through gradual change driven by natural selection. My concern is for the neglect of the vast amount of evidence supporting the theory that modern humans did not emerged in a gradual, step-wise fashion, so there is no reason to believe that cognition and language evolved in this manner. Here I argue that hominins evolved through major evolutionary leaps, which may have numbered only two or three significant mutation ``events". Neoteny (the retention of infant or juvenile growth rates) appears to have been a major force in the evolution of our primate ancestors and this process can explain the sudden emergence of many of the traits that define what it means to be human. Further evidence from the fossil and archaeological record supports a ``sudden" emergence of human cognition and language.

Susan J. Lanyon 2007-06-07Z 2011-03-11T08:56:51Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5583 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5583 2007-06-07Z

The improbability of a spontaneously generated self-assembling molecule has suggested that life began with a set of simpler, collectively replicating elements, such as an enclosed autocatalytic set of polymers (or protocell). Since replication occurs without a self-assembly code, acquired characteristics are inherited. Moreover, there is no strict distinction between alive and dead; one can only infer that a protocell was alive if it replicates. These features of early life render natural selection inapplicable to the description of its change-of-state because they defy its underlying assumptions. Moreover, natural selection describes only randomly generated novelty; it cannot describe the emergence of form at the interface between organism and environment. Self-organization is also inadequate because it is restricted to interactions amongst parts; it too cannot account for context-driven change. A modified version of selection theory or self-organization would not work because the description of change-of-state through interaction with an incompletely specified context has a completely different mathematical structure, i.e. entails a non-Kolmogorovian probability model. It is proposed that the evolution of early life is appropriately described as lineage transformation through context-driven actualization of potential (CAP), with self-organized change-of-state being a special case of no contextual influence, and competitive exclusion of less fit individuals through a selection-like process possibly (but not necessarily) playing a secondary role. It is argued that natural selection played an important role in evolution only after genetically mediated replication was established.

Dr. Liane M. Gabora 2006-08-01Z 2011-03-11T08:56:33Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5036 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5036 2006-08-01Z

Objective: The research agenda for the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) has emphasized the need for a more etiologically-based classification system, especially for stress-induced and fear-circuitry disorders. Testable hypotheses based on threats to survival during particular segments of the human era of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) may be useful in developing a brain-evolution-based classification for the wide spectrum of disorders ranging from disorders which are mostly overconsolidationally such as PTSD, to fear-circuitry disorders which are mostly innate such as specific phobias. The recently presented Paleolithic-human-warfare hypothesis posits that blood–injection phobia can be traced to a “survival (fitness) enhancing” trait, which evolved in some females of reproductive-age during the millennia of intergroup warfare in the Paleolithic EEA. The study presented here tests the key a priori prediction of this hypothesis—that current blood–injection phobia will have higher prevalence in reproductive-age women than in post-menopausal women. Method: The Diagnostic Interview Schedule (version III-R) , which included a section on blood and injection phobia, was administered to 1920 subjects in the Baltimore ECA Follow-up Study. Results: Data on BII phobia was available on 1724 subjects (1078 women and 646 males) . The prevalence of current blood– injection phobia was 3.3% in women aged 27–49 and 1.1% in women over age 50 (OR 3.05, 95% CI 1.20–7.73) . [The corresponding figures for males were 0.8% and 0.7% (OR 1.19, 95% CI 0.20–7.14)] . Conclusions: This epidemiological study provides one source of support for the Paleolithic-human-warfare (Paleolithic-threat) hypothesis regarding the evolutionary (distal) etiology of bloodletting-related phobia, and may contribute to a more brain- evolution-based re-conceptualization and classification of this fear circuitry-related trait for the DSM-V. In addition, the finding reported here may also stimulate new research directions on more proximal mechanisms which can lead to the development of evidence-based psychopharmacological preventive interventions for this common and sometimes disabling fear-circuitry disorder.

Dr. Stefan Bracha Dr. O. Joseph Bienvenu Dr. William W. Eaton 2006-08-01Z 2011-03-11T08:56:33Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5033 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5033 2006-08-01Z

In a series of recent articles, we suggest that family dentists, military dentists and psychiatrists with expertise in posttraumatic stress disorder (especially in the Veterans Health Administration) are likely to see an increased number of patients with symptomatic jaw-clenching and early stages of tooth- grinding (Bracha et al., 2005). Returning warfighters and other returnees from military deployment may be especially at risk for high rates of clenching- induced masticatory muscle disorders at early stages of incisor grinding. The literature we have recently reviewed strongly supports the conclusion that clenching and grinding may primarily be a manifestation of experiencing extreme fear or severe chronic distress (respectively). We have recently reviewed the clinical and paleoanthropological literature and have noted that ancestral warfare and ancestral combat, in the early Paleolithic Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) may be a neglected factor explaining the conservation of the archaic trait of bite-muscle strengthening. We have hypothesized that among ancestral warriors, jaw clenching may have rapidly strengthened the two primary muscles involved in biting, the masseter muscles and the much larger temporalis muscles. The strengthening of these muscles may have served the purpose of enabling a stronger, deeper, and therefore more lethal, defensive bite for early Paleolithic humans. The neuroevolutionary perspective presented here may be novel to many dentists. However, it may be useful in patient education and in preventing progression from jaw-clenching to chronic facial pain.

Dr. Stefan Bracha Dr., COL, MC Donald A. Person Dr. David M. Bernstein Dr. Norman A. Flaxman Nicole K. Masukawa 2006-09-25Z 2011-03-11T08:56:34Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5084 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5084 2006-09-25Z

In a series of recent articles, we suggest that family dentists, military dentists and psychiatrists with expertise in posttraumatic stress disorder (especially in the Veterans Health Administration) are likely to see an increased number of patients with symptomatic jaw-clenching and early stages of tooth- grinding (Bracha et al., 2005). Returning warfighters and other returnees from military deployment may be especially at risk for high rates of clenching- induced masticatory muscle disorders at early stages of incisor grinding. The literature we have recently reviewed strongly supports the conclusion that clenching and grinding may primarily be a manifestation of experiencing extreme fear or severe chronic distress (respectively). We have recently reviewed the clinical and paleoanthropological literature and have noted that ancestral warfare and ancestral combat, in the early Paleolithic Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) may be a neglected factor explaining the conservation of the archaic trait of bite-muscle strengthening. We have hypothesized that among ancestral warriors, jaw clenching may have rapidly strengthened the two primary muscles involved in biting, the masseter muscles and the much larger temporalis muscles. The strengthening of these muscles may have served the purpose of enabling a stronger, deeper, and therefore more lethal, defensive bite for early Paleolithic humans. The neuroevolutionary perspective presented here may be novel to many dentists. However, it may be useful in patient education and in preventing progression from jaw-clenching to chronic facial pain.

Dr. Stefan Bracha Dr., COL, MC Donald A. Person Dr. David M. Bernstein Dr. Norman A. Flaxman Nicole K. Masukawa 2005-05-14Z 2011-03-11T08:56:03Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4349 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4349 2005-05-14Z

Symmetry is an important concept in biology, being related to mate selection strategies, health, and survival of species. In human faces, the relevance of left-right symmetry to attractiveness and health is not well understood. We compared the appearance of facial attractiveness, health, and symmetry in three separate experiments. Participants inspected front views of faces on the computer screen and judged them on a 5-point scale according to their attractiveness in Experiment 1, health in Experiment 2, and symmetry in Experiment 3. We found that symmetry and attractiveness were not strongly related in faces of women or men while health and symmetry were related. There was a significant difference between attractiveness and symmetry judgments but not between health and symmetry judgments. Moreover, there was a significant difference between attractiveness and health. Facial symmetry may be critical for the appearance of health but it does not seem to be critical for the appearance of attractiveness, not surprisingly perhaps because human faces together with the human brain have been shaped by adaptive evolution to be naturally asymmetrical.

D. W. Zaidel S. M. Aarde K. Baig 2006-04-08Z 2011-03-11T08:56:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4823 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4823 2006-04-08Z

HOW CHILDREN ACQUIRE LANGUAGE Over the last few decades research into child language acquisition has been revolutionized by the use of ingenious new techniques which allow one to investigate what in fact infants (that is children not yet able to speak) can perceive when exposed to a stream of speech sound, the discriminations they can make between different speech sounds, differentspeech sound sequences and different words. However on the central features of the mystery, the extraordinarily rapid acquisition of lexicon and complex syntactic structures, little solid progress has been made. The questions being researched are how infants acquire and produce the speech sounds (phonemes) of the community language; how infants find words in the stream of speech; and how they link words to perceived objects or action, that is, discover meanings. In a recent general review in Nature of children's language acquisition, Patricia Kuhl also asked why we do not learn new languages as easily at 50 as at 5 and why computers have not cracked the human linguistic code. The motor theory of language function and origin makes possible a plausible account of child language acquisition generally from which answers can be derived also to these further questions. Why computers so far have been unable to 'crack' the language problem becomes apparent in the light of the motor theory account: computers can have no natural relation between words and their meanings; they have no conceptual store to which the network of words is linked nor do they have the innate aspects of language functioning - represented by function words; computers have no direct links between speech sounds and movement patterns and they do not have the instantly integrated neural patterning underlying thought - they necessarily operate serially and hierarchically. Adults find the acquisition of a new language much more difficult than children do because they are already neurally committed to the link between the words of their first language and the elements in their conceptual store. A second language being acquired by an adult is in direct competition for neural space with the network structures established for the first language.

Robin Allott 2005-12-19Z 2011-03-11T08:56:14Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4647 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4647 2005-12-19Z

Selection theory requires multiple, distinct, simultaneously-actualized states. In cognition, each thought or cognitive state changes the 'selection pressure' against which the next is evaluated; they are not simultaneously selected amongst. Creative thought is more a matter of honing in a vague idea through redescribing successive iterations of it from different real or imagined perspectives; in other words, actualizing potential through exposure to different contexts. It has been proven that the mathematical description of contextual change of state introduces a non-Kolmogorovian probability distribution, and a classical formalism such as selection theory cannot be used. This paper argues that creative thought evolves not through a Darwinian process, but a process of context-driven actualization of potential.

Dr. Liane M. Gabora 2006-05-25Z 2011-03-11T08:56:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4876 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4876 2006-05-25Z

It is reported a great variety of functional actions of GABA in auditory system. Although many studies reports the presence and distribution of GABA receptors; nevertheless, the studies about the inhibitory GABA-dependent neurons distribution in the Inferior Culliculus are scarce. We are interested in studies on the role played by GABAergic neurons in the acoustic information transmission in the Central Nucleus of Inferior Culliculus. The existence and distribution of GABAergic neurons in CNIC, could give us understandings on how the inhibitory actions of neurotransmitters are participating in ways which the information flow is spatial-temporal associated with the firing synchrony in each isofrequency region. And with these results, we could achieve some insights over the emergence of certain mind properties from neurons dynamic interactions.

Walter Riofrio coldriver Luis Angel Aguilar 2005-09-18Z 2011-03-11T08:56:10Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4533 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4533 2005-09-18Z

Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here.

Christophe Menant 2006-08-01Z 2011-03-11T08:56:33Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5035 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5035 2006-08-01Z

The Paleolithic-Threat hypothesis reviewed here posits that habitual efferent fainting can be traced back to fear-induced allelic polymorphisms that were selected into some genomes of anatomically, mitochondrially, and neurally modern humans (Homo sapiens sapiens) in the Mid-Paleolithic because of the survival advantage they conferred during periods of inescapable threat. We posit that during Mid-Paleolithic warfare an encounter with “a stranger holding a sharp object” was consistently associated with threat to life. A heritable hard- wired or firm-wired (prepotentiated) predisposition to abruptly increase vagal tone and collapse flaccidly rather than freeze or attempt to flee or fight in response to an approaching sharp object, a minor injury, or the sight of blood, polymorphism for the hemodynamically “paradoxical” flaccid- immobility in response to these stimuli may have increased some non-combatants’ chances of survival. This is consistent with the unusual age and sex pattern of fear-induced fainting. The Paleolithic-Threat hypothesis also predicts a link to various hypo-androgenic states (e.g. low dehydroxyepiandrosterone-sulfate. We offer five predictions testable via epidemiological, clinical, and ethological/primatological methods. The Paleolithic-Threat hypothesis has implications for research in the aftermath of man-made disasters, such as terrorism against civilians, a traumatic event in which this hypothesis predicts epidemics of fear-induced fainting

Dr. Stefan Bracha Adam S. Bracha Dr. Andrew E. Williams Tyler C. Ralston Jennifer M. Matsukawa 2005-09-18Z 2011-03-11T08:56:10Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4531 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4531 2005-09-18Z

Information and meaning exist around us and within ourselves, and the same information can correspond to different meanings. This is true for humans and animals, and is becoming true for robots. We propose here an overview of this subject by using a systemic tool related to meaning generation that has already been published (C. Menant, Entropy 2003). The Meaning Generator System (MGS) is a system submitted to a constraint that generates a meaningful information when it receives an incident information that has a relation with the constraint. The content of the meaningful information is explicited, and its function is to trigger an action that will be used to satisfy the constraint of the system. The MGS has been introduced in the case of basic life submitted to a "stay alive" constraint. We propose here to see how the usage of the MGS can be extended to more complex living systems, to humans and to robots by introducing new types of constraints, and integrating the MGS into higher level systems. The application of the MGS to humans is partly based on a scenario relative to the evolution of body self-awareness toward self-consciousness that has already been presented (C. Menant, Biosemiotics 2003, and TSC 2004). The application of the MGS to robots is based on the definition of the MGS applied to robots functionality, taking into account the origins of the constraints. We conclude with a summary of this overview and with themes that can be linked to this systemic approach on meaning generation.

Christophe Menant crmenant@free.fr 2006-07-03Z 2011-03-11T08:56:28Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4951 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4951 2006-07-03Z

The debate over the evolution of an innate language capacity seems to divide into two principle schools of thought. Jackendoff (1999a, 1999b) has argued that language processing is based on three autonomous generative components, phonological, syntactic, and semantic/conceptual and he is committed to the view that the language faculty evolved incrementally through natural selection. Pinker (1994, 333) also sees ``no reason to doubt that the principle explanation is the same as for any other complex instinct or organ, Darwin's theory of natural selection", when theorizing about language evolution. An alternative approach has been taken recently by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002). They argue that the property that makes human language unique (recursion), may be a recent emergence in hominid evolution. It follows from this line of thought that most of the anatomical characteristics that support language (e.g. vocal tract and controlled breathing) may be merely variations of previously evolved biological structures, and not of a different kind. Leaving aside the argument of whether these structures evolved gradually, they did not evolve nor were they ``tuned" to serve the faculty of language. Jackendoff (1999a) accuses those who do not accept that language arose gradually through natural selection as having been ``forced to devalue evolutionary argumentation". Jackendoff's concern seems to stem from the view that there is only one way that evolution can proceed, through gradual change honed by natural selection. My concern is for the neglect of the vast amount of evidence supporting the theory that modern humans did not emerged in a gradual, step-wise fashion. Here I argue that hominins evolved through major evolutionary leaps, which may have numbered only two or three significant mutation ``events". Neoteny (the retention of infant or juvenile growth rates) has been the major force in the evolution of our primate ancestors and this process can explain the sudden emergence of many of the traits that define what it means to be human, including the sudden emergence of human cognition and language.

Susan J. Lanyon 2004-12-25Z 2011-03-11T08:55:47Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3991 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3991 2004-12-25Z

Cellular phone is one of the most developing technological artifacts today. The evolution occurs through random innovation. Our effort is trying to view the evolution of this artifact from memetic’s point of view. By constructing a phylomemetic tree based on cellular phone memes to infer or estimate the evolutionary history and relationship among cellular phone. We adopt several methods, which are commonly used in constructing phylogenetic tree, they are UPGMA algorithm and Parsimony Maximum algorithm to construct cellphone phylomemetic tree. Therefore we compare with the innovation tree, which is based on serial number and their appearance time. From phylomemetic tree, we then analyze the process of a cellular phone innovation through looking out on the cellular phone type lies in the same cluster. The comparison of the simulation tree result shows a generally different branching pattern, giving a presumption that innovation in cellular phone is not really relating with their serial number, but occurs merely because of random mutation of allomeme design and competes with its technological development.

Mr. Deni Khanafiah Mr. Hokky Situngkir 2007-03-06Z 2011-03-11T08:56:47Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5433 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5433 2007-03-06Z

A common method of improving how well understood a theory is, is by comparing it to another theory which has been better developed. Radical interpretation is a theory which attempts to explain how communication has meaning. Radical interpretation is treated as another time dependent theory and compared to the time dependent theory of biological evolution. Several similarities and differences are uncovered. Biological evolution can be gradual or punctuated. Whether radical interpretation is gradual or punctuated depends on how the question is framed: on the coarse-grained time scale it proceeds gradually, but on the fine-grained time scale it proceeds by punctuated equilibria. Biological evolution proceeds by natural selection, the counterpart to this is the increase in both correspondence and coherence. Exaption, mutations, and spandrels have counterparts metaphor, speech errors, and puns respectively. Homologous and analogs have direct counterparts in specific words. The most important differences originate from the existence of a unit of inheritance (the traditional gene) occurring in biological evolution - there is no such unit in language.

Mark D.Roberts 2004-01-11Z 2011-03-11T08:55:27Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3373 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3373 2004-01-11Z

The scientific study of cognition in the context of biological evolution (Cognition and Evolution, CE) has led to the result, that all our thoughts and cognitions, including science and philosophy, are dependent on our cognitive apparatus in its present stage of evolution. I find, that this result is in contradiction with the basic philosophy of mainstream biology, the philosophy of materialist realism, which recognizes the existence a material world independent of human observation and cognition. I ther efore regard it as impossible to make a contradiction-free account of CE based on materialist realism (including "hypothetical realism"). An account of natural science, biological evolution, and CE based on an idealist philosophy is offered, and it is argued that this account is free of contradictions. Key words : Cognition and biological evolution, contradiction-free account, philosophy of science, idealist philosophy, materialist philosophy, time, psychological Now.d

Dr. Axel Randrup 2004-02-03Z 2011-03-11T08:55:28Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3418 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3418 2004-02-03Z

An idea is not a replicator because it does not consist of coded self-assembly instructions. It may retain structure as it passes from one individual to another, but does not replicate it. The cultural replicator is not an idea but an associatively-structured network of them that together form an internal model of the world, or worldview. A worldview is a primitive, uncoded replicator, like the autocatalytic sets of polymers widely believed to be the earliest form of life. Primitive replicators generate self-similar structure, but because the process happens in a piecemeal manner, through bottom-up interactions rather than a top-down code, they replicate with low fidelity, and acquired characteristics are inherited. Just as polymers catalyze reactions that generate other polymers, the retrieval of an item from memory can in turn trigger other items, thus cross-linking memories, ideas, and concepts into an integrated conceptual structure. Worldviews evolve idea by idea, largely through social exchange. An idea participates in the evolution of culture by revealing certain aspects of the worldview that generated it, thereby affecting the worldviews of those exposed to it. If an idea influences seemingly unrelated fields this does not mean that separate cultural lineages are contaminating one another, because it is worldviews, not ideas, that are the basic unit of cultural evolution.

Dr. Liane Gabora 2011-05-02T17:19:18Z 2011-05-02T17:19:18Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7243 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7243 2011-05-02T17:19:18Z

Holland has elucidated the new paradigm of self-organization in complex adaptive systems. This paradigm holds for all living systems, including the personality. In conjunction with the theory of archetypes, self-organization suggests two radical hypotheses, one about early development, the other about the origins of autism. Autism is associated with several medical conditions, with genetic markers, and with infant visual deprivation. None of these factors, however, is either necessary or sufficient to cause autism. It is proposed that each of these factors increases the probability of a primary psychological deficit: failure in the first few weeks to acquire (or retain) the image of the mother’s eyes. These hypotheses were derived from analytic work with patients who have early narcissistic injury and with patients who have mild autistic traits. Both diagnoses may arise from the same initial disturbance: Symington and others have argued that autism is an extreme form of infantile narcissism. Indirect evidence for the image-of-the-eyes hypotheses comes from the evolution of primates, from infant-mother observations, from observations of infant vision, and from experiments on vision in other vertebrates. Byrd recently confirmed that the incidence of autism is increasing dramatically. The image-of-the-eyes hypotheses suggest that this increase may be due to the increased use, in early infancy, of non-maternal childcare including television and video. The search for environmental triggers for autism must be interdisciplinary. This paper makes a timely contribution to that search.

Dr Maxson McDowell maxmcdowell@jungny.com 2004-11-20Z 2011-03-11T08:55:44Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3953 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3953 2004-11-20Z

The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. We offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the problems of error and of representation of fictional and abstract entities.

Dr. Gregg Rosenberg Dr. Michael L. Anderson 2006-12-12Z 2011-03-11T08:56:44Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5299 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5299 2006-12-12Z

In recent years, it has become apparent that behavioural and brain lateralization is the rule rather than the exception among vertebrates. The study of lateralization has been so far the province of neurology and neuropsychology. We show how such research can be integrated with evolutionary biology to more fully understand lateralization. In particular, we address the fact that, within a species, left- and right-type individuals are often in a definite proportion different from 1/2 (e.g., hand use in humans). We argue that traditional explanations of brain lateralization (that it may avoid costly duplication of neural circuitry and reduce interference between functions) cannot account for this fact, because increased individual efficiency is unre- lated to the frequency of left- and right-type individuals in a population. A further puzzle is that, if a majority of individuals are of the same type, individual behaviour becomes more predictable to other organisms. Here we show that alignment of the direction of behavioural asymmetries in a population can arise as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behaviour with that of other asymmetrical organisms. Thus, brain and behavioural lateralization, as we know it in humans and other vertebrates, may have evolved under basically "social" selection pressures.

Stefano Ghirlanda Giorgio Vallortigara 2004-08-13Z 2011-03-11T08:55:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3715 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3715 2004-08-13Z

The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions.

Christophe R. Menant 2004-03-17Z 2011-03-11T08:55:29Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3494 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3494 2004-03-17Z

Random Boolean Network has been used to find out regulation patterns of genes in organism. This approach is very interesting to use in a game such as N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here we assume that agent’s action is influenced by input in the form of choices of cooperate or defect she accepted from other agent or group of agents in the system. Number of cooperators, pay-off value received by each agent, and average value of the group, are observed in every state, from initial state chosen until it reaches its state-cycle attractor. In simulation performed here, we gain information that a system with large number agents based on action on input K equals to two, will reach equilibrium and stable condition over strategies taken out by its agents faster than higher input, that is K equals to three. Equilibrium reached in longer interval, yet it is stable over strategies carried out by agents.

Hokky Situngkir Deni Khanafiah 2003-12-13Z 2011-03-11T08:55:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3306 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3306 2003-12-13Z

An approach to robotics called layered evolution and merging features from the subsumption architecture into evolutionary robotics is presented, its advantages and its relevance for science and engineering are discussed. This approach is used to construct a layered controller for a simulated robot that learns which light source to approach in an environment with obstacles. The evolvability and performance of layered evolution on this task is compared to (standard) monolithic evolution, incremental and modularised evolution. To test the optimality of the evolved solutions the evolved controller is merged back into a single network. On the grounds of the test results, it is argued that layered evolution provides a superior approach for many tasks, and future research projects involving this approach are suggested.

Mr Julian Togelius 4535 2003-09-19Z 2011-03-11T08:55:20Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3145 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3145 2003-09-19Z

Using neuroimaging experiments and neuropsychological case studies, Keenan mainly examines the neural basis of mirror self-recognition (MSR) and Theory of Mind (TOM), and proposes that self-awareness is dominantly associated with areas of the right hemisphere. I believe that this conclusion is both inflated and premature. MSR is only superficially related to genuine, fully mature human self-awareness. Furthermore, TOM should not be equated with self-awareness because some forms of it (e.g., self-rumination) actually interfere with thinking about others' mental states. One more general (and serious) problem with the book is the proposal that because MSR and TOM are mainly generated by right hemispheric activity, then it follows that self-awareness itself is associated with activity of the same hemisphere. Recent studies on autobiographical memory and self-description also indicate left hemispheric activity

Alain Morin 2004-06-28Z 2011-03-11T08:55:37Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3694 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3694 2004-06-28Z

We propose here to clarify some of the relations existing between information and meaning by showing how meaningful information can be generated by a system submitted to a constraint. We build up definitions and properties for meaningful information, a meaning generator system and the domain of efficiency of a meaning (to cover cases of meaningful information transmission). Basic notions of information processing are used.

Christophe Menant 2004-07-30Z 2011-03-11T08:55:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3726 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3726 2004-07-30Z

The “Kennewick Man” controversy is an extremely important case in the history of American anthropology. As anthropologists with backgrounds in American Indian studies and American archaeology, we have a particular interest in this case. In this paper we present our perspective on the Kennewick Man case as anthropologists with expertise in archaeology, Pacific Northwest precontact history, Plateau ethnology, and cultural resource law. In general we find that the August 30, 2000, decision of Magistrate John Jelderks of the United States District Court for the district of Oregon to be incorrect and without anthropological foundation. Based on an analysis of the evidence reviewed by the Department of the Interior and Magistrate Jelderks we conclude that the Department of the Interior made a reasonable decision in determining that a preponderance of the evidence supports repatriation of the Kennewick Man to the defendants.

Peter N. Jones Darby Stapp 2006-08-01Z 2011-03-11T08:56:33Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5037 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5037 2006-08-01Z

n/a

Dr. Stefan Bracha Jennifer M. Yamashita Tyler Ralston Dr. Jeffrey Lloyd-Jones G. A. Nelson Dr. David M. Bernstein Dr. Norman Flaxman Frederick Gusman 2006-12-08Z 2011-03-11T08:56:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5280 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5280 2006-12-08Z

Organisms can learn by individual experience to recognize relevant stimuli in the environment or they can genetically inherit this ability from their parents. Here, we ask how these two modes of acquisition affect signal evolution, focusing in particular on the exaggeration and cost of signals. We argue first, that faster learning by individual receivers cannot be a driving force for the evolution of exaggerated and costly signals unless signal senders are related or the same receiver and sender meet repeatedly. We argue instead that biases in receivers’ recognition mechanisms can promote the evolution of costly exaggeration in signals. We provide support for this hypothesis by simulating coevolution between senders and receivers, using artificial neural networks as a model of receivers’ recognition mechanisms. We analyse the joint effects of receiver biases, signal cost and mode of acquisition, investigating the circumstances under which learned recognition gives rise to more exaggerated signals than inherited recognition. We conclude the paper by discussing the relevance of our results to a number of biological scenarios.

Masashi Kamo Stefano Ghirlanda Magnus Enquist 2004-02-13Z 2011-03-11T08:55:28Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3435 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3435 2004-02-13Z

Sound is a medium used by humans to carry information. The existence of this kind of medium is a pre-requisite for language. It is organized into a code, called speech, which provides a repertoire of forms that is shared in each language community. This code is necessary to support the linguistic interactions that allow humans to communicate. How then may a speech code be formed prior to the existence of linguistic interactions? Moreover, the human speech code is characterized by several properties: speech is digital and compositional (vocalizations are made of units re-used systematically in other syllables); phoneme inventories have precise regularities as well as great diversity in human languages; all the speakers of a language community categorize sounds in the same manner, but each language has its own system of categorization, possibly very different from every other. How can a speech code with these properties form? These are the questions we will approach in the paper. We will study them using the method of the artificial. We will build a society of artificial agents, and study what mechanisms may provide answers. This will not prove directly what mechanisms were used for humans, but rather give ideas about what kind of mechanism may have been used. This allows us to shape the search space of possible answers, in particular by showing what is sufficient and what is not necessary. The mechanism we present is based on a low-level model of sensory-motor interactions. We show that the integration of certain very simple and non language-specific neural devices allows a population of agents to build a speech code that has the properties mentioned above. The originality is that it pre-supposes neither a functional pressure for communication, nor the ability to have coordinated social interactions (they do not play language or imitation games). It relies on the self-organizing properties of a generic coupling between perception and production both within agents, and on the interactions between agents.

Dr. Pierre-Yves Oudeyer 2005-02-22Z 2011-03-11T08:55:51Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4108 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4108 2005-02-22Z

Sound is a medium used by humans to carry information. The existence of this kind of medium is a pre-requisite for language. It is organized into a code, called speech, which provides a repertoire of forms that is shared in each language community. This code is necessary to support the linguistic interactions that allow humans to communicate. How then may a speech code be formed prior to the existence of linguistic interactions? Moreover, the human speech code is characterized by several properties: speech is digital and compositional (vocalizations are made of units re-used systematically in other syllables); phoneme inventories have precise regularities as well as great diversity in human languages; all the speakers of a language community categorize sounds in the same manner, but each language has its own system of categorization, possibly very different from every other. How can a speech code with these properties form? These are the questions we will approach in the paper. We will study them using the method of the artificial. We will build a society of artificial agents, and study what mechanisms may provide answers. This will not prove directly what mechanisms were used for humans, but rather give ideas about what kind of mechanism may have been used. This allows us to shape the search space of possible answers, in particular by showing what is sufficient and what is not necessary. The mechanism we present is based on a low-level model of sensory-motor interactions. We show that the integration of certain very simple and non language-specific neural devices allows a population of agents to build a speech code that has the properties mentioned above. The originality is that it pre-supposes neither a functional pressure for communication, nor the ability to have coordinated social interactions (they do not play language or imitation games). It relies on the self-organizing properties of a generic coupling between perception and production both within agents, and on the interactions between agents.

Pierre-Yves Oudeyer 2002-08-04Z 2011-03-11T08:54:57Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2360 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2360 2002-08-04Z

Female remating is the fundamental to evolutionary biology as it determines the pattern of sexual selection and sexual conflict. Remating in females is an important component of Drosophila mating systems because it is associated with pattern of sperm usage and sexual selection. Remating is common in females of many species of Drosophila in both natural and laboratory populations. It is reported in many insect species and vertebrates also. Female remating is prerequisite for the occurrence of sperm competition between the males and the consequences of this competition such as sperm precedence or sperm displacement have also been reported in many species of Drosophila. Female remating is dependent on the amount of sperm stored, the components of male seminal fluid, the level of nutrition and egg-laying, in laboratory by different experimental designs and density of flies. Remating by female is an insurance against male sterility and sub-fertility and result in increasing the genetic heterogeneity of a female offspring. Remating results in greater productivity in females of many species of Drosophila. In this paper we review the female remating with respect to sperm competition and sexual selection in Drosophila and have given the possible female’s benefits of remating. We also review the role of accessory gland fluid in remating, cost associated with remating and genetic basis of female remating and some possible mechanisms of sperm competition in the light of last male sperm priority and paternity assurance in Drosophila and other insects. We have also suggested the future area of research.

Dr. Shree Ram Singh Dr. B N Singh Dr. H F Hoenigsberg 2002-08-31Z 2011-03-11T08:54:59Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2440 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2440 2002-08-31Z

JohnnyVon is an implementation of self-replicating automata in continuous two-dimensional space. Two types of particles drift about in a virtual liquid. The particles are automata with discrete internal states but continuous external relationships. Their internal states are governed by finite state machines but their external relationships are governed by a simulated physics that includes brownian motion, viscosity, and spring-like attractive and repulsive forces. The particles can be assembled into patterns that can encode arbitrary strings of bits. We demonstrate that, if an arbitrary “seed” pattern is put in a “soup” of separate individual particles, the pattern will replicate by assembling the individual particles into copies of itself. We also show that, given sufficient time, a soup of separate individual particles will eventually spontaneously form self-replicating patterns. We discuss the implications of JohnnyVon for research in nanotechnology, theoretical biology, and artificial life.

Arnold Smith Peter Turney peter.turney Robert Ewaschuk 2004-07-30Z 2011-03-11T08:55:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3725 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3725 2004-07-30Z

Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and Y chromosome studies have been used increasingly over the last 20 years by anthropological geneticists and others to reconstruct the peopling of the Americas as well as to infer American Indian cultural affiliation and demographic histories. While the promise of this method is great, there are several problems inherent in some of its current uses. These limitations are discussed concerning the following six currently accepted methods: interpretation of coalescent times as times of origin; 2) the current uses of haplogroups; 3) sample sizes; 4) use of language groups to define population groups; 5) use of contemporary American Indian reservations to infer prehistoric tribal history; and 6) a combination of these to determine American Indian population history, historic migrations, and demographic history. This paper concludes that caution must be exercised in claiming too much for the method. Instead, it is recommend that it be used in conjunction with other established sources of data such as oral history, ethnography, linguistics, and archaeology when attempting to reconstruct American Indian cultural history or in determining the cultural affiliation of groups.

Peter N. Jones 2002-01-11Z 2011-03-11T08:54:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2014 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2014 2002-01-11Z

(summary of the whole book) This volume provides a comprehensive survey of computational models and methodologies used for studying the origin and evolution of language and communication. With contributions from the most influential figures in the field, Simulating the Evolution of Language presents and summarises current computational approaches to language evolution and highlights new lines of development. Among the main discussion points are: · Analysis of emerging linguistic behaviours and structures · Demonstration of the strict interaction and interdependence between language and other non-linguistic abilities · Direct comparisons between simulation studies and empirical research Essential reading for researchers and students in the areas of evolutionary and adaptive systems, language evolution, modelling and linguistics, it will also be of particular interest to computer scientists working on multi-agent systems, robotics and internet agents.

Angelo Cangelosi Domenico Parisi 2004-07-13Z 2011-03-11T08:55:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3713 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3713 2004-07-13Z

Biosemiotics and Semiotics have similarities and differences. Both deal with signal and meaning. One difference is that Biosemiotics covers a domain (life) that is less complex that the one addressed by Semiotics (human). We believe that this difference can be used to have Biosemiotics bringing added value to Semiotics. This belief is based on the fact that a theory of meaning is easier to build up for living elements than for humans, and that the results obtained for life can make available some tools for a higher level of complexity. Semiotic has been encountering some difficulties to deliver a scientific theory of meaning that can be efficient at the level of human mind. The obstacles come from our ignorance on the nature of human. As it is true that we do not understand the nature of human mind on a scientific basis. On the other hand, the nature and properties of life are better understood. And we can propose a modelization for a generation of meaningful information in the field of elementary life. Once such a modelization is established, it is possible to look at extending it to the domain of human life. Such an approach on a theory of meaning (begininig in Biosemiotics and aiming at Semiotics), is what we present in this paper. Taking an elementary living element as reference, we introduce the bases of a systemic theory of meaning. Using a simple living system submitted to a constraint, we define a meaningful information, a meaning generator system and some elements related to meaningful information transmission. We then try to identify the hypothesis that need to be taken into account so the results obtained for living elements can be extended to human.

Christophe R. Menant 2007-04-04Z 2011-03-11T08:56:49Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5484 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5484 2007-04-04Z

Biosemiotics and Semiotics have similarities and differences. Both deal with signal and meaning. One difference is that Biosemiotics covers a domain (life) that is less complex that the one addressed by Semiotics (human). We believe that this difference can be used to have Biosemiotics bringing added value to Semiotics. This belief is based on the fact that a theory of meaning is easier to build up for living elements than for humans, and that the results obtained for life can make available some tools for a higher level of complexity. Semiotic has been encountering some difficulties to deliver a scientific theory of meaning that can be efficient at the level of human mind. The obstacles come from our ignorance on the nature of human. As it is true that we do not understand the nature of human mind on a scientific basis. On the other hand, the nature and properties of life are better understood. And we can propose a modelization for a generation of meaningful information in the field of elementary life. Once such a modelization is established, it is possible to look at extending it to the domain of human life. Such an approach on a theory of meaning (begininig in Biosemiotics and aiming at Semiotics), is what we present in this paper. Taking an elementary living element as reference, we introduce the bases of a systemic theory of meaning. Using a simple living system submitted to a constraint, we define a meaningful information, a meaning generator system and some elements related to meaningful information transmission. We then try to identify the hypothesis that need to be taken into account so the results obtained for living elements can be extended to human.

Christophe Menant 2002-12-18Z 2011-03-11T08:55:07Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2665 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2665 2002-12-18Z

Ongoing "spontaneous" electrical field potentials of assemblies of neurons in the brains of diverse animal groups differ widely in character and amplitude without obvious explanation. There may be correlates with other measures of brain complexity, such as histological differentiation but there are so far no known differences between the EEG s of humans and other mammals or between mammals and reptiles, amphibians or fish, apart from amplitude. The proposition is defended that further search for descriptors or statistical, probably non-linear features of the time series will reveal consistent differences - meaning that we have so far missed major features of the natural history of EEGs, just as we have, thus far, relatively neglected the identification of features of the physiology of the brain relevant to its evolution of complexity through major grades of phyla, classes and orders.

T.H. Bullock 2003-02-17Z 2011-03-11T08:55:10Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2777 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2777 2003-02-17Z

Ongoing “spontaneous” electrical field potentials of assemblies of neurons in the brains of diverse animal groups differ widely in character and amplitude without obvious explanation. There may be correlates with other measures of brain complexity, such as histological differentiation but there are so far no known differences between the EEG s of humans and other mammals or between mammals and reptiles, amphibians or fish, apart from amplitude. The proposition is defended that further search for descriptors or statistical, probably non-linear features of the time series will reveal consistent differences - meaning that we have so far missed major features of the natural history of EEGs, just as we have, thus far, relatively neglected the identification of features of the physiology of the brain relevant to its evolution of complexity through major grades of phyla, classes and orders.

T.H. Bullock 2002-05-04Z 2011-03-11T08:54:55Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2202 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2202 2002-05-04Z

A deduction is produced from three allometric scaling laws, showing cortical surface area scales one-to-one with body surface area as a general but, ex hypothesi, highly consistent principle across Mammalia.

Mark Reid 2006-12-08Z 2011-03-11T08:56:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5277 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5277 2006-12-08Z

In studies of both animal and human behaviour, game theory is used as a tool for understanding strategies that appear in interactions between individuals. Game theory focuses on adaptive behaviour, which can be attained only at evolutionary equilibrium. Here we suggest that behaviour appearing during interactions is often outside the scope of such analysis. In many types of interaction, conflicts of interest exist between players, fueling the evolution of manipulative strategies. Such strategies evolve out of equilibrium, commonly appearing as spectacular morphology or behaviour with obscure meaning, to which other players may react in non-adaptive, irrational way approach, and outline the conditions in which evolutionary equilibria cannot be maintained. Evidence from studies of biological interactions seems to support the view that behaviour is often not at equilibrium. This also appears to be the case for many human cultural traits, which have spread rapidly despite the fact that they have a negative influence on reproduction.

Magnus Enquist Anthony Arak Stefano Ghirlanda Carl-Adam Wachtmeister 2002-04-05Z 2011-03-11T08:54:54Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2163 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2163 2002-04-05Z

Evolutionary theory proposes that adaptive traits are reproduced more successfully than maladaptive traits. Accordingly, natural selection should favour heterosexuality as it facilitates reproduction and the propagation of genes. However, the question becomes, what has maintained homosexuality in a small but consistent percentage of the human population? Research into the evolutionary and hormonal factors associated with a homosexual orientation have yielded provocative but inconsistent results. It also suggests that human sexual orientation, and in particular homosexual orientation, is too complex to be described by one simple model or a single research discipline. The current paper treads a new path and emphasises an integrative approach for the understanding of homosexuality. The authors examine the combined effects of evolutionary factors and neurohormonal processes on the development of a homosexual orientation. It is suggested that research into the topic could benefit from an examination of and change in some of the assumptions upon which much past research has been based.

Frank Muscarella Bernhard Fink Karl Grammer Michael Kirk-Smith 2002-05-29Z 2011-03-11T08:54:55Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2228 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2228 2002-05-29Z

Evolutionary theory proposes that adaptive traits are reproduced more successfully than maladaptive traits. Accordingly, natural selection should favour heterosexuality as it facilitates reproduction and the propagation of genes. However, the question becomes, what has maintained homosexuality in a small but consistent percentage of the human population? Research into the evolutionary and hormonal factors associated with a homosexual orientation have yielded provocative but inconsistent results. It also suggests that human sexual orientation, and in particular homosexual orientation, is too complex to be described by one simple model or a single research discipline. The current paper treads a new path and emphasises an integrative approach for the understanding of homosexuality. The authors examine the combined effects of evolutionary factors and neurohormonal processes on the development of a homosexual orientation. It is suggested that research into the topic could benefit from an examination of and change in some of the assumptions upon which much past research has been based.

Frank Muscarella Bernhard Fink Karl Grammer Michael Kirk-Smith 2001-12-01Z 2011-03-11T08:54:50Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1948 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1948 2001-12-01Z

ABSTRACT—In Drosophila ananassae, female remating with respect to productivity and sperm displace-ment was studied by employing different mutant strains and a wild type strain. In all the experiments, the continuous confinement technique was used. The comparison of productivity between once-mated (control) and remated females reveals that the productivity of remated females is significantly higher than that of once-mated ones in all the crosses. The P2´ values (the proportion of second male progeny produced after remating) were calculated to test sperm displacement in each cross of remated females. In all the crosses, high P2´ values (0.91–0.94) were found which indicate sperm precedence of second male to mate suggest-ing the existence of sperm displacement in D. ananassae. Furthermore, female productivity is increased after remating in D. ananassae.

Shree Ram Singh 2002-01-16Z 2011-03-11T08:54:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2036 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2036 2002-01-16Z

Using neural nets to simulate learning and the genetic algorithm to simulate evolution in a toy world of mushrooms and mushroom-foragers, we place two ways of acquiring categories into direct competition with one another: In (1) "sensorimotor toil,” new categories are acquired through real-time, feedback-corrected, trial and error experience in sorting them. In (2) "symbolic theft,” new categories are acquired by hearsay from propositions – boolean combinations of symbols describing them. In competition, symbolic theft always beats sensorimotor toil. We hypothesize that this is the basis of the adaptive advantage of language. Entry-level categories must still be learned by toil, however, to avoid an infinite regress (the “symbol grounding problem”). Changes in the internal representations of categories must take place during the course of learning by toil. These changes can be analyzed in terms of the compression of within-category similarities and the expansion of between-category differences. These allow regions of similarity space to be separated, bounded and named, and then the names can be combined and recombined to describe new categories, grounded recursively in the old ones. Such compression/expansion effects, called "categorical perception" (CP), have previously been reported with categories acquired by sensorimotor toil; we show that they can also arise from symbolic theft alone. The picture of natural language and its origins that emerges from this analysis is that of a powerful hybrid symbolic/sensorimotor capacity, infinitely superior to its purely sensorimotor precursors, but still grounded in and dependent on them. It can spare us from untold time and effort learning things the hard way, through direct experience, but it remain anchored in and translatable into the language of experience.

Angelo Cangelosi Stevan Harnad 2001-02-10Z 2011-03-11T08:54:30Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1298 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1298 2001-02-10Z

Neural networks that learn the What and Where task perform better if they possess a modular architecture for separately processing the identity and spatial location of objects. In previous simulations the modular architecture either was hardwired or it developed during an individual's life based on a preference for short connections given a set of hardwired unit locations. We present two sets of simulations in which the network architecture is genetically inherited and it evolves in a population of neural networks in two different conditions: (1) both the architecture and the connection weights evolve; (2) the network architecture is inherited and it evolves but the connection weights are learned during life. The best results are obtained in condition (2). Condition (1) gives unsatisfactory results because (a) adapted sets of weights can suddenly become maladaptive if the architecture changes, (b) evolution fails to properly assign computational resources (hidden units) to the two tasks, (c) genetic linkage between sets of weights for different modules can result in a favourable mutation in one set of weights being accompanied by an unfavourable mutation in another set of weights.

Andrea Di Ferdinando Raffaele Calabretta Domenico Parisi 2002-08-04Z 2011-03-11T08:54:57Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2359 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2359 2002-08-04Z

Within the current theory of evolution, the development in the direction of higher complexity is taken to be a necessary condition. This gives birth to a problem why this direction is prevalent for evolution. Philosophers and scientists tried to substantiate this condition and to explain it, yet the question still remains open. Our aim is to find specific regularities in nature that make complexity the chosen direction. Three main causes for this direction are deduced from initial principles, assuming that information and energy are the vital nutrients for evolution. Consequently, we base our explication and explanation of causes on the principles of information theory, Ashby’s principle of requisite variety/complexity, as well as we suggest and ground some additional principles of the system development. This makes possible to separate three principal stages for evolution of living organisms: biological, neurological, and epistemological.

Dr. Mark Burgin Irving Simon 2008-11-23T09:12:25Z 2011-03-11T08:57:16Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6279 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6279 2008-11-23T09:12:25Z

Information and meanings are present everywhere around us and within ourselves. Specific studies have been implemented in order to link information and meaning: - Semiotics/Biosemiotics - Phenomenology - Analytic Philosophy, linguistics - Psychology No general coverage is available for the notion of meaning. We propose to complement this lack by a systemic approach to meaning generation

Mr Christophe Menant christophe.menant@hotmail.fr 2003-10-14Z 2011-03-11T08:55:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3219 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3219 2003-10-14Z

The title is not a metaphor, though past tense might be better as this chapter is about how each of the many hundred abrupt coolings of the last several million years could have served as a pump stroke, each elevating intelligence a small increment - even though what natural selection was operating on was not intelligence per se. While we often use the term 'intelligence' to encompass both a broad range of abilities and the efficiency with which they're enacted, it also implies flexibility and creativity, an "ability to slip the bonds of instinct and generate novel solutions to problems" (Gould and Gould 1994, p. 70). Those three pillars of animal intelligence - association, imitation, and insight - are also impressive (Byrne 1994), as are the occasional symbolic (Deacon 1997) and reasoning (Gould & Gould, 1998) abilities. But Piaget (1929; 1952) said that intelligence is what you use when you don't know what to do, when neither innateness nor learning has prepared you for the particular situation.

William H Calvin 2001-06-19Z 2011-03-11T08:54:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1615 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1615 2001-06-19Z

Many special problems crop up when evolutionary theory turns, quite naturally, to the question of the adaptive value and causal role of consciousness in human and nonhuman organisms. One problem is that -- unless we are to be dualists, treating it as an independent nonphysical force -- consciousness could not have had an independent adaptive function of its own, over and above whatever behavioral and physiological functions it "supervenes" on, because evolution is completely blind to the difference between a conscious organism and a functionally equivalent (Turing Indistinguishable) nonconscious "Zombie" organism: In other words, the Blind Watchmaker, a functionalist if ever there was one, is no more a mind reader than we are. Hence Turing-Indistinguishability = Darwin-Indistinguishability. It by no means follows from this, however, that human behavior is therefore to be explained only by the push-pull dynamics of Zombie determinism, as dictated by calculations of "inclusive fitness" and "evolutionarily stable strategies." We are conscious, and, more important, that consciousness is piggy-backing somehow on the vast complex of unobservable internal activity -- call it "cognition" -- that is really responsible for generating all of our behavioral capacities. Hence, except in the palpable presence of the irrational (e.g., our sexual urges) where distal Darwinian factors still have some proximal sway, it is as sensible to seek a Darwinian rather than a cognitive explanation for most of our current behavior as it is to seek a cosmological rather than an engineering explanation of an automobile's behavior. Let evolutionary theory explain what shaped our cognitive capacity (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 1996, but let cognitive theory explain our resulting behavior.

Stevan Harnad 2002-07-16Z 2011-03-11T08:54:57Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2324 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2324 2002-07-16Z

What genotypic features explain the evolvability of organisms that have to accomplish many different tasks? The genotype of behaviorally complex organisms may be more likely to encode modular neural architectures because neural modules dedicated to distinct tasks avoid neural interference, i.e., the arrival of conflicting messages for changing the value of connection weights during learning. However, if the connection weights for the various modules are genetically inherited, this raises the problem of genetic linkage: favorable mutations may fall on one portion of the genotype encoding one neural module and unfavorable mutations on another portion encoding another module. We show that this can prevent the genotype from reaching an adaptive optimum. This effect is different from other linkage effects described in the literature and we argue that it represents a new class of genetic constraints. Using simulations we show that sexual reproduction can alleviate the problem of genetic linkage by recombining separate modules all of which incorporate either favorable or unfavorable mutations. We speculate that this effect may contribute to the taxonomic prevalence of sexual reproduction among higher organisms. In addition to sexual recombination, the problem of genetic linkage for behaviorally complex organisms may be mitigated by entrusting evolution with the task of finding appropriate modular architectures and learning with the task of finding the appropriate connection weights for these architectures.

Raffaele Calabretta Andrea Di Ferdinando Günter P. Wagner Domenico Parisi 2007-04-04Z 2011-03-11T08:56:49Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5479 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5479 2007-04-04Z

This is the official printed Russian summary of PhD Thesis, describing a series of studies of the phenotypic organization and ecological significance of individual differences in fish behavior. The following species were studied: guppy Poecilia retuculata, lion-headed cichlid Steatocranus cassuarius, convict cichlid Archocentrus nigrofasciatum, wrasses Symphodus ocellatus, S. tinca, and two species of sturgeons Acipenser stellatus and A. gueldenstaedti. In this Thesis, I developed methods for the analysis of individual differences in fish behavior and studied their structure, development, and ecological and evolutionary significance.

Dr. Sergey Budaev 2000-10-24Z 2011-03-11T08:54:25Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1051 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1051 2000-10-24Z

Behavior analysis is properly part of evolutionary biology, because only evolutionary theory can explain the origins of behavior and because behavior analysis follows the same mode of explanation as evolutionary theory. The resemblance among operant shaping, cultural evolution, and genetic evolution appears clearly only in the light of a general concept of evolutionary process. Every evolutionary process consists of three elements: variation, recurrence, and selection. Evolutionarily significant variation occurs among substitutable variants within a pool. These variants are defined by differences in their environmental effects. Although the metaphor of copying characterizes recurrence in genetic evolution, replication is only one type of recurrence. In cultural and operant evolution, mechanisms like stimulus control and induction cause the recurrence of the variants. Selection occurs when recurrence is differential. Differences in environmental effects produce differences in recurrence, and those differences feed back to affect the composition of the pool of variants. This general view of evolutionary process clarifies the distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations of behavior. Genetic, cultural, and operant evolution all admit of this distinction, because they all distinguish advantageous mechanisms from a history of advantage. Proximate explanations deal with the ?expression? of variants, whereas ultimate explanations deal with the feedback from environmental effects to the frequencies of variants in the pool. The three evolutionary processes may be seen as nested: cultural evolution within genetic evolution, and operant evolution within cultural evolution. A complete understanding of human behavior requires constructing six types of explanation: proximate and ultimate explanations in all three processes.

William M. Baum 2000-07-17Z 2011-03-11T08:54:21Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/870 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/870 2000-07-17Z

Humans, but no other animal, make meaningful use of spoken language. What is unclear, however, is whether this capacity depends on a unique constellation of perceptual and neurobiological mechanisms, or whether a subset of such mechanisms are shared with other organisms. To explore this problem, we conducted parallel experiments on human newborns and cotton-top tamarin monkeys to assess their ability to discriminate unfamiliar languages. Using a habituation-dishabituation procedure, we show that human newborns and tamarins can discriminate sentences from Dutch and Japanese, but not if the sentences are played backwards. Moreover, the cues for discrimination are not present in backward speech. This suggests that the human newborns' tuning to certain properties of speech relies on general processes of the primate auditory system.

Franck Ramus Marc D. Hauser Cory Miller Dylan Morris Jacques Mehler 2000-01-28Z 2011-03-11T08:53:41Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/132 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/132 2000-01-28Z

The isocortex is a distinctive feature of the mammalian brain, which has no clear counterpart in the cerebral hemispheres of other amniotes. Historically, there have been long-standing controversies regarding possible homologues of this structure in reptiles and birds. In these vertebrate classes, a structure denominated dorsal ventricular ridge develops in the lateral aspect of the hemisphere and, like the mammalian isocortex, receives ascending auditory and visual tectofugal projections. On these grounds, it has been postulated that part of the dorsal ventricular ridge is homologue to part of the mammalian isocortex (i.e. the auditory and the extrastriate visual cortices). Dissenting views have claimed that the dorsal ventricular ridge originates from a topographically different part of the hemisphere than the isocortex, and therefore there is no embryonic similarity between these two structures. Furthermore, recent evidence on the expression patterns of regulatory genes strongly suggests that a large part of the dorsal ventricular ridge arises from a region denominated the intermediate territory or ventral pallium, which in mammals gives rise to parts of the amygdalar complex among other structures. Considering that embryological criteria are in some cases more reliable to determine homology than comparisons of adult states, we are inclined for the developmental approach, which prescribes non-homology between the isocortex and the dorsal ventricular ridge. Additionally, we suggest a scenario for the origin of the isocortex as an expansion of the reptilian dorsal cortex, which is consistent with current evidence.

Francisco Aboitiz Daniver Morales Juan. Montiel 2003-12-13Z 2011-03-11T08:55:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3311 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3311 2003-12-13Z

The origin of the alphabet has long been a subject for research, speculation and myths. How to explain its survival and effectiveness over thousands of years? One approach is in terms of the practical problems faced by the originator of the alphabet: another would examine the archaeological record; a third might focus on the perceptual process by which the alphabet makes rapid reading possible. It is proposed that the alphabet originated in an intellectual sequence similar to that followed by Alexander Bell and Henry Sweet in constructing their Visible and Organic Alphabets.The originator of the alphabet used the same kind of introspective analysis of his own speech sounds and of the manner in which they were articulated. This was the vital step. The next step was to represent the articulatory differences in terms of visual patterns. One way to understand what might have been involved is to attempt to replicate the process oneself.

Robin Allott 2001-02-12Z 2011-03-11T08:54:29Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1296 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1296 2001-02-12Z

The evolution of simulated robots with three different architectures is studied. We compared a non-modular feed forward network, a hardwired modular and a duplication-based modular motor control network. We conclude that both modular architectures outperform the non-modular architecture, both in terms of rate of adaptation as well as the level of adaptation achieved. The main difference between the hardwired and duplication-based modular architectures is that in the latter the modules reached a much higher degree of functional specialization of their motor control units with regard to high level behavioral functions. The hardwired architectures reach the same level of performance, but have a more distributed assignment of functional tasks to the motor control units. We conclude that the mechanism through which functional specialization is achieved is similar to the mechanism proposed for the evolution of duplicated genes. It is found that the duplication of multifunctional modules first leads to a change in the regulation of the module, leading to a differentiation of the functional context in which the module is used. Then the module adapts to the new functional context. After this second step the system is locked into a functionally specialized state. We suggest that functional specialization may be an evolutionary absorption state.

Raffaele Calabretta 2001-02-12Z 2011-03-11T08:54:32Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1304 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1304 2001-02-12Z

The evolution of simulated robots with three different architectures is studied. We compared a non-modular feed forward network, a hardwired modular and a duplication-based modular motor control network. We conclude that both modular architectures outperform the non-modular architecture, both in terms of rate of adaptation as well as the level of adaptation achieved. The main difference between the hardwired and duplication-based modular architectures is that in the latter the modules reached a much higher degree of functional specialization of their motor control units with regard to high level behavioral functions. The hardwired architectures reach the same level of performance, but have a more distributed assignment of functional tasks to the motor control units. We conclude that the mechanism through which functional specialization is achieved is similar to the mechanism proposed for the evolution of duplicated genes. It is found that the duplication of multifunctional modules first leads to a change in the regulation of the module, leading to a differentiation of the functional context in which the module is used. Then the module adapts to the new functional context. After this second step the system is locked into a functionally specialized state. We suggest that functional specialization may be an evolutionary absorption state.

Raffaele Calabretta Stefano Nolfi Domenico Parisi Gunter P. Wagner 2000-10-19Z 2011-03-11T08:54:25Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1042 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1042 2000-10-19Z

The empathy literature is characterized by debate regarding the nature of the phenomenon. We propose a unified theory of empathy, divided into ultimate and proximate levels, grounded in the emotional link between individuals. On an ultimate level, emotional linkage supports group alarm, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators; these exist across species and greatly effect reproductive success. Proximately, emotional linkage arises from a direct mapping of another's behavioral state onto a subject's behavioral representations, which activate responses in the subject. This ultimate and proximate account parsimoniously explains different phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels of empathy.

Stephanie D. Preston Frans B. M. de Waal 2000-03-04Z 2011-03-11T08:53:53Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/403 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/403 2000-03-04Z

Language is both a biological and a cultural phenomenon. Our aim here is to discuss, in an evolutionary perspective, the articulation of these two aspects of language. For this, we draw on the general conceptual framework developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) while at the same time dissociating ourselves from her view of language.

Gloria Origgi Dan Sperber 2001-06-19Z 2011-03-11T08:54:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1619 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1619 2001-06-19Z

What lies on the two sides of the linguistic divide is fairly clear: On one side, you have organisms buffeted about to varying degrees, depending on their degree of autonomy and plasticity, by the states of affairs in the world they live in. On the other side, you have organisms capable of describing and explaining the states of affairs in the world they live in. Language is what distinguishes one side from the other. How did we get here from there? In principle, one can tell a seamless story about how inborn, involuntary communicative signals and voluntary instrumental praxis could have been shaped gradually, through feedback from their consequences, first into analog pantomime with communicative intent, and then into arbitrary category names combined into all-powerful, truth-value-bearing propositions, freed from the iconic "shape" of their referents and able to tell all. The attendant increase in speed and scope in acquiring and sharing information can be demonstrated in simple artificial life simulations that place the old and new means into direct competition: Symbolic theft always beats sensorimotor toil, and the strategy is evolutionarily stable, as long as the bottom-level categories are grounded in sensorimotor toil.

Stevan Harnad 2000-11-23Z 2011-03-11T08:54:25Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1077 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1077 2000-11-23Z

It is the ambition of evolutionary psychology to explain how the basic features of human mental life came to be selected because of their contribution to biological survival. Counted among the most basic must be the subjective qualities of conscious sensory experience: the felt redness we experience on looking at a ripe tomato, the felt saltiness on tasting an anchovy, the felt pain on being pricked by a thorn. But, as many theorists acknowledge, with these qualia, the ambition of evolutionary psychology may have met its match. Everyone agrees that a trait can only contribute to an organism's biological survival in so far as it operates in the public domain. Yet almost everyone also agrees that the subjective quality of sensory experience is (at least for all practical purposes) private and without external influence. Then, maybe we must either concede that the subjective quality of sensations cannot after all have been determined by selection (even if this is theoretically depressing) or else demonstrate that the quality of sensations is not as private as it seems to be (even if this is intuitively unconvincing). No. I believe neither of these solutions to the puzzle is in fact the right one. I argue instead that the truth is that the quality of sensations has indeed been shaped by selection in the past, despite the fact that it is today effectively private. And this situation has come about as a result of a remarkable evolutionary progression, whereby the primitive activity of sensing slowly became "privatized" - that is to say, removed from the domain of overt public behavior and transformed into a mental activity that is now, in humans, largely if not exclusively internal to the subject's mind.

Nicholas Humphrey 2003-04-15Z 2011-03-11T08:55:15Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2868 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2868 2003-04-15Z

It is the ambition of evolutionary psychology to explain how the basic features of human mental life came to be selected because of their contribution to biological survival. Counted among the most basic must be the subjective qualities of conscious sensory experience: the felt redness we experience on looking at a ripe tomato, the felt saltiness on tasting an anchovy, the felt pain on being pricked by a thorn. But, as many theorists acknowledge, with these qualia, the ambition of evolutionary psychology may have met its match. Everyone agrees that a trait can only contribute to an organism's biological survival in so far as it operates in the public domain. Yet almost everyone also agrees that the subjective quality of sensory experience is (at least for all practical purposes) private and without external influence. Then, maybe we must either concede that the subjective quality of sensations cannot after all have been determined by selection (even if this is theoretically depressing) or else demonstrate that the quality of sensations is not as private as it seems to be (even if this is intuitively unconvincing). No. I believe neither of these solutions to the puzzle is in fact the right one. I argue instead that the truth is that the quality of sensations has indeed been shaped by selection in the past, despite the fact that it is today effectively private. And this situation has come about as a result of a remarkable evolutionary progression, whereby the primitive activity of sensing slowly became "privatized" - that is to say, removed from the domain of overt public behavior and transformed into a mental activity that is now, in humans, largely if not exclusively internal to the subject's mind.

Nicholas Humphrey 2001-09-13Z 2011-03-11T08:54:47Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1799 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1799 2001-09-13Z

The idea that there are any large-scale trends in the evolution of biological organisms is highly controversial. It is commonly believed, for example, that there is a large-scale trend in evolution towards increasing complexity, but empirical and theoretical arguments undermine this belief. Natural selection results in organisms that are well adapted to their local environments, but it is not clear how local adaptation can produce a global trend. In this paper, I present a simple computational model, in which local adaptation to a randomly changing environment results in a global trend towards increasing evolutionary versatility. In this model, for evolutionary versatility to increase without bound, the environment must be highly dynamic. The model also shows that unbounded evolutionary versatility implies an accelerating evolutionary pace. I believe that unbounded increase in evolutionary versatility is a large-scale trend in evolution. I discuss some of the testable predictions about organismal evolution that are suggested by the model.

Peter Turney 2004-04-07Z 2011-03-11T08:55:31Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3552 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3552 2004-04-07Z

We argue that the locomotion of organisms is better understood as a form of interaction with a subjective environment, rather than as a set of behaviors allegedly amenable to objective descriptions. An organism's interactions with its subjective environment are in turn understandable in terms of its cognitive architecture. We propose a large-scale classification of the possible types of cognitive architectures, giving a sketch of the subjective structure that each of them superimposes on space and of the relevant consequences on locomotion. The classification comprises a main division between nonrepresentational and representational architectures and further subdivisions.

Maurizio Tirassa Antonella Carassa Giuliano Geminiani 2000-03-21Z 2011-03-11T08:54:04Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/557 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/557 2000-03-21Z

In this paper the connections between the evolutionary paradigm called adaptationism and the field of evolutionary computation (EC) will be outlined. After giving an introduction to adaptationism we will try to show that the so called adaptational stance can be applied in EC as well as in biology and this application may have significant benefits. It will also be shown that this approach has serious, inherent limitations in both cases especially in the case of EC, because we lack the language which could be used to form the theories, but these representational limitations can be handled by devoting efforts to construct this language.

Mark Jelasity 1999-08-24Z 2011-03-11T08:53:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/389 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/389 1999-08-24Z

New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism, Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that ALL a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology.

John F. Post 1999-07-16Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/183 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/183 1999-07-16Z

This article is a theoretical consideration on the role of sensory pleasure and mental joy as optimizers of behavior. It ends with an axiomatic proposal. When they compare the human body to its environment, Philosophers recognise the cosmos as the Large Infinite, and the atomic particles as the Small Infinite. The human brain reaches such a degree of complexity that it may be considered as a third infinite in the universe, a Complex Infinite. It follows that any force capable of moving such an infinite deserves a place among the forces of the universe. Physicists have recognized four forces, the gravitational, the electromagnetic, the weak, and the strong nuclear force. Forces are defined in four dimentions (reversible or not in time) and it is postulated that these forces are valid and applicable everywhere. Pleasure and displeasure, the affective axis of consciousness, can move the infinitely complex into action and no human brain can avoid the trend to maximize its pleasure. Therefore, we suggest, axiomatically, that the affective capability of consciousness operates in a way similar to the four forces of the Physics, i.e. influences the behavior of conscious agents in a way similar to the way the four forces influence masses and particles. However, since a mental phenomenon is dimensioneless we propose to call the affective capability of consciousness the fifth influence rather than the fifth force.

Michel Cabanac Remi A. Cabanac Harold T. Hammel 2002-01-16Z 2011-03-11T08:54:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2021 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2021 2002-01-16Z

This paper discusses the simulation results of a model of biological development for neural networks based on a regulatory genome. The model’s results are analyzed using the framework of Heterochrony theory (McKinney and McNamara, 1991). The network development is controlled by genes that produce elements regulating the activation, inhibition, and delay of neurogenetic events. The genome can also regulate the gene expression mechanisms. An ecological task of foraging behavior is used to test the model with an evolving population of artificial organisms. Organisms evolve an optimal foraging behavior and the ability to adapt to changing environments. The adaptive strategy consists in changes of network architecture that are determined by the regulatory rearrangment of neurogenetic events. Results show how heterochronic changes play an adaptive role in the evolution of neural networks.

Angelo Cangelosi 2002-10-09Z 2011-03-11T08:55:03Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2499 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2499 2002-10-09Z

Evolvability is the capacity to evolve. This paper introduces a simple computational model of evolvability and demonstrates that, under certain conditions, evolvability can increase indefinitely, even when there is no direct selection for evolvability. The model shows that increasing evolvability implies an accelerating evolutionary pace. It is suggested that the conditions for indefinitely increasing evolvability are satisfied in biological and cultural evolution. We claim that increasing evolvability is a large-scale trend in evolution. This hypothesis leads to testable predictions about biological and cultural evolution.

Peter Turney 2003-09-19Z 2011-03-11T08:55:20Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3159 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3159 2003-09-19Z

Religion has been in the past, and still is in a number of countries, the main cohesive force holding populations, particularly genetically disparate ones, together in one system. Patterns of sexual behaviour (often strongly influenced by religious beliefs and prescriptions) in different societies have determined the organisational character of the society - from the nuclear family (now apparently in decline) in most Western countries and the extended family of earlier periods. Both religion and patterns of sexual behaviour as cohesive forces have been radically challenged by science, both as a mode of thought and as the source of technologies which change the environment in which societies operate. A sociobiology of societies has to be founded on a sociobiology of the individuals forming the society and on a biologizing of sociology. The survival of populations (interpreted as gene pools) and of societal forms are interlocked; a sociobiology of societies can start to consider the conditions and forces which over long periods determine the relative success or failure of nations and social systems.

Robin Allott 2000-06-15Z 2011-03-11T08:53:53Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/408 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/408 2000-06-15Z

In order to become aware of inconsistencies, one must first construe of the world in a way that reflects its consistencies. This paper begins with a tentative model for how a set of discrete memories transforms into an interconnected worldview wherein relationships between memories are forged by way of abstractions. Inconsistencies prompt the invention of new abstractions. In regions of the conceptual network where inconsistencies abound, a cognitive analog of simulated annealing is in order; there is a willingness to question previous assumptions—to ‘loosen’ conceptual relationships—so as to let new concepts thoroughly percolate through the worldview and exert the needed revolutionary effect. In so doing there is a risk of assimilating dangerous concepts. Repression arrests the process by which dangerous thoughts infiltrate the conceptual network, and deception blocks thoughts that have already been assimilated. These forms of self-initiated worldview inconsistency may evoke feelings of fragmentation at the level of the individual or the society.

Liane M. Gabora 2000-01-31Z 2011-03-11T08:53:53Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/398 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/398 2000-01-31Z

A common method of improving how well understood a theory is, is by comparing it to another theory which has been better developed. Radical interpretation is a theory which attempts to explain how communication has meaning. Radical interpretation is treated as another time dependent theory and compared to the time dependent theory of biological evolution. Several similarities and differences are uncovered. Biological evolution can be gradual or punctuated. Whether radical interpretation is gradual or punctuated depends on how the question is framed: on the coarse-grained time scale it proceeds gradually, but on the fine-grained time scale it proceeds by punctuated equilibria. Biological evolution proceeds by natural selection, the counterpart to this is the increase in both correspondence and coherence. Exaption, mutations, and spandrels have counterparts metaphor, speech errors, and puns respectively. Homologous and analogs have direct counterparts in specific words. The most important differences originate from the existence of a unit of inheritance (the traditional gene) occurring in biological evolution - there is no such unit in language.

Mark D.Roberts 1999-01-10Z 2011-03-11T08:54:17Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/785 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/785 1999-01-10Z

Buller recently posted a critique of evolutionary psychology (reproduced below). Although I disagree with many of his assertions, this is the most credible attempt to critique evolutionary psychology that I have encountered. Buller’s arguments regarding improper motivational inferences from evolutionary psychological explanations are largely correct--such inferences are indeed erroneous. Furthermore, the mistakes he identifies have been made by some prominent evolutionists including, apparently, W. D. Hamilton (Symons, personal communication). However, most evolutionary psychologists are not saying what he claims they are saying. Buller wishes to find evolutionary psychology trapped in Freudian quicksand so that he can rescue it. Instead, it is he who must hoist himself from the bog using the theoretical rigging created by evolutionary psychologists over the last two decades, including, most prominently, Don Symons, a primary target of his essay.

Edward H. Hagen 1998-08-27Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/172 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/172 1998-08-27Z

This is a comment on an article by Perrett et al., on the same issue of Nature, investigating face perception. With computer graphics, Perrett and colleagues have produced exaggerated male and female faces, and asked people to rate them with respect to femininity or masculinity, and personality traits such as intelligence, emotionality and so on. The key question is: what informations do faces (and sexual signals in general) convey? One view, supported by Perrett and colleagues, is that all aspects of sexual signals convey important information about partner quality. We suggest instead that the interaction between the signal and the receiver's nervous system can result in the evolution of sexual traits not linked to partner quality.

Magnus Enquist Stefano Ghirlanda 1998-08-03Z 2011-03-11T08:54:00Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/506 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/506 1998-08-03Z

In this paper I claim that one of the main characteristics that makes the Evolutionary Robotics approach suitable for the study of adaptive behavior in natural and artificial agents is the possibility to rely largely on a self-organization process. Indeed by using Artificial Evolution the role of the designer may be limited to the specification of a fitness function which measures the ability of a given robot to perform a desired task. From an engineering point of view the main advantage of relying on self-organization is the fact that the designer does not need to divide the desired behavior into simple basic behaviors to be implemented into separate layers (or modules) of the robot control system. By selecting individuals for their ability to perform the desired behavior as a whole, simple basic behaviors can emerge from the interaction between several processes in the control system and from the interaction between the robot and the environment. From the point of view of the study of natural systems, the possibility of evolving robots that are free to select their way to solve a task by interacting with their environment may help us to understand how natural organisms produce adaptive behavior. Finally, the attempt to scale up to more complex tasks may help us to identify what the critical features of Natural Evolution are which allowed the emergence of the extraordinary variety of highly adapted life forms present on the planet.

Stefano Nolfi 1998-06-22Z 2011-03-11T08:54:12Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/700 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/700 1998-06-22Z

This paper is about how to give human-like powers to complete agents. For this the most important design choice concerns the overall architecture. Questions regarding detailed mechanisms, forms of representations, inference capabilities, knowledge etc. are best addressed in the context of a global architecture in which different design decisions need to be linked. Such a design would assemble various kinds of functionality into a complete coherent working system, in which there are many concurrent, partly independent, partly mutually supportive, partly potentially incompatible processes, addressing a multitude of issues on different time scales, including asynchronous, concurrent, motive generators. Designing human like agents is part of the more general problem of understanding design space, niche space and their interrelations, for, in the abstract, there is no one optimal design, as biological diversity on earth shows.

Aaron Sloman 1998-06-22Z 2011-03-11T08:54:12Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/695 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/695 1998-06-22Z

There is now a huge amount of interest in consciousness among scientists as well as philosophers, yet there is so much confusion and ambiguity in the claims and counter-claims that it is hard to tell whether any progress is being made. This ``position paper'' suggests that we can make progress by temporarily putting to one side questions about what consciousness is or which animals or machines have it or how it evolved. Instead we should focus on questions about the sorts of architectures that are possible for behaving systems and ask what sorts of capabilities, states and processes, might be supported by different sorts of architectures. We can then ask which organisms and machines have which sorts of architectures. This combines the standpoint of philosopher, biologist and engineer. If we can find a general theory of the variety of possible architectures (a characterisation of ``design space'') and the variety of environments, tasks and roles to which such architectures are well suited (a characterisation of ``niche space'') we may be able to use such a theory as a basis for formulating new more precisely defined concepts with which to articulate less ambiguous questions about the space of possible minds. For instance our initially ill-defined concept (``consciousness'') might split into a collection of more precisely defined concepts which can be used to ask unambiguous questions with definite answers. As a first step this paper explores a collection of conjectures regarding architectures and their evolution. In particular we explore architectures involving a combination of coexisting architectural levels including: (a) reactive mechanisms which evolved very early, (b) deliberative mechanisms which evolved later in response to pressures on information processing resources and (c) meta-management mechanisms that can explicitly inspect evaluate and modify some of the contents of various internal information structures. It is conjectured that in response to the needs of these layers, perceptual and action subsystems also developed layers, and also that an ``alarm'' system which initially existed only within the reactive layer may have become increasingly sophisticated and extensive as its inputs and outputs were linked to the newer layers. Processes involving the meta-management layer in the architecture could explain the origin of the notion of ``qualia''. Processes involving the ``alarm'' mechanism and mechanisms concerned with resource limits in the second and third layers gives us an explanation of three main forms of emotion, helping to account for some of the ambiguities which have bedevilled the study of emotion. Further theoretical and practical benefits may come from further work based on this design-based approach to consciousness. A deeper longer term implication is the possibility of a new science investigating laws governing possible trajectories in design space and niche space, as these form parts of high order feedback loops in the biosphere.

Aaron Sloman 1998-08-20Z 2011-03-11T08:53:38Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/60 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/60 1998-08-20Z

No abstract

Wim E. Crusio 1998-03-24Z 2011-03-11T08:53:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/164 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/164 1998-03-24Z

Species evolve, very slowly, through selection of genes which give rise to phenotypes well adapted to their environments. The cultures, including the languages, of human communities evolve, much faster, maintaining at least a minimum level of adaptedness to the external, non- cultural environment. In the phylogenetic evolution of species, the transmission of information across generations is via copying of molecules, and innovation is by mutation and sexual recombination. In cultural evolution, the transmission of information across generations is by learning, and innovation is by sporadic invention or borrowing from other cultures. This much is the foundational bedrock of evolutionary theory. But things get more complicated; there can be gene-culture co-evolution. Prior to the rise of culture, the physical environment is the only force shaping biological evolution from outside the organism, and cultures themselves are clearly constrained by the evolved biological characteristics of their members. But cultures become part of the external environment, and influence the course of biological evolution. For example, altruistic cultures with developed medical knowledge reduce the cost to the individual of carrying genes disposing to certain pathologies (such as diabetes); and such genes become more widespread in the populations maintaining such cultures. Assortative mating can affect biological evolution, and particular cultures may influence the factors which are sorted for in mating. (For a careful discussion of the effects of cultural evolution on natural selection, see Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer, 1971:774- 804). This paper examines mechanisms involved in the co-evolution of a biological trait, the critical period for language acquisition, and a property of human cultures, the size of their languages. A gene/culture interaction will be shown that can be described as a kind of symbiosis, but perhaps more aptly as an `arms race'. In this introduction, we will sketch the basic mechanics of the interaction in very broad terms; the rest of the paper will explain and justify the details. The implications of our model for second language acquisition are given toward the end of the paper.

James R Hurford Simon Kirby 1998-07-09Z 2011-03-11T08:54:13Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/717 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/717 1998-07-09Z

This paper discusses some of the requirements for the control architecture of an intelligent human-like agent with multiple independent dynamically changing motives in a dynamically changing only partly predictable world. The architecture proposed includes a combination of reactive, deliberative and meta-management mechanisms along with one or more global ``alarm'' systems. The engineering design requirements are discussed in relation our evolutionary history, evidence of brain function and recent theories of Damasio and others about the relationships between intelligence and emotions. (The paper was completed in haste for a deadline and I forgot to explain why Descartes was in the title. See Damasio 1994.)

A. Sloman 2006-12-08Z 2011-03-11T08:56:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5278 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5278 2006-12-08Z

In aggressive interactions, animals often use a discrete set of signals, while the properties being signalled are likely to be continuous, for example fighting ability or value of victory. Here we investigate a particular model of fighting which allows for conventional signalling of subjective resource value to occur. The result shows that neither perfect nor no signalling are evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in the model. Instead, we find ESSs in which partial information is communicated, with discrete displays signalling a range of values rather than a precise one. The result also indicates that communication should be more precise in conflicts over small resources. Signalling strategies can exist in fighting because of the common interest in avoiding injuries, but communication is likely to be limited because of the fundamental conflict over the resource. Our results reflect a compromise between these two factors. Data allowing for a thorough test of the model are lacking; however, existing data seem consistent with the obtained theoretical results.

Magnus Enquist Stefano Ghirlanda Pete L. Hurd 1998-03-24Z 2011-03-11T08:54:07Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/617 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/617 1998-03-24Z

Human languages, such as French, Cantonese or American Sign Language, are socio- cultural entities. Knowledge of them (`competence') is acquired by exposure to the ap- propriate environment. Languages are maintained and transmitted by acts of speaking and writing; and this is also the means by which languages evolve. The utterances of one generation are processed by their children to form mental grammars, which in some sense summarize, or generalize over, the children's linguistic experiences. These grammars are the basis for the production of a new avalanche of utterances to which the next generation in its turn is subjected. (This picture is simplified, of course, as generations overlap.) Languages inhabit two distinct and separate modes of existence, which have been called (by Chomsky, 1986) `E-Language' and `I-Language'. E-language is the external observable behaviour --- utterances and inscriptions and manifestations of their meanings. E-language is regarded by some as so chaotic and subject to the vicissitudes of everyday human life as to be a poor candidate for systematic study. (E-Language corresponds to what Chomsky, in earlier terminology, called `performance'.) Out of this blooming buzzing confusion the individual child distils an order internal to the mind; the child constructs a coherent systematic set of rules mapping meanings onto forms. This set of rules is the child's I-Language (where `I' is for `internal'). No two individuals' I-Languages have to be the same, although those of people living in the same community will overlap very significantly. But there will usually be at least some slight difference between the I-language features prevalent in one generation and those prevalent in the next. This is the stuff of language evolution, in the sense of the historical development of individual languages, such as Swedish, Navaho or Zulu.

James R Hurford 1998-06-15Z 2011-03-11T08:53:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/170 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/170 1998-06-15Z

Most work on evolving cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma treats the non-iterated game as an undesirable simple case that should be risen above. It has been taken as a given that populations evolving to play the non-iterated game will always converge on defection. This paper questions this assumption, and demonstrates that organizing a population spatially dramatically changes the nature of the game and allows cooperation to emerge.

M. Oliphant 2000-03-21Z 2011-03-11T08:54:04Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/556 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/556 2000-03-21Z

This paper introduces a niching technique called GAS (S stands for species) which dynamically creates a subpopulation structure (taxonomic chart) using a radius function instead of a single radius, and a `cooling' method similar to simulated annealing. GAS offers a solution to the niche radius problem with the help of these techniques. A method based on the speed of species is presented for determining the radius function. Speed functions are given for both real and binary domains. We also discuss the sphere packing problem on binary domains using some tools of coding theory to make it possible to evaluate the output of the system. Finally two problems are examined empirically. The first is a difficult test function with unevenly spread local optima. The second is an NP-complete combinatorial optimization task, where a comparison is presented to the traditional genetic algorithm.

Mark Jelasity Jozsef Dombi 1998-10-20Z 2011-03-11T08:53:39Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/67 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/67 1998-10-20Z

This chapter provides a brief overview of quantitative-genetic theory. Quantitative-genetics provides important tools to help elucidate the genetic underpinnings of behavioral and neural phenotypes. This information can then provide substantial insights into the previous evolutionary history of a phenotype, as well as into brain-behavior relationships. The most often employed crossbreeding designs are the classical Mendelian cross and the diallel cross. The information rendered by the former is limited to the two parental strains used and cannot be broadly generalized. The principal usefulness of this design is for testing whether a given phenotype is influenced by either one gene or by more genes. The diallel cross renders more generalizable information, the more so if many different strains are used, such as estimates of genetic correlations. To estimate the latter, correlations between inbred strain means may provide a helpful shortcut. Some commonly encountered mistakes in the interpretation of the results of quantitative-genetic studies are presented and explained.

WIm E. Crusio 1998-06-22Z 2011-03-11T08:54:12Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/694 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/694 1998-06-22Z

This paper attempts to characterise a unifying overview of the practice of software engineers, AI designers, developers of evolutionary forms of computation, designers of adaptive systems, etc. The topic overlaps with theoretical biology, developmental psychology and perhaps some aspects of social theory. Just as much of theoretical computer science follows the lead of engineering intuitions and tries to formalise them, there are also some important emerging high level cross disciplinary ideas about natural information processing architectures and evolutionary mechanisms and that can perhaps be unified and formalised in the future. There is some speculation about the evolution of human cognitive architectures and consciousness.

Aaron Sloman 1998-07-09Z 2011-03-11T08:54:13Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/716 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/716 1998-07-09Z

This paper attempts to characterise a unifying overview of the practice of software engineers, AI designers, developers of evolutionary forms of computation, designers of adaptive systems, etc. The topic overlaps with theoretical biology, developmental psychology and perhaps some aspects of social theory. Just as much of theoretical computer science follows the lead of engineering intuitions and tries to formalise them, there are also some important emerging high level cross disciplinary ideas about natural information processing architectures and evolutionary mechanisms and that can perhaps be unified and formalised in the future. There is some speculation about the evolution of human cognitive architectures and consciousness.

A. Sloman 2003-09-04Z 2011-03-11T08:55:20Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3133 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3133 2003-09-04Z

Though evolution has no purpose, it may be legitimate to speculate about the direction and plausible consequences of technological and other developments and trends in social organization. Human societies are in implicit competition with each other; each society aims to survive, to prosper, to achieve stability and order for the members of the national group. Each society does this in the environment created by the existence of other similar societies. Because human individuals are conscious not only of their own selves but also of the selves of others, because the shared communication through language of members of the group makes possible the moulding of each individual's behaviour and attitudes and the transmission of structures of ideas about the society of which they form part, what is rejected as implausible for thoughtless and language-less creatures has to be considered for human communities: the reality of a process of group selection. Due to technological progress, radical changes affecting the most basic evolutionary forces are taking place: the continual refinement of contraceptive techniques, the use of chemicals to manipulate brains and behaviour, the ability directly to manipulate genetic structures. In the case of other species, particularly the social insects, evolution has produced very specific group structures depending on specialised systems of communication (biochemical and behavioural) and on changes in the genetic organisation of the group. Where may the new developments in human society lead? Which new or changed societal structures will achieve fitness both at the group level and in terms of the relative fitness of the succession of individuals composing the group? We need a sociobiology of human societies to complement the sociobiology of the human individual.

Robin Allott 1999-01-27Z 2011-03-11T08:54:17Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/794 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/794 1999-01-27Z

Like the information patterns that evolve through biological processes, mental representations, or memes, evolve through adaptive exploration and transformation of an information space through variation, selection, and transmission. Since unlike genes, memes do not come packaged with instructions for their replication, our brains do it for them, strategically, guided by a fitness landscape that reflects both internal drives and a worldview that is continually updated through meme assimilation. This paper presents a model for how an individual becomes a meme-evolving agent via the emergence of an autocatalytic network of sparse, distributed memories, and discusses implications for complex, creative thought processes and why they are unique to humans. Memetics can do more than account for the spread of catchy tunes; it can pave the way for the kind of overarching framework for the humanities that the first form of evolution has provided for the biological sciences.

L. Gabora 2000-07-10Z 2011-03-11T08:53:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/151 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/151 2000-07-10Z

We recently reported finding asymmetry in the appearance of beauty on the face [39]. Here we investigated whether facial beauty is a stable characteristic (on the owner's very face) or is in the perceptual space of the observer. We call the question 'the owner versus observer hypothesis'. We compared identity judgements and attractiveness ratings of observers. Subjects viewed left-left and right-right composites of faces and decided which most resembled the normal face (Experiment 1). Identity judgements (resemblance) are known to be associated with perceptual factors in the observer. Another group viewed the same normal faces and rated them on attractiveness (Experiment 2). In each experiment there were two separate viewing conditions, original and reversed (mirror-image). Lateral reversal did affect the results of Experiment 1 (confirming previous findings [3,18]) but did not affect the results of Experiment 2. The fact that lateral reversal did not affect the results of Experiment 2 suggests that facial attractiveness is more dependent on physiognomy (of the owner) and less dependent on an asymmetrical perceptual process (in the observer) than is facial identity. The results are discussed in the context of beauty’s biological significance and facial processing in the brain.

Audrey C. Chen Craig German Dahlia W. Zaidel 2005-05-14Z 2011-03-11T08:56:03Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4354 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4354 2005-05-14Z

Music provides a challenging system for the analysis of cultural evolution. The dialectical approach to music seeks to identify the internal stylistic tensions and contradictions (in terms of thesis and antithesis) which give rise to new musical forms (synthesis). The Darwinian alternative to dialectics, which in its most reductionist form is becoming known as memetics, seeks to interpret the evolution of music by examining the adaptiveness of its various component parts in the selective environment of culture. This essay compares the memetic and dialectical approaches with special reference to the development of jazz in the era of recorded sound, in the light of Benzon’s classification of musical styles into evolutionary Ranks (Benzon 1993). It is concluded that the basic postulate of memetics is falsifiable and therefore that memetics qualifies as scientific in the Popperian sense, rather than being simply a pseudo-scientific metanarrative for cultural evolution. Some suggestions for empirical analysis are provided. In contrast, the dialectical perspective is not scientific in the Popperian sense, but does provide a good explanatory framework for the history of jazz in the years 1900-1970, and shows how transitions between Ranks may be generated. However, dialectics is considerably less successful in the construction of a model to explain the period since 1970.

Dr Derek Gatherer 1998-07-02Z 2011-03-11T08:53:50Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/346 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/346 1998-07-02Z

This book is a collection of essays by a leading philosopher of biology and spans his career over almost the last twenty years. Most of the topics that have been of concern to philosophers of biology in this period are touched on to some extent, and the collection of these essays in a convenient volume will certainly be welcomed by everyone working in this field. The essays are arranged chronologically, and divided into three sections. Although the chapters in the first section have substantial interconnections, being involved with fundamental conceptual issues in evolutionary theory, on the whole there is not much attempt to tie the book into anything more than a sequence of independent essays. The later sections, moreover, cover a quite diverse range of topics. The whole is neither more nor less than the sum of the parts. For

J. Dupre 2003-10-14Z 2011-03-11T08:55:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3217 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3217 2003-10-14Z

Selectionism emphasizes carving patterns, memes remind us of minimal replicable patterns, but a full-fledged Darwinian process needs six essential ingredients to keep going, to recursively bootstrap quality from rude beginnings. While there may be situations ("sparse Darwinism") in which a reduced number suffice, another five ingredients, while not essential, greatly enhance the speed and stability of a Darwinian process. While our best examples are drawn from species evolution, the immune response, and evolutionary epistemology, the Darwinian process may well be a major law of the universe, right up there with chemical bonds as a prime generator of interesting combinations that discover stratified stabilities.

William H Calvin 2000-02-03Z 2011-03-11T08:54:20Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/843 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/843 2000-02-03Z

None

Nicholas Humphrey 1998-06-15Z 2011-03-11T08:53:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/169 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/169 1998-06-15Z

A Saussurean communication system exists when an entire communicating population uses a single "language" that maps states unambiguously onto symbols and then back into the original states. This paper describes a number of simulations performed with a genetic algorithm to investigate the conditions necessary for such communication systems to evolve. The first simulation shows that Saussurean communication evolves in the simple case where direct selective pressure is placed on individuals to be both good transmitters and good receivers. The second simulation demonstrates that, in the more realistic case where selective pressure is only placed on doing well as a receiver, Saussurean communication fails to evolve. Two methods, inspired by research on the Prisoner's Dilemma, are used to attempt to solve this problem. The third simulation shows that, even in the absence of selective pressure on transmission, Saussurean communication can evolve if individuals interact multiple times with the same communication partner and are given the ability to respond differentially based on past interaction. In the fourth simulation, spatially organized populations are used, and it is shown that this allows Saussurean communication to evolve through kin selection.

Michael Oliphant 2001-10-11Z 2011-03-11T08:54:48Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1818 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1818 2001-10-11Z

An inductive learning algorithm takes a set of data as input and generates a hypothesis as output. A set of data is typically consistent with an infinite number of hypotheses; therefore, there must be factors other than the data that determine the output of the learning algorithm. In machine learning, these other factors are called the bias of the learner. Classical learning algorithms have a fixed bias, implicit in their design. Recently developed learning algorithms dynamically adjust their bias as they search for a hypothesis. Algorithms that shift bias in this manner are not as well understood as classical algorithms. In this paper, we show that the Baldwin effect has implications for the design and analysis of bias shifting algorithms. The Baldwin effect was proposed in 1896, to explain how phenomena that might appear to require Lamarckian evolution (inheritance of acquired characteristics) can arise from purely Darwinian evolution. Hinton and Nowlan presented a computational model of the Baldwin effect in 1987. We explore a variation on their model, which we constructed explicitly to illustrate the lessons that the Baldwin effect has for research in bias shifting algorithms. The main lesson is that it appears that a good strategy for shift of bias in a learning algorithm is to begin with a weak bias and gradually shift to a strong bias.

Peter D. Turney 2003-04-16Z 2011-03-11T08:55:15Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2889 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2889 2003-04-16Z

This position paper argues that the Baldwin effect is widely misunderstood by the evolutionary computation community. The misunderstandings appear to fall into two general categories. Firstly, it is commonly believed that the Baldwin effect is concerned with the synergy that results when there is an evolving population of learning individuals. This is only half of the story. The full story is more complicated and more interesting. The Baldwin effect is concerned with the costs and benefits of lifetime learning by individuals in an evolving population. Several researchers have focussed exclusively on the benefits, but there is much to be gained from attention to the costs. This paper explains the two sides of the story and enumerates ten of the costs and benefits of lifetime learning by individuals in an evolving population. Secondly, there is a cluster of misunderstandings about the relationship between the Baldwin effect and Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics. The Baldwin effect is not Lamarckian. A Lamarckian algorithm is not better for most evolutionary computing problems than a Baldwinian algorithm. Finally, Lamarckian inheritance is not a better model of memetic (cultural) evolution than the Baldwin effect.

Peter Turney 2175 2001-06-19Z 2011-03-11T08:54:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1626 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1626 2001-06-19Z

What language allows us to do is to steal categories through hearsay instead of having to earn them through the honest toil of learning them from direct exposure and trial and error feedback from the consequences of miscategorisation. To make us capable of theft, however, the content-bearing symbols of language must ultimately be grounded in categories that have been earned through honest toil (unless "prepared" by Darwinian theft); it cannot be linguistic theft all the way down. Category names must be grounded in the capacity to sort, label and interact with the proximal sensorimotor projections of their distal members in a way which coheres systematically with their interpretations, singly, and strung together to express propositions.

Stevan Harnad 1998-07-02Z 2011-03-11T08:53:50Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/349 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/349 1998-07-02Z

Elliott Sober is among the leading contemporary contributors to the philosophy of biology. He also has an exceptional ability to explain difficult ideas clearly. He is therefore very well equipped to provide an accessible yet state-of-the-art introduction to the philosophy of biology, and in most respects this optimistic prognosis is justified by the present volume. Focussing on evolutionary biology, Sober provides a general overview of evolutionary theory; a chapter on creationism that serves as a vehicle for the discussion of the evidence for evolution; and chapters on fitness, the units of selection, adaptationism, systematics, and sociobiology. Sober displays a thorough mastery of both the biological issues and the recent philosophical controversies that have surrounded them, and the presentation is always lucid and free from unnecessary technicalities. Anyone not thoroughly conversant with contemporary discussions of evolutionary theory could learn from this book.

J. Dupre 1998-07-02Z 2011-03-11T08:53:50Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/348 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/348 1998-07-02Z

Biological knowledge has increased exponentially in the last century or so, and it would be surprising if some of this knowledge did not have implications for philosophy. In contrast with a good deal of Elliott Sober's best known work, which aims to bring philosophical methods to bear on issues within biology, the theme of this collection of essays is to explore some ways in which biological ideas, or more specifically evolutionary ideas, may be brought to bear on philosophical issues. Sober notes in his Introduction that there is no systematic theme beyond the attempt to explore the philosophical implications of taking evolutionary biology seriously. And certainly this is a diverse collection, especially with regard to the extent to which the various arguments of these papers depend on any particular content to evolutionary claims.

J. Dupre 2000-08-15Z 2011-03-11T08:54:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/919 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/919 2000-08-15Z

Unilateral brain damage which includes the hippocampus leads to memory impairments consistent with hemispheric specialization on the same side. Damage to the corpus callosum, the major connecting pathway between the left and right hemispheres, also leads to memory impairments. This suggests both hemispheric specialization on the hippocampal level and a critical role for the corpus callosum in memory functions. A complete hippocampal formation is present on either side of the brain but traditionally only one is studied. However, a comparison between the neuronal populations in the hippocampus on both sides revealed asymmetry in connectivity among hippocampal subfields. The profile of memory impairments of commissurotomy (‘split-brain’) patients is described. The results are discussed in terms of a relationship between hippocampus and corpus callosum in humans. As hemispheric specialization evolved, inter-hippocampal connections became less important and the corpus callosum became prominent in memory functions.

Dahlia W. Zaidel 1998-11-13Z 2011-03-11T08:54:16Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/756 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/756 1998-11-13Z

Non-bizarre psychotic delusions are hypothesized to be psychological adaptations which evolved to mitigate the dangerous consequences of social exclusion and ostracism. When we lived in small, kin-based groups, delusions would have functioned to combat social exclusion by closely mimicking conditions, such as external threats or illness, where fellow group members were likely to cooperate and provide assistance. If delusions are adaptations to social exclusion, then they should onset when an individual faces a serious social threat, they should function (in ancestral type environments) to prevent exclusion-at least in the short term-and they should cease when the social threat ceases, an hypothesis which is examined in the context of numerous published studies of Delusional Disorder (DD).

Edward H. Hagen 1999-01-22Z 2011-03-11T08:54:02Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/531 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/531 1999-01-22Z

This paper describes a computational model of how ideas, or memes, evolve through the processes of variation, selection, and replication. Every iteration, each neural-network based agent in an artificial society has the opportunity to acquire a new meme, either through 1) INNOVATION, by mutating a previously-learned meme, or 2) IMITATION, by copying a meme performed by a neighbor. Imitation, mental simulation, and using past experience to bias mutation all increase the rate at which fitter memes evolve. Memes at epistatic loci converged more slowly than memes at over- or underdominant loci. The higher the ratio of innovation to imitation, the greater the meme diversity, and the higher the fitness of the fittest meme. Optimization is fastest for the society as a whole with an innovation to imitation ratio of 2:1, but diversity is comprimized.

L. Gabora 1999-09-02Z 2011-03-11T08:53:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/392 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/392 1999-09-02Z

"Adaptation properties," as individuated according to evolutionary biology, cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. This causes serious if not fatal trouble for several of Kim's crucial theses: the Causal Individuation of Kinds, Weak Supervenience, Alexander's Dictum, the synchronicity thesis (that all psychological kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism), the Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that all a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology.

John F. Post 2000-03-28Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/185 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/185 2000-03-28Z

The asymmetrical status of facial beauty has rarely been investigated. We studied positive facial characteristics, attractiveness and smiling, through the use of left-left and right-right composites of unfamiliar faces of women and men with natural expressions. Results showed that women's right-right composites were judged significantly more attractive than left-left composites while there was no left-right difference in men's composites (Experiment 1). On the other hand, left-left composites were judged to have more pronounced smiling expressions than right-right composites in both women's and men's faces (Experiment 2). The results confirm previous findings for leftward facial expressiveness and show for the first time asymmetry in facial attractiveness and a difference in its manifestation in women's and men's faces. The findings have biological implications for the relationship between the appearance of the sides of the face and hemispheric specialization. The organization of beauty in the human face may have been shaped by evolutionary pressures on facial asymmetries, especially as they pertain to mate selection.

Dahlia. W. Zaidel Audrey Chen Craig German 1998-08-07Z 2011-03-11T08:53:51Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/357 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/357 1998-08-07Z

It is argued that complexity has only a limited use as a paradigm against reductionist approaches and that it has a much richer potential as a comparable property. What can complexity be usefully said to be a property of is discussed. It is argued that it is unlikely to have any useful value as applied to real object or systems. Further that even relativising it to an observer has problems. It is proposed that complexity can be only usefully applied to constructions within a given language. It is argued that complexity is usefully differentiated from the concepts of size, ignorance, variety, minimum description length and order. A definition of complexity is proposed which can be summarised as follows: That property of a language expression which makes it difficult to formulate its overall behaviour even when given almost complete information about its atomic components and their inter-relations.. Some of the consequences of this definition are discussed. It is shown that this definition encompasses several existing varieties of complexity measures and is then applied to some examples pertaining to the evolution of complex' systems including: "What is the complexity that has evolved in organisms and has it increased?".

Bruce Edmonds 2003-10-14Z 2011-03-11T08:55:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3214 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3214 2003-10-14Z

Language, foresight, musical skills and other hallmarks of intelligence are connected through an underlying facility that enhances rapid movements. Creativity may result from a Darwinian contest within the brain.

William H Calvin 2003-04-28Z 2011-03-11T08:55:16Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2911 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2911 2003-04-28Z

This paper discusses research into whether the memories of adaptive autonomous agents can be made to spontaneously evolve spacing effects. Experiments involving human memory have shown that learning trials massed closely in time elicit slower learning than the equivalent number trials spaced apart in time. These "spacing effects" have been observed across a wide array of conditions. The experimental results detailed here show that such effects can be made to evolve spontaneously in autonomous agents. The results also suggest that the greater learning difficulty humans experience from closely spaced trials may not be the result of a defect of biology, but rather may be a consequence of a need to give only the appropriate weight to each learning experience.

J. S. Markovitch 2002-01-11Z 2011-03-11T08:54:52Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2025 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2025 2002-01-11Z

Much research has been dedicated recently to applying genetic algorithms to populations of neural networks. However, while in real organisms the inherited genotype maps in complex ways into the resulting phenotype, in most of this research the development process that creates the individual phenotype is ignored. In this paper we present a model of neural development which includes cell division and cell migration in addition to axonal growth and branching. This reflects, in a very simplified way, what happens in the ontogeny of real organisms. The development process of our artificial organisms shows successive phases of functional differentiation and specialization. In addition, we find that mutations that affect different phases of development have very different evolutionary consequences. A single change in the early stages of cell division/migration can have huge effects on the phenotype while changes in later stages have usually a less drammatic impact. Sometimes changes that affect the first developental stages may be retained producing sudden changes in evolutionary history.

Angelo Cangelosi Domenico Parisi Stefano Nolfi 1998-09-06Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/173 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/173 1998-09-06Z

Pace Wilson & Sober, group selection has not won over biology. However, the combination of fission/fusion organization (favoring coalition formation and relatively complex tactical behavior) with weapons (which in conjunction with group and/or ambush attacks greatly reduce the costs to actors of lethal inter- and intragroup aggression) create circumstances which may well have favored group selection in hominid evolution.

Jim Moore 2001-06-18Z 2011-03-11T08:54:41Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1591 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1591 2001-06-18Z

Both Artificial Life and Artificial Mind are branches of what Dennett has called "reverse engineering": Ordinary engineering attempts to build systems to meet certain functional specifications, reverse bioengineering attempts to understand how systems that have already been built by the Blind Watchmaker work. Computational modelling (virtual life) can capture the formal principles of life, perhaps predict and explain it completely, but it can no more be alive than a virtual forest fire can be hot. In itself, a computational model is just an ungrounded symbol system; no matter how closely it matches the properties of what is being modelled, it matches them only formally, with the mediation of an interpretation. Synthetic life is not open to this objection, but it is still an open question how close a functional equivalence is needed in order to capture life. Close enough to fool the Blind Watchmaker is probably close enough, but would that require molecular indistinguishability, and if so, do we really need to go that far?

Stevan Harnad 2003-11-27Z 2011-03-11T08:55:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3286 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3286 2003-11-27Z

The motor theory proposes that the complex semantic, syntactic and phonetic structures of language developed from a pre-existing complex system, more specifically the pre-existing motor system. Language thus emerged as an external physical expression of the neural basis for movement control. Features which made a wide range of skilled actions possible -- a set of elementary motor subprograms together with rules, expressed in neural organisation, for combining subprograms into extended action-sequences -- were transferred to form a parallel set of programs and rules for speech and language. The already established integration of motor control with perceptual organisation led directly to a systematic relation between language and the externally-perceived world. But if language originated in the establishment of new brain connections between the organisation of motor control and perception on the one hand and the neural and physiological systems involved in language on the other, how is it that as far back as can be traced there has been a multiplicity of different languages, with different phonological systems, different lexicons and different grammatical (syntactic and morphological) structures? Because of these differences, de Saussure, Bloomfield and most linguists have concluded, or assumed, that languages must be arbitary constructs, certainly as regards their lexicons, and that there can be no direct relation between the sound-structures of languages and the external world. The paper examines ways in which a reconciliation can be made between the hypothesis of a biological (physiological and neurological) process of language evolution and the observed diversity of languages.

Robin Michael Allott 2003-11-03Z 2011-03-11T08:55:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3264 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3264 2003-11-03Z

Literature, music, mathematics, art, are constituents of culture and each of them has its separate history. But each of them can also be seen as a manifestation of a human biological drive, a drive towards exploration, experimentation, the analysis of human perception. Culture is not something separate from human evolution but a part of a continuing human evolution, indeed the main form which human evolution has taken over the last few thousand years. It is a familiar idea, but perhaps a wrong one, that human evolution, as a Darwinian process, has ceased and been replaced by something quite new, a more Lamarckian process involving the inheritance of acquired characteristics, more specifically of the changing forms of human culture. On this see for example Dawkins(1986), or Huxley(1926).

Robin Allott 2003-10-14Z 2011-03-11T08:55:22Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3212 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3212 2003-10-14Z

Plan-ahead becomes necessary for those movements which are over-and-done in less time than it takes for the feedback loop to operate. Natural selection for one of the ballistic movements (hammering, clubbing, and throwing) could evolve a plan-ahead serial buffer for hand-arm commands that would benefit the other ballistic movements as well. This same circuitry may also sequence other muscles (children learning handwriting often screw up their faces and tongues) and so novel oral-facial sequences may also benefit (as might kicking and dancing). An elaborated version of the sequencer may constitute a Darwin Machine that spins scenarios, evolves sentences, and facilitates insight by offline simulation. An example is given of an evolutionary scenario from an apelike ancestor, demonstrating the transition behaviors and growth curve considerations that any such theory needs to have; this particular scenario (involving throwing improvements) also suggests an explanation for the puzzling design of the Acheulean "handaxe."

Prof William H Calvin 1998-12-13Z 2011-03-11T08:54:17Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/772 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/772 1998-12-13Z

Traits that are influenced by a configuration--rather than by a simple sum-- of polymorphic genes may not be seen to be genetic unless one studies monozygotic twins (who share all their genes and thus all gene configurations) because such “emergenic” traits will tend not to run in families. Personal idiosyncrasies that have been found to be surprisingly concordant among MZ twins separated in infancy and reared apart may be emergenic traits. More speculatively, important human traits like leadership, genius in its many manfestations, being an eflective therapist or parent, as well as certain psychopathological syndromes, may also be emergenic. These ideas re-emphasize the importance of the role played in human aflairs by genetic variation.

D.T. Lykken T.J.Jr. Bouchard M. McGue A. Tellegen 2004-04-06Z 2011-03-11T08:55:27Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3392 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3392 2004-04-06Z

Love has always been a central preoccupation in individual human lives, but there has been little consideration of it by psychologists or other scientists and little attempt to explain it as an evolutionary phenomenon. There are various possible behavioral precursors of love: animal "love", empathy, group feeling, sexuality, the mother/infant bond. The principal candidates are sexuality and the mother/infant bond. Sexuality has been favored as an origin by those few writers who have discussed the issue but has characteristics which distinguish it sharply from love and make it an unlikely precursor. However, the mother/infant bond alone does not fully account for the characteristics of human love. Love evolved as the outcome of interaction between the genetic basis for mother/infant attachment and other capabilities of the evolving human manifested in and made possible by the increase in human brain- size: enlarged cognitive capacity, improved communication abilities and the evolution of language. The capacity for language led to the emergence of the conscious self, and with this the capability to recognise and empathise the selfhood of others. The deepening of the mother/infant attachment into love played, and still plays, an essential role in the transmission of culture from one generation to the next and in making possible the cohesion of the human group. This account fits well with recent research into the process and significance of the mother/infant relation.

Robin Allott 2004-01-20Z 2011-03-11T08:55:27Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3393 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3393 2004-01-20Z

Love has always been a central preoccupation in individual human lives, but there has been little consideration of it by psychologists or other scientists and little attempt to explain it as an evolutionary phenomenon. There are various possible behavioral precursors of love: animal "love", empathy, group feeling, sexuality, the mother/infant bond. The principal candidates are sexuality and the mother/infant bond. Sexuality has been favored as an origin by those few writers who have discussed the issue but has characteristics which distinguish it sharply from love and make it an unlikely precursor. However, the mother/infant bond alone does not fully account for the characteristics of human love. Love evolved as the outcome of interaction between the genetic basis for mother/infant attachment and other capabilities of the evolving human manifested in and made possible by the increase in human brain- size: enlarged cognitive capacity, improved communication abilities and the evolution of language. The capacity for language led to the emergence of the conscious self, and with this the capability to recognise and empathise the selfhood of others. The deepening of the mother/infant attachment into love played, and still plays, an essential role in the transmission of culture from one generation to the next and in making possible the cohesion of the human group. This account fits well with recent research into the process and significance of the mother/infant relation.

Robin Allott 1998-09-29Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/178 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/178 1998-09-29Z

Cheney & Seyfarth (C&S) argue for a hybrid approach which 'place (empiricistic findings) tentatively within the framework of a more mentalistic approach'(p.9). The book is an important contribution to clarify the value and limits of the intentional approach in interpreting monkey behaviour, particularly C&S's excellent field work with vervets. But, unintentionally, it also demonstrates that cognitive science is more a perspective than a scientific discipline. In order to illustrate this, I shall consider the following topics: evolution of intelligence, concept formation, philosophy of science

Winand Dittrich 1998-04-25Z 2011-03-11T08:53:42Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/165 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/165 1998-04-25Z

Offline trial and error is probably the basic way of solving novel problems and, where fancier procedures such as algorithms are used, trial-and-error was probably the main way of evolving them. We need to know how humans evolved such simulation abilities. And it would be nice to know some alternative paths that an extraterrestrial intelligence might have followed. I'm going to give an example of the neural machinery that intelligence might require, a brief description of how it might have evolved, then discuss hominid evolution more generally and speculate about what might happen in the next century as we better understand the machinery underlying our own higher intellectual functions.

William H. Calvin 1998-11-15Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/180 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/180 1998-11-15Z

Two major consequences of placentophagia, the ingestion of afterbirth materials that occurs usually during mammalian parturition, have been uncovered in the past several years. The first is that increased contact, associated with ingesting placenta and amniotic fluid from the surface of the young, causes an accelerated onset of maternal behavior toward those young. The second, which probably has importance for a broader range of mammalian taxa than the first, is that ingestion of afterbirth materials produces enhancement of ongoing opioid-mediated analgesia. The active substance in placenta and amniotic fluid has been named POEF, for Placental Opioid-Enhancing Factor. Recent research on both consequences is summarized, with particular attention to POEF, the generalizability of the enhancement phenomenon, its locus and mode of action, and its significance for new approaches to the management of pain and addiction.

Mark B. Kristal 2003-11-14Z 2011-03-11T08:55:24Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3269 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3269 2003-11-14Z

This paper amplifies and at certain points extends the account of the motor theory given previously. The semantic, syntactic and phonetic structures of language developed on the basis of a complex pre-existing system. More specifically, the structures of language were a transfer from or a calque of the structures of the pre-existing motor system. The motor system had developed in terms of neural motor programs controlling the different categories of movement. The motor programs were formed from a limited set of basic subroutines which in combination could be used to produce an open-ended and essentially infinite range of actions. The development of language made use of these pre-existing subroutines into extended programs. By way of the motor patterning imposed on the anatomical features which went to form the articulatory system, language emerged as an external physical expression of the physiological and neurological basis for movement control. Movement control was already necessarily closely integrated with the parallel system for the processing and control of perception. Language thus acquired the ability to express the range and inter-relations of perceptual content.

Robin Allott 2003-10-24Z 2011-03-11T08:55:23Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3242 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3242 2003-10-24Z

An objective basis for morality can be found in an evolutionary account of its origin and development. Morality is a key factor in the success of human groups in competition or co-existence with each other.A group's moral code represents an increasingly rational pattern of behaviour derived from the collective experience of the group handed down from generation to generation. Group selection is a controversial idea for animal evolution but it is inescapable in accounting for human evolution under the influence of language and the accumulation of cultural patterns. Morality has an objective physiological and neurological basis in so far as it exists to moderate the expression of the array of genetically-derived emotional patterns. Emotions represent the combination of action tendencies (neural motor programs) with (physiologically-derived) affective concomitants. The relation between emotion, empathy and morality is important. Empathy (a special form of perception still largely unexplained) has a key role both in the formation and cohesion of human groups and in the observance within groups of a moral code. Ultimately observance of moral rules depends on recognition by each individual of an integrating purpose in his life. In so far as the moral code is directed towards achieving this integrating purpose, morality for the individual becomes objective.

Robin Allott 1998-06-15Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/197 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/197 1998-06-15Z

While most work on the evolution of language has been centered on the evolution of syntax, my focus in this paper is instead on more basic features that separate human communication from the systems of communication used by other animals. In particular, I argue that human language is the only existing system of learned arbitrary reference. While innate communication systems are, by definition, directly transmitted genetically, the transmission of a learned learned systems must be indirect. Learners must acquire the system by being exposed its the use in the community. Although it is reasonable that a learner has access to the utterances that are produced, it is less clear how accessible the meaning is that the utterance is intended to convey. This particularly problematic if the system of communication is symbolic -- where form and meaning are linked in a purely conventional way. Given this, I propose that the ability to transmit a learned symbolic system of communication from one generation to the next represents a key milestone in the evolution of language.

Michael Oliphant 1998-06-15Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/196 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/196 1998-06-15Z

Human language is a unique ability. It sits apart from other systems of communication in two striking ways: it is syntactic, and it is learned. While most approaches to the evolution of language have focused on the evolution of syntax, this paper explores the computational issues that arise in shifting from a simple innate communication system to an equally simple one that is learned. Associative network learning within an observational learning paradigm is used to explore the computational difficulties involved in establishing and maintaining a simple learned communication system. Because Hebbian learning is found to be sufficient for this task, it is proposed that the basic computational demands of learning are unlikely to account for the rarity of even simple learned communication systems. Instead, it is the problem of *observing* that is likely to be central -- in particular the problem of determining what meaning a signal is intended to convey.

Michael Oliphant 1998-09-06Z 2011-03-11T08:53:43Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/175 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/175 1998-09-06Z

Genetical models of the evolution of reciprocal altruism (as distinct from cooperation, mutualism, or nepotism) have difficulty explaining the initial establishment of an altruist gene in a selfish deme. Though potential mechanisms have been suggested, there is an alternative: much "altruistic" behavior may in fact be purely selfish in origin and consequently reciprocity need not be invoked to provide a selective benefit to the actor. _Sharing_ and _helping_ are fundamentally different behavior categories and should not be confused. Patterns of resource sharing in chimpanzees correspond to predictions made by a selfish model but not to those of a reciprocal altruism model, and many observations of human gift exchange are consistent with the selfish, but not the altruistic, model. This suggests that presumed hominid meat exchange may have been the result of competition, not altruism or even cooperation, and that evolutionary models of "altruistic" behavior should be treated with caution.

Jim Moore 1998-12-14Z 2011-03-11T08:54:17Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/774 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/774 1998-12-14Z

Preliminaty findings from an on-going study of monozygotic twins reared apart (MZA) and data from a larger sample of twins reared together (MZT and DZT), indicate a surprisingly strong influence of genetic variation on aptitudes, psychophysiological characteristics, personality traits and even dimensions of attitude and interest. For some of these variables, MZT and MZA twins show high intra-class correlations while DZT twins are no more similar than pairs of unrelated persons. It is suggested that such traits are “emergenic,” i.e., that they are determined by the interaction--rather than the sum--of genetic influences. Emergenic traits, although perhaps strongly genetic, will not tend to run in families and for this reason have been neglected by students of behavior genetics. For this and several other listed reasons, wider use of twins in psychological research is strongly recommended.

David T. Lykken 2011-12-16T00:58:34Z 2011-12-16T00:58:34Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7755 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7755 2011-12-16T00:58:34Z

The mathematical structures underlying the theories of organismic sets, (M, R)-systems and molecular sets are shown to be transformed naturally within the theory of categories and functors. Their natural transformations allow the comparison of distinct entities, as well as the modelling of dynamics in “organismic” structures.

Prof. Dr. I. C. Baianu ibaianu@illinois.edu 2000-06-07Z 2011-03-11T08:54:21Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/858 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/858 2000-06-07Z

In this article, past comparisons of learning and evolution as analogous processes are discussed and some inaccuracies and omissions in those discussions are pointed out. The evolutionary analogy is examined for its ability to suggest solutions to five fundamental theoretical issues about learning - superstitions, why a reinforcer has the effect it does, the relationship among various procedures yielding learning, the relevance of the matching law to the problem of what reinforces an avoidance response, and whether behavioral and cognitive views of learning can be reconciled. In each case it is argued that the analogy is instructive.

Marion Blute 2000-07-15Z 2011-03-11T08:54:21Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/866 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/866 2000-07-15Z

A theory of the evolution of lanaguage, beginning with bipedalism and lateralization, through instrumental and iconic gesture, to arcbitrary symbols, propositions and speech. The "translatability thesis" is also introduced, to the effect that all languages are intertranslatable (hence all can express any and every proposition).

Horst Dieter Steklis Stevan Harnad 2011-12-16T00:58:07Z 2011-12-16T00:58:07Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7753 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7753 2011-12-16T00:58:07Z

Transformations of dynamical systems and organismic structures are discussed in terms of adjoint, simple adjoint and weak adjoint functors of organismic supercategories during development and evolution of organisms on markedly different timescales. A representation of nuclear transplants in terms of adjoint functors and a novel interpretation of nuclear transplant experiments is proposed. Three new theorems are proven for adjoint dynamical systems representing multi-potent developing cells and additional results are obtained for weak adjoint systems such as differentiated (specialized) cells.

Prof. Dr. I. C. Baianu icb Prof.Dr. Dragos Scripcariu 2011-12-16T00:58:58Z 2011-12-16T00:58:58Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7752 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7752 2011-12-16T00:58:58Z

The representation of biological systems in terms of organismic supercategories, introduced in previous papers by Baianu et al. (Bull. Math. Biophysics,30, 625–636;31, 59–70) is further discussed. To state more clearly this representation some new definitions are introduced. Also, some necessary changes in axiomatics are made. The conclusion is reached that any organismic supercategory has at least one superpushout, and this expresses the fact that biological systems are multistable. This way a connection between some results of Rashevsky’s theory of organismic sets and our results becomes obvious.

Prof. Dr. I.C. Baianu icb 2004-10-06Z 2011-12-16T00:59:02Z http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3831 This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3831 2004-10-06Z

The representation of physical and complex biological systems in terms of organismic supercategories was introduced in 1968 by Baianu and Marinescu in the attached paper which was published in the Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, edited by Nicolas Rashevsky. The different approaches to relational biology, developed by Rashevsky, Rosen and by Baianu et al.(1968,1969,1973,1974,1987,2004)were later discussed. The present paper is an attempt to outline an abstract unitary theory of systems. In the introduction some of the previous abstract representations of systems are discussed. Also a possible connection of abstract representations of systems with a general theory of measure is proposed. Then follow some necessary definitions and authors' proposals for an axiomatic theory of systems. Finally some concrete examples are analyzed in the light of the proposed theory. An abstract representation of biological systems from the standpoint of the theory of supercategories is presented. The relevance of such representations forG-relational biologies is suggested. In section A the basic concepts of our representation, that is class, system, supercategory and measure are introduced. Section B is concerned with the mathematical representation starting with some axioms and principles which are natural extensions of the current abstract representations in biology. Likewise, some extensions of the principle of adequate design are introduced in section C. Two theorems which present the connection between categories and supercategories are proved. Two other theorems concerning the dynamical behavior of biological and biophysical systems are derived on the basis of the previous considerations. Section D is devoted to a general study of oscillatory behavior in enzymic systems, some general quantitative relations being derived from our representation. Finally, the relevance of these results for a quantum theoretic approach to biology is discussed. http://www.springerlink.com/content/141l35843506596h/

Prof. Dr. I.C. Baianu icb Dr. Mircea M. Marinescu