

Controlling Cars on a Bridge

Jean-Raymond Abrial
(edited by Thai Son Hoang)

Department of Computer Science
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich (ETH Zürich)

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Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 The Requirement Document
- 3 Formal Models
 - Initial Model
 - First Refinement
 - Second Refinement
 - Third Refinement



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Purpose of this Lecture (1)

- To present an **example of system development**
- Our approach: a series of **more and more accurate models**
- This approach is called **refinement**
- The models formalize the view of an **external observer**
- With each refinement **observer “zooms in”** to see more details



Purpose of this Lecture (2)

- Each model will be analyzed and **proved to be correct**
- The **aim** is to obtain a system that will be **correct by construction**
- The **correctness criteria** are formulated as **proof obligations**
- **Proofs** will be performed by using the **sequent calculus**
- **Inference rules** used in the sequent calculus will be **reviewed**



What you will Learn

- The concepts of **state** and **events** for defining models
- Some **principles** of system development:
invariants and **refinement**
- A refresher of **classical logic** and **simple arithmetic foundations**
- A refresher of **formal proofs**



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A Requirements Document (1)

- The system we are going to build is a **piece of software** connected to some **equipment**.
- There are two kinds of requirements:
 - those concerned with the **equipment**, labeled **EQP**,
 - those concerned with the **function** of the system, labeled **FUN**.
- The function of this system is to **control cars** on a **narrow bridge**.
- This bridge is supposed to link the **mainland** to a small **island**.




A Requirements Document (2)

The system is controlling cars on a bridge between the mainland and an island

FUN-1

- This can be illustrated as follows



A Requirements Document (3)

- The controller is equipped with two traffic lights with two colors.

The system has two traffic lights with two colors: green and red


EQP-1



A Requirements Document (4)

- One of the traffic lights is situated on the mainland and the other one on the island. Both are close to the bridge.

- This can be illustrated as follows



A Requirements Document (5)

The traffic lights control the entrance to the bridge at both ends of it

EQP-2

- Drivers are supposed to obey the traffic light by not passing when a traffic light is red.

Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one

EQP-3



A Requirements Document (6)

- There are also some car sensors situated at both ends of the bridge.
- These sensors are supposed to detect the presence of cars intending to enter or leave the bridge.
- There are four such sensors. Two of them are situated on the bridge and the other two are situated on the mainland and on the island.

The system is equipped with four car sensors each with two states: on or off	EQP-4
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


A Requirements Document (7)

The sensors are used to detect the presence of cars entering or leaving the bridge

EQP-5

- The pieces of equipment can be illustrated as follows:



A Requirements Document (8)

- This system has two main constraints: the number of cars on the bridge and the island is limited and the bridge is one way.

The number of cars on the bridge and the island is limited	FUN-2
--	-------

The bridge is one way or the other, not both at the same time	FUN-3
---	-------



The Reference Document (1)

The system is controlling cars on a bridge between the mainland and an island

FUN-1

The number of cars on the bridge and the island is limited

FUN-2

The bridge is one way or the other, not both at the same time

FUN-3



The Reference Document (2)

The system has two traffic lights with two colors: green and red

EQP-1

The traffic lights control the entrance to the bridge at both ends of it

EQP-2

Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one

EQP-3



The Reference Document (3)

The system is equipped with four car sensors each with two states: on or off

EQP-4

The sensors are used to detect the presence of cars entering or leaving the bridge

EQP-5



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Our Refinement Strategy

- **Initial model:** Limiting the number of cars (FUN-2)
- **First refinement:** Introducing the one way bridge (FUN-3)
- **Second refinement:** Introducing the traffic lights (EQP-1,2,3)
- **Third refinement:** Introducing the sensors (EQP-4,5)



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


Initial Model


- It is **very simple**
- We completely ignore the equipment: traffic lights and sensors
- We do not even consider the bridge
- We are just interested in the pair **“island-bridge”**
- We are focusing **FUN-2**: limited number of cars on island-bridge



A Situation as Seen from the Sky



Two Events that may be Observed



Formalizing the State: Constants and Axioms

- **STATIC PART** of the state: **constant** d with **axiom** $axm0_1$

constant: d

axm0_1: $d \in \mathbb{N}$

- d is the **maximum number of cars** allowed on the Island-Bridge
- $axm0_1$ states that d is a **natural number**
- Constant d is a member of the set $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$



Formalizing the State: variable

- **DYNAMIC PART:** **variable** v with **invariants** $inv0_1$ and $inv0_2$

variable: n

inv0_1: $n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2: $n \leq d$

- n is the **effective number of cars** on the Island-Bridge
- n is a natural number ($inv0_1$)
- n is always smaller than or equal to d ($inv0_2$): this is **FUN_2**




Naming Conventions

- Labels $axm0_1$, $inv0_1$, ... are chosen **systematically**
- The label axm or inv recalls the **purpose:** **axiom** of constants or **invariant** of variables
- The **0** as in $inv0_1$ stands for the initial model.
- Later we will have $inv1_1$ for an invariant of refinement **1**, etc.
- The **1** like in $inv0_1$ is a serial number
- Any convention is **valid** as long as it is **systematic**



Event ML_out

- This is the **first transition** (or event) that can be **observed**
- A car is leaving the mainland and entering the Island-Bridge




- The **number of cars** in the Island-Bridge is **incremented**



Event ML_in

- We can also observe a **second transition** (or event)
- A car leaving the Island-Bridge and re-entering the mainland



- The **number of cars** in the Island-Bridge is **decremented**



Formalizing the two Events: an **Approximation**

- Event ML_out **increments** the number of cars

$$\text{ML_out} \\ n := n + 1$$

- Event ML_in **decrements** the number of cars

$$\text{ML_in} \\ n := n - 1$$

- An event is denoted by its **name** and its **action** (an assignment)



Why an **Approximation**?

These events are approximations for **two reasons**:

- 1 They might be **refined** (made more precise) later
- 2 They might be **insufficient** at this stage because **not consistent with the invariant**

We have to perform a **proof** in order to **verify this consistency**.



Invariants

- An invariant is a **constraint** on the allowed values of the variables
- An invariant **must hold on all reachable states** of a model
- To verify that this holds we must show that
 1. the invariant holds for **initial states** (later), and
 2. the invariant is **preserved by all events** (following slides)
- We will formalize these two statements as **proof obligations (POs)**
- We need a **rigorous proof** showing that these POs indeed hold



Towards the Proof: Before-after Predicates

- To each event can be associated a **before-after predicate**
- It describes the **relation** between the **values** of the variable(s) *just before* and *just after* the event occurrence
- The **before-value** is denoted by the **variable name**, say n
- The **after-value** is denoted by the **primed variable name**, say n'



ML_out
 $n := n + 1$

ML_in
 $n := n - 1$

The Events

The corresponding **before-after** predicates

$n' = n + 1$

$n' = n - 1$

These representations are equivalent.



About the Shape of the Before-after Predicates

- The before-after predicates we have shown are **very simple**
- The after-value n' is defined as a **function** of the before-value n
- This is because the corresponding events are **deterministic**
- In later lectures, we shall consider some **non-deterministic** events:

$$n' = n + 1 \quad n' = n - 1$$

$$n' \in \{n + 1, n + 2\}$$



Intuition about Invariant Preservation

- Let us consider invariant **inv0_1**
- And let us consider event ML_out with before-after predicate
- **Preservation of inv0_1** means that we have (just after ML_out):

$$n \in \mathbb{N}$$

$$n' = n + 1$$

$$n' \in \mathbb{N} \quad \text{that is} \quad n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$$



Being more Precise

- Under **hypothesis** $n \in \mathbb{N}$ the **conclusion** $n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$ holds
- This can be written as follows

$$n \in \mathbb{N} \vdash n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$$

- This type of statement is called a **sequent** (next slide)
- Sequent above: **invariant preservation proof obligation for inv0_1**
- More **General form** of this PO will be introduced shortly



Sequents

- A **sequent** is a formal statement of the following shape

$$H \vdash G$$

- **H** denotes a **set of predicates**: the **hypotheses** (or **assumptions**)
- **G** denotes a predicate: the **goal** (or **conclusion**)
- The symbol " \vdash ", called the **turnstile**, stands for **provability**.
It is read: "**Assumptions H yield conclusion G**"



Proof Obligation: Invariant Preservation (1)

- We collectively denote our set of **constants** by **c**
- We denote our set of **axiomss** by **A(c)**: $A_1(c), A_2(c), \dots$
- We collectively denote our set of **variables** by **v**
- We denote our set of **invariants** by **I(c, v)**: $I_1(c, v), I_2(c, v), \dots$



Proof Obligation: Invariant Preservation (2)

- We are given an **event** with **before-after predicate** $v' = E(c, v)$
- The following sequent expresses **preservation of invariant** $I_i(c, v)$:

$$A(c), I(c, v) \vdash I_i(c, E(c, v)) \quad \text{INV}$$

- It says: $I_i(c, E(c, v))$ provable under hypotheses $A(c)$ and $I(c, v)$
- We have given the name **INV** to this proof obligation



Explanation of the Proof Obligation

$A(c), I(c, v) \vdash I_i(c, E(c, v))$	INV
--	-----

- We assume that $A(c)$ as well as $I(c, v)$ hold just before the occurrence of the event represented by $v' = E(c, v)$
- Just after the occurrence, invariant $I_i(c, v)$ becomes $I_i(c, v')$, that is, $I_i(c, E(c, v))$
- The predicate $I_i(c, E(c, v))$ must then hold for $I_i(c, v)$ to be an invariant



Vertical Layout of Proof Obligations

- The proof obligation

$A(c), I(c, v) \vdash I_i(c, E(c, v))$	INV
--	-----

- can be re-written vertically as follows:

Axioms Invariants ⊢ Modified Invariant	$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ ⊢ $I_i(c, E(c, v))$	INV
---	---	-----



Back to our Example

- We have **two events**

ML_out $n := n + 1$

ML_in $n := n - 1$

- And **two invariants**

inv0_1: $n \in \mathbb{N}$

inv0_2: $n \leq d$

- Thus, we need to prove **four proof obligations**



Proof obligation for ML_out and inv0_1

ML_out $n := n + 1$	$(n' = n + 1)$
------------------------	----------------

Axiom axm0_1 Invariant inv0_1 Invariant inv0_2 ⊢ Modified Invariant inv0_1
--

$d \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \leq d$ ⊢ $n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$

- This proof obligation is named: **ML_out / inv0_1 / INV**



Proof obligation for ML_out and inv0_2

ML_out
 $n := n + 1$

$(n' = n + 1)$

Axiom **axm0_1**
Invariant **inv0_1**
Invariant **inv0_2**
⊢
Modified Invariant **inv0_2**

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n + 1 \leq d$

- This proof obligation is named: **ML_out / inv0_2 / INV**



Proof obligation for ML_in and inv0_1

ML_in
 $n := n - 1$

$(n' = n - 1)$

Axiom **axm0_1**
Invariant **inv0_1**
Invariant **inv0_2**
⊢
Modified Invariant **inv0_1**

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n - 1 \in \mathbb{N}$

- This proof obligation is named: **ML_in / inv0_1 / INV**



Proof obligation for ML_in and inv0_2

ML_in
 $n := n - 1$

$(n' = n - 1)$

Axiom **axm0_1**
Invariant **inv0_1**
Invariant **inv0_2**
⊢
Modified Invariant **inv0_2**

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n - 1 \leq d$

- This proof obligation is named: **ML_in / inv0_2 / INV**



Summary of Proof Obligations

ML_out / inv0_1 / INV

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$

ML_out / inv0_2 / INV

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n + 1 \leq d$

ML_in / inv0_1 / INV


$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n - 1 \in \mathbb{N}$

ML_in / inv0_2 / INV

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
⊢
 $n - 1 \leq d$




Informal Proof of ML_out / inv0_1 / INV



- In the first step, we **remove some irrelevant hypotheses**
- In the second and final step, we **accept the sequent as it is**
- We have implicitly applied **inference rules**
- For **rigorous reasoning** we will make these rules **explicit**



Inference Rules




- Above horizontal line: n sequents called **antecedents** ($n \geq 0$)
- Below horizontal line: exactly one sequent called **consequent**
- To prove the consequent, **it is sufficient** to prove the antecedents
- A rule with no antecedent ($n = 0$) is called an **axiom**



Inference Rule: Monotonicity of Hypotheses

- The rule that removes hypotheses can be stated as follows:





- It expresses the **monotonicity** of the hypotheses



Some Arithmetic Rules of Inference

- The **Second Peano Axiom**



More Arithmetic Rules of Inference

- Axioms about **ordering relations** on the integers

$$\frac{}{n < m \vdash n + 1 \leq m} \text{ INC}$$

$$\frac{}{n \leq m \vdash n - 1 \leq m} \text{ DEC}$$



Application of Inference Rules

- Consider again the **2nd Peano axiom**:

$$\frac{}{n \in \mathbb{N} \vdash n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}} \text{ P2}$$

- It is a **rule schema** where **n** is called a **meta-variable**

- It can be applied to following sequent by **matching** $a + b$ with **n**:

$$a + b \in \mathbb{N} \vdash a + b + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$$



Proofs

- A **proof** is a **tree of sequents** with axioms at the leaves.
- The rules applied to the **leaves are axioms**.
- Each sequent is **labeled with** (name of) **proof rule** applied to it.
- The sequent at the root of the tree is called the **root sequent**.
- The **purpose** of a proof is to establish the **truth** of its root sequent.




A Formal Proof of: ML_out / inv0_1 / INV

$$\frac{\frac{d \in \mathbb{N} \quad n \in \mathbb{N} \quad n \leq d}{\vdash n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}} \text{ MON}}{n \in \mathbb{N} \vdash n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}} \text{ P2}$$


- Proof requires only application of two rules: **MON** and **P2**




A Failed Proof Attempt: ML_out / inv0_2 / INV




- We put a **?** to indicate that **we have no rule to apply**
- The proof fails: we cannot conclude with rule INC ($n < d$ needed)





A Failed Proof Attempt: ML_in / inv0_1 / INV



- The proof fails: we cannot conclude with rule P2' ($0 < n$ needed)





A Formal Proof of: ML_in / inv0_2 / INV



Reasons for Proof Failure

- We needed hypothesis $n < d$ to prove **ML_out / inv0_2 / INV**
- We needed hypothesis $0 < n$ to prove **ML_in / inv0_1 / INV**



- We are going to add $n < d$ as a **guard** to event ML_out
- We are going to add $0 < n$ as a **guard** to event ML_in



Improving the Events: Introducing Guards

```
ML_out
when
  n < d
then
  n := n + 1
end
```

```
ML_in
when
  0 < n
then
  n := n - 1
end
```

- We are adding **guards** to the events
- The guard is the **necessary condition** for an event to “occur”



Proof Obligation: General Invariant Preservation

- Given c with **axioms** $A(c)$ and v with **invariants** $I(c, v)$
- Given an **event** with **guard** $G(c, v)$ and **b-a predicate** $v' = E(c, v)$
- We modify the Invariant Preservation PO as follows:

```
Axioms
Invariants
Guard of the event
┌
Modified Invariant
```

$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ $G(c, v)$ \vdash $I_i(c, E(c, v))$	INV
---	------------



A Formal Proof of: ML_out / inv0_1 / INV

```
d ∈ ℕ
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
n < d
┌
n + 1 ∈ ℕ
```

MON

```
n ∈ ℕ
┌
n + 1 ∈ ℕ
```

P2

- Adding new assumptions to a sequent **does not affect its provability**



A Formal Proof of: ML_out / inv0_2 / INV

```
d ∈ ℕ
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
n < d
┌
n + 1 ≤ d
```

MON

```
n < d
┌
n + 1 ≤ d
```


INC

- Now we can conclude the proof using rule INC


$n < m \vdash n + 1 \leq m$	INC
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
A Formal Proof: ML_in / inv0_1 / INV



- Now we can conclude the proof using rule P2'




A Formal Proof: ML_in / inv0_2 / INV



- Again, the proof still works after the addition of a new assumption




Re-proving the Events: No Proofs Fail




Initialization

- Our system must be **initialized** (with no car in the island-bridge)
- The initialization event is **never guarded**
- It does **not mention any variable** on the right hand side of :=
- Its before-after predicate is just an **after predicate**




Proof Obligation: Invariant Establishment

- Given c with axioms $A(c)$ and v with invariants $I(c, v)$
- Given an init event with after predicate $v' = K(c)$
- The Invariant Establishment PO is the following:




Applying the Invariant Establishment PO




More Arithmetic Inference Rules


- First Peano Axiom



- Third Peano Axiom (slightly modified)



Proofs of Invariant Establishment



A Missing Requirement

- It is possible for the system to be blocked if both guards are false
- We do not want this to happen
- We figure out that one important requirement was missing

Once started, the system should work for ever	FUN-4
---	-------



Proof Obligation: Deadlock Freedom

- Given c with axioms $A(c)$ and v with invariants $I(c, v)$
- Given the guards $G_1(c, v), \dots, G_m(c, v)$ of the events
- We have to prove the following:

$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ \vdash $G_1(c, v) \vee \dots \vee G_m(c, v)$	DLF
---	-----



Applying the Deadlock Freedom PO

axm0_1 inv0_1 inv0_2 \vdash <p>Disjunction of guards</p>
--

$d \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \leq d$ \vdash $n < d \vee 0 < n$
--

- This cannot be proved with the inference rules we have so far
- $n \leq d$ can be replaced by $n = d \vee n < d$
- We continue our proof by a case analysis:
 - case 1: $n = d$
 - case 2: $n < d$



Inference Rules for Disjunction

- Proof by case analysis


$\frac{H, P \vdash R \quad H, Q \vdash R}{H, P \vee Q \vdash R} \text{ OR_L}$
--

- Choice for proving a disjunctive goal


$\frac{H \vdash P}{H \vdash P \vee Q} \text{ OR_R1}$	$\frac{H \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \vee Q} \text{ OR_R2}$
---	---




Proof of Deadlock Freedom



Proof of Deadlock Freedom (cont'd)



Proof of Deadlock Freedom (cont'd)



- The first ? seems to be obvious
- The second ? can be (partially) solved by applying the equality




More Inference Rules: Identity and Equality


- The identity axiom (conclusion holds by hypothesis)




- Rewriting an equality (EQ_LR) and reflexivity of equality (EQL)



Proof of Deadlock Freedom (end)



 - We still have a problem: *d must be positive!*

Adding the Forgotten Axiom

- If *d* is equal to 0, then **no car can ever enter the Island-Bridge**

axm0_2: $0 < d$



Initial Model: Conclusion

- Thanks to the **proofs**, we discovered **3 errors**
- They were corrected by:
 - **adding guards** to both events
 - **adding an axiom**
- The **interaction of modeling and proving** is an essential element of Formal Methods with Proofs




Proof Obligations for Initial Model


- We have seen three kinds of proof obligations:
 - The **Invariant Establishment** PO: INV
 - The **Invariant Preservation** PO: INV
 - The **Deadlock Freedom** PO (optional): DLF



Proof Obligations for Initial Model (cont'd)



Summary of Initial Model




Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 The Requirement Document
- 3 Formal Models
 - Initial Model
 - First Refinement
 - Second Refinement
 - Third Refinement





Reminder of the physical system




First Refinement: Introducing a One-Way Bridge

- We go down with our **parachute**
- Our **view** of the system gets **more accurate**
- We introduce the **bridge** and **separate it from the island**
- We **refine** the state and the events
- We also add **two new events**: **IL_in** and **IL_out**
- We are focusing on **FUN-3**: one-way bridge



Introducing Three New Variables: a , b , and c



- a denotes the number of cars **on bridge** going **to island**
- b denotes the number of cars **on island**
- c denotes the number of cars **on bridge** going **to mainland**
- a , b , and c are the **concrete variables**
- They **replace the abstract variable n**



Refining the State: Formalizing Variables a , b , and c

- Variables a , b , and c denote **natural numbers**

$$\begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}$$



Refining the State: Introducing New Invariants

- Relating the **concrete state** (a, b, c) to the **abstract state** (n)

$$a + b + c = n$$

- Formalizing the new invariant: **one way bridge** (this is **FUN-3**)

$$a = 0 \vee c = 0$$



Refining the State: Summary

constants: d
variables: a, b, c

inv1_1: $a \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1_2: $b \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1_3: $c \in \mathbb{N}$


inv1_4: $a + b + c = n$

inv1_5: $a = 0 \vee c = 0$

- Invariants **inv1_1** to **inv1_5** are called the **concrete invariants**
- **inv1_4** glues the abstract state, n , to the concrete state, a, b, c




Proposal for Refining Event ML_out



ML_out
when
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
then
 $a := a + 1$
end



Proposal for Refining Event ML_in



ML_in
when
 $0 < c$
then
 $c := c - 1$
end



B-A Predicates: Preserved Variables

```
ML_out
when
  a + b < d
  c = 0
then
  a := a + 1
end
```

```
ML_in
when
  0 < c
then
  c := c - 1
end
```

Before-after predicates showing the unmodified variables:

$$a' = a + 1 \wedge b' = b \wedge c' = c$$

$$a' = a \wedge b' = b \wedge c' = c - 1$$


Intuition about Refinement

The concrete model behaves as specified by the abstract model (i.e., concrete model does not exhibit any new behaviors)

To show this we have to prove that

- every concrete event is simulated by its abstract counterpart (event refinement: following slides)
- to every concrete initial state corresponds an abstract one (initial state refinement: later)

We will make these two conditions more precise and formalize them as proof obligations.



Intuition about refinement (1)

```
(abstract_)ML_out
when
  n < d
then
  n := n + 1
end
```

```
(concrete_)ML_out
when
  a + b < d
  c = 0
then
  a := a + 1
end
```

- The concrete version is not contradictory with the abstract one
- When the concrete version is enabled then so is the abstract one
- Executions seem to be compatible



Intuition about refinement (2)

```
(abstract_)ML_in
when
  0 < n
then
  n := n - 1
end
```

```
(concrete_)ML_in
when
  0 < c
then
  c := c - 1
end
```

- Same remarks as in the previous slide
- But this has to be confirmed by well-defined proof obligations



Proof Obligations for Refinement

- The concrete guard is **stronger** than the abstract one
- Each concrete action is **compatible** with its abstract counterpart



Proving Correct Refinement: the Situation

Constants c with **axioms** $A(c)$

Abstract variables v with **abstract invariant** $I(c, v)$

Concrete variables w with **concrete invariant** $J(c, v, w)$


Abstract event with **guards** $G(c, v)$: $G_1(c, v), G_2(c, v), \dots$

Abstract event with **before-after predicate** $v' = E(c, v)$

Concrete event with **guards** $H(c, w)$ and **b-a predicate** $w' = F(c, w)$



Correctness of Event Refinement



1. The concrete guard is **stronger** than the abstract one (**Guard Strengthening, following slides**)
2. Each concrete action is **simulated by** its abstract counterpart (**Concrete Invariant Preservation, later**)



Proof Obligation: Guard Strengthening

Axioms
Abstract Invariant
Concrete Invariant
Concrete Guard
⊢
Abstract Guard

$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ $J(c, v, w)$ $H(c, w)$ ⊢ $G_i(c, v)$	GRD
--	-----



Proof Obligations for Guard Strengthening

- ML_out / GRD
- ML_in / GRD



Applying Guard Strengthening to Event ML_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of ML_out

⊢
Abstract guard of ML_out

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
⊢
 $n < d$


ML_out / GRD

(abstract-)ML_out
when
 $n < d$
then
 $n := n + 1$
end

(concrete-)ML_out
when
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
then
 $a := a + 1$
end



Proof of ML_out / GRD



Applying Guard Strengthening to Event ML_in

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guard of ML_in

⊢
Abstract guard of ML_in

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < c$
⊢
 $0 < n$


ML_in / GRD

(abstract-)ML_in
when
 $0 < n$
then
 $n := n - 1$
end


(concrete-)ML_in
when
 $0 < c$
then
 $c := c - 1$
end



Proof of ML_in / GRD



Proof of ML_in / GRD




An Additional Rule: the Contradiction Rule

- In the previous proof, we have used and additional inference rule
- It says that a **false hypothesis entails any goal**



Correctness of Invariant Refinement



Proof Obligation: Invariant Refinement

<p>Axioms Abstract Invariants Concrete Invariants Concrete Guards ⊢ Modified Concrete Invariant</p>	<p>$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ $J(c, v, w)$ $H(c, w)$ ⊢ $J_j(c, E(c, v), F(c, w))$</p>	<p>INV</p>
---	--	------------



Overview of Proof Obligations

- ML_out / GRD **done**
- ML_in / GRD **done**
- ML_out / inv1_4 / INV
- ML_out / inv1_5 / INV
- ML_in / inv1_4 / INV
- ML_in / inv1_5 / INV



Applying Invariant Refinement to Event ML_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of ML_out

⊢
Modified Invariant inv1_4

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
⊢
 $a + 1 + b + c = n + 1$


ML_out / inv1_4 / INV

(abstract-)ML_out
when
 $n < d$
then
 $n := n + 1$
end

(concrete-)ML_out
when
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
then
 $a := a + 1$
end



Proof of ML_out / inv1_4 / INV



Applying Invariant Refinement to Event ML_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of ML_out

$$\begin{aligned} & d \in \mathbb{N} \\ & 0 < d \\ & n \in \mathbb{N} \\ & n \leq d \\ & a \in \mathbb{N} \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ & a + b + c = n \\ & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ & a + b < d \\ & c = 0 \\ \vdash & a + 1 = 0 \vee c = 0 \end{aligned}$$

ML_out / inv1_5 / INV

Modified Invariant inv1_5

(abstract-)ML_out
when
 $n < d$
then
 $n := n + 1$
end

(concrete-)ML_out
when
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
then
 $a := a + 1$
end



Proof of ML_out / inv1_5 / INV

$$\begin{aligned} & d \in \mathbb{N} \\ & 0 < d \\ & n \in \mathbb{N} \\ & n \leq d \\ & a \in \mathbb{N} \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ & a + b + c = n \\ & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ & a + b < d \\ \vdash & c = 0 \\ & a + 1 = 0 \vee c = 0 \end{aligned}$$

MON

$$\begin{aligned} & c = 0 \\ \vdash & a + 1 = 0 \vee c = 0 \end{aligned}$$

OR_R2

$$\begin{aligned} & c = 0 \\ \vdash & c = 0 \end{aligned}$$

HYP



Applying Invariant Refinement to Event ML_in

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of ML_in

$$\begin{aligned} & d \in \mathbb{N} \\ & 0 < d \\ & n \in \mathbb{N} \\ & n \leq d \\ & a \in \mathbb{N} \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ & a + b + c = n \\ & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ & 0 < c \\ \vdash & a + b + c - 1 = n - 1 \end{aligned}$$

ML_in / inv1_4 / INV

Modified Invariant inv1_4

(abstract-)ML_in
when
 $0 < n$
then
 $n := n - 1$
end

(concrete-)ML_in
when
 $0 < c$
then
 $c := c - 1$
end



Proof of ML_in / inv1_4 / INV

$$\begin{aligned} & d \in \mathbb{N} \\ & 0 < d \\ & n \in \mathbb{N} \\ & n \leq d \\ & a \in \mathbb{N} \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ & a + b + c = n \\ & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ & 0 < c \\ \vdash & a + b + c - 1 = n - 1 \end{aligned}$$

MON

$$\begin{aligned} & a + b + c = n \\ \vdash & a + b + c - 1 = n - 1 \end{aligned}$$

EQ_LR

$\vdash n - 1 = n - 1$ EQL



Applying Invariant Refinement to Event ML_in

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of ML_in
Modified Invariant **inv1_5**

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$

ML_in / inv1_5 / INV

(abstract-)ML_in
when
 $0 < n$
then
 $n := n - 1$
end

(concrete-)ML_in
when
 $0 < c$
then
 $c := c - 1$
end



Proof of ML_in / inv1_5 / INV

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$

MON
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$

OR_L
MON ...
 $a = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$
EQ_LR ...
 $c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$



Proof of ML_in / inv1_5 / INV

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$

MON
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$

OR_L
MON ...
 $a = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$
EQ_LR ...
 $c = 0$
 $0 < c$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$

OR_R1
 $a = 0$
 $\vdash a = 0 \vee c - 1 = 0$
HYP
 $a = 0 \vdash a = 0$
ARITH
 $0 < 0 \vdash a = 0 \vee -1 = 0$
CNTR
 $\perp \vdash a = 0 \vee -1 = 0$



Refining the Initialization Event **init**

- Concrete initialization

init
 $a := 0$
 $b := 0$
 $c := 0$

- Corresponding after predicate

$a' = 0 \wedge b' = 0 \wedge c' = 0$



Proof Obligation: Initialization Refinement

Constants c with axioms $A(c)$

Concrete invariant $J(c, v, w)$

Abstract initialization with after predicate $v' = K(c)$

Concrete initialization with after predicate $w' = L(c)$

Axioms \vdash Modified concrete invariants	$A(c)$ \vdash $J_j(c, K(c), L(c))$	INV
--	--	-----



Overview of Proof Obligations

- ML_out / GRD **done**
- ML_in / GRD **done**
- ML_out / **inv1_4** / INV **done**
- ML_out / **inv1_5** / INV **done**
- ML_in / **inv1_4** / INV **done**
- ML_in / **inv1_5** / INV **done**
- **inv1_4** / INV
- **inv1_5** / INV



Applying the Initialization Refinement PO

axm0_1 axm0_2 \vdash Modified concrete invariant inv1_4 $(a + b + c = n)$
--

$d \in \mathbb{N}$ $d > 0$ \vdash $0 + 0 + 0 = 0$
--

axm0_1 axm0_2 \vdash Modified concrete invariant inv1_5 $(a = 0 \vee c = 0)$

$d \in \mathbb{N}$ $d > 0$ \vdash $0 = 0 \vee 0 = 0$




Adding New Events

- new events add transitions that have **no abstract counterpart**
- can be seen as a kind of **internal steps** (w.r.t. abstract model)
- can only be seen by an **observer** who is “**zooming in**”
- **temporal refinement**: refined model has a finer time granularity




New Event IL_in



```
IL_in
when
  0 < a
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
end
```



New Event IL_out



```
IL_out
when
  0 < b
  a = 0
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
```



Several Actions Done Together

```
IL_in
when
  0 < a
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
end
```

```
IL_out
when
  0 < b
  a = 0
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
```

Before-after predicates

$$a' = a + 1 \wedge b' = b + 1 \wedge c' = c$$

$$a' = a \wedge b' = b - 1 \wedge c' = c + 1$$


The empty assignment: **skip**

The before-after predicate of **skip** in the **initial model**

$$n' = n$$

The before-after predicate of **skip** in the **first refinement**

$$a' = a \wedge b' = b \wedge c' = c$$

The guard of the **skip** event is **true**.



Refinement Proof Obligations for New Events

- (1) A new event must **refine an implicit event**, made of a **skip action**
 - Guard strengthening is **trivial**
 - Need to prove **invariant refinement**
- (2) The new events **must not diverge**
 - To prove this we have to exhibit a **variant**
 - The variant yields a **natural number** (could be more complex)
 - Each new event must **decrease this variant**



Overview of Proof Obligations

- ML_out / GRD **done**
- ML_in / GRD **done**
- ML_out / inv1_4 / INV **done**
- ML_out / inv1_5 / INV **done**
- ML_in / inv1_4 / INV **done**
- ML_in / inv1_5 / INV **done**
- inv1_4 / INV **done**
- inv1_5 / INV **done**
- IL_in / inv1_4 / INV
- IL_in / inv1_5 / INV
- IL_out / inv1_4 / INV
- IL_out / inv1_5 / INV



Event IL_in Refines skip (1)

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of IL_in
⊢
Modified Invariant inv1_4

$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ 0 < d \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ 0 < a \\ \vdash \\ a - 1 + b + 1 + c = n \end{array}$$

IL_in / inv1_4 / INV

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{IL_in} \\ \text{when} \\ 0 < a \\ \text{then} \\ a := a - 1 \\ b := b + 1 \\ \text{end} \end{array}$$


Proof of IL_in / inv1_4 / INV

$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ 0 < d \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ 0 < a \\ \vdash \\ a - 1 + b + 1 + c = n \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l} a + b + c = n \\ \vdash \\ a - 1 + b + 1 + c = n \end{array}$$

ARITH

$$\begin{array}{l} a + b + c = n \\ \vdash \\ a + b + c = n \end{array}$$

HYP



Event IL_in Refines skip (2)

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of IL_in
Modified Invariant inv1_5

$$\begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 0 < d \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 a + b + c = n \\
 a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 0 < a \\
 \vdash \\
 a - 1 = 0 \vee c = 0
 \end{array}$$

IL_in / inv1_5 / INV

```

IL_in
when
  0 < a
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
end
    
```



Proof of IL_in / inv1_5 / INV

$$\begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 0 < d \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 a + b + c = n \\
 a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 0 < a \\
 \vdash \\
 a - 1 = 0 \vee c = 0
 \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l}
 a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 0 < a \\
 \vdash \\
 a - 1 = 0 \vee c = 0
 \end{array}$$

OR_L ...



Proof of IL_in / inv1_5 / INV

$$\begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 0 < d \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 a + b + c = n \\
 a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 0 < a \\
 \vdash \\
 a - 1 = 0 \vee c = 0
 \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l}
 a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 0 < a \\
 \vdash \\
 a - 1 = 0 \vee c = 0
 \end{array}$$

OR_L ...



Proof Obligation: Convergence of New Events (1)

Axioms $A(c)$, invariants $I(c, v)$, concrete invariant $J(c, v, w)$
 New event with guard $H(c, w)$
 Variant $V(c, w)$

Axioms Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guard of a new event \vdash Variant $\in \mathbb{N}$	$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ $J(c, v, w)$ $H(c, w)$ \vdash $V(c, w) \in \mathbb{N}$	NAT
---	--	-----



Proof Obligation: Convergence of New Events (2)

Axioms $A(c)$, invariants $I(c, v)$, concrete invariant $J(c, v, w)$
New event with guard $H(c, w)$ and **b-a predicate** $w' = F(c, w)$
Variant $V(c, w)$

Axioms Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guard ⊢ Modified Var. < Var.	$A(c)$ $I(c, v)$ $J(c, v, w)$ $H(c, w)$ ⊢ $V(c, F(c, w)) < V(c, w)$	VAR
---	--	-----



Proposed Variant

variant_1: $2 * a + b$

- Weighted sum of a and b



Overview of Proof Obligations

- ML_out / GRD done
- ML_in / GRD done
- ML_out / inv1_4 / INV done
- ML_out / inv1_5 / INV done
- ML_in / inv1_4 / INV done
- ML_in / inv1_5 / INV done
- inv1_4 / INV done
- inv1_5 / INV done
- IL_in / inv1_4 / INV done
- IL_in / inv1_5 / INV done
- IL_out / inv1_4 / INV done
- IL_out / inv1_5 / INV done
- IL_in / NAT
- IL_out / NAT
- IL_in / VAR
- IL_out / VAR



Decreasing of the Variant by Event IL_in

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guard of IL_in
⊢
Modified variant < Variant

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $0 < a$
⊢
 $2 * (a - 1) + b + 1 < 2 * a + b$

IL_in / VAR

IL_in
when
 $0 < a$
then
 $a := a - 1$
 $b := b + 1$
end



Decreasing of the Variant by Event IL_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Concrete guards of IL_out

⊢
Modified variant < Variant

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & 0 < d \\
 & n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & n \leq d \\
 & a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & a + b + c = n \\
 & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 & 0 < b \\
 & a = 0 \\
 & \vdash 2 * a + b - 1 < 2 * a + b
 \end{aligned}$$

IL_out / VAR

```

IL_out
when
  0 < b
  a = 0
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
    
```



Relative Deadlock Freedom

There a **no new deadlocks in the concrete model**, that is, all deadlocks of the concrete model are already present in the abstract model.

Proof obligation requires that **whenever some abstract event is enabled then so is some concrete event**.

This proof obligation is **optional** (depending on system under study).



Proof Obligation: Relative Deadlock Freedom

The $G_i(c, v)$ are the abstract guards
The $H_i(c, v)$ are the concrete guards
If some abstract guard is true then so is some concrete guard:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & A(c) \\
 & I(c, v) \\
 & J(c, v, w) \\
 & G_1(c, v) \vee \dots \vee G_m(c, v) \\
 & \vdash \\
 & H_1(c, w) \vee \dots \vee H_n(c, w)
 \end{aligned}$$

DLF



Applying the Relative Deadlock Freedom PO

axm0_1
axm0_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
Disjunction of abstract guards
⊢
Disjunction of concrete guards

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & 0 < d \\
 & n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & n \leq d \\
 & a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & a + b + c = n \\
 & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 & 0 < n \vee n < d \\
 & \vdash (a + b < d \wedge c = 0) \vee \\
 & \quad (c > 0 \vee a > 0) \\
 & \quad (b > 0 \wedge a = 0)
 \end{aligned}$$

DLF

```

ML_out
when
  a + b < d
  c = 0
then
  a := a + 1
end
    
```

```

ML_in
when
  c > 0
then
  c := c - 1
end
    
```

```

IL_in
when
  a > 0
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
end
    
```

```

IL_out
when
  b > 0
  a = 0
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
    
```



More Inference Rules: Negation and Conjunction

$$\frac{H, \neg P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \vee Q} \text{ NEG}$$

$$\frac{H, P, Q \vdash R}{H, P \wedge Q \vdash R} \text{ AND_L}$$

$$\frac{H \vdash P \quad H \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \wedge Q} \text{ AND_R}$$



Proof of DLF

$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ 0 < d \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge c = 0) \vee \\ (a > 0 \vee \\ a > 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0)) \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge c = 0) \vee \\ c > 0 \vee \\ a > 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0) \end{array}$$

NEG

$$\begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ \neg (c > 0) \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge c = 0) \vee \\ a > 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0) \end{array}$$

ARITH



Proof of DLF

$$\begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ c = 0 \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge c = 0) \vee \\ a > 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0) \end{array} \xrightarrow{\text{EQ_LR}} \begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + 0 = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge 0 = 0) \vee \\ a > 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0) \end{array} \xrightarrow{\text{NEG}} \begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + 0 = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge 0 = 0) \vee \\ a > 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0) \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} a \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + 0 = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \neg (a > 0) \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge 0 = 0) \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge a = 0) \end{array} \text{ ARITH } \dots$$




Proof of DLF (cont'd)

$$\begin{array}{l} a + b + 0 = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ a = 0 \\ \vdash \\ (a + b < d \wedge 0 = 0) \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge 0 = 0) \end{array} \xrightarrow{\text{EQ_LR}} \begin{array}{l} 0 + b + 0 = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ 0 + b < d \wedge 0 = 0 \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge 0 = 0) \end{array} \xrightarrow{\text{ARITH}} \dots$$

$$\begin{array}{l} b = n \\ n > 0 \vee n < d \\ \vdash \\ (b < d \wedge 0 = 0) \vee \\ (b > 0 \wedge 0 = 0) \end{array} \text{ EQ_LR } \dots$$



Proof of DLF (cont'd)



Overview of Proof Obligations


- ML_out / GRD **done**
- ML_in / GRD **done**
- ML_out / inv1_4 / INV **done**
- ML_out / inv1_5 / INV **done**
- ML_in / inv1_4 / INV **done**
- ML_in / inv1_5 / INV **done**
- inv1_4 / INV **done**
- inv1_5 / INV **done**
- IL_in / inv1_4 / INV **done**
- IL_in / inv1_5 / INV **done**
- IL_out / inv1_4 / INV **done**
- IL_out / inv1_5 / INV **done**
- IL_in / NAT **done**
- IL_out / NAT **done**
- IL_in / VAR **done**
- IL_out / VAR **done**
- DLF **done**



Summary of Refinement POs

- For old events:
 - Strengthening of guards: **GRD**
 - Concrete invariant preservation: **INV**
- For new events:
 - Refining the implicit skip event: **INV**
 - Absence of divergence: **NAT** and **VAR**
- For all events:
 - Relative deadlock freedom: **DLF**

Proof Obligations for Refinement (1/2)



Proof Obligations for Refinement (2/2)

Axioms Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guards of a new event \vdash Variant $\in \mathbb{N}$	NAT
--	-----

Axioms Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guards of a new event \vdash Modified variant $<$ Variant	VAR
--	-----

Axioms Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Disjunction of abstract events guards \vdash Disjunction of concrete events guards	DLF
--	-----



State of the First Refinement

constants: d

variables: a, b, c

inv1_1: $a \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1_2: $b \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1_3: $c \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1_4: $a + b + c = n$

inv1_5: $a = 0 \vee c = 0$

variant1: $2 * a + b$



Events of the First Refinement

init

$a := 0$
 $b := 0$
 $c := 0$

ML_in

when
 $0 < c$
then
 $c := c - 1$
end

ML_out

when
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
then
 $a := a + 1$
end

IL_in

when
 $0 < a$
then
 $a := a - 1$
 $b := b + 1$
end

IL_out

when
 $0 < b$
 $a = 0$
then
 $b := b - 1$
 $c := c + 1$
end




Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 The Requirement Document
- 3 **Formal Models**
 - Initial Model
 - First Refinement
 - **Second Refinement**
 - Third Refinement



Second Refinement: Introducing Traffic Lights



Extending the Constants

set: `COLOR`

constants: `red, green`

axm2_1: `COLOR = {green, red}`

axm2_2: `green ≠ red`



Extending the Variables


$il_tl \in COLOR$

$ml_tl \in COLOR$

Remark: Events `IL_in` and `ML_in` are **not modified** in this refinement




Extending the Invariant (1)



- A green **mainland traffic light** implies **safe access** to the bridge




Extending the Invariant (1)



- A green mainland traffic light implies safe access to the bridge

$$ml_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow c = 0 \wedge a + b < d$$


Refining Event ML_out



```
(abstract_)ML_out
when
  c = 0
  a + b < d
then
  a := a + 1
end
```




Refining Event ML_out



```
(abstract_)ML_out
when
  c = 0
  a + b < d
then
  a := a + 1
end
```

```
(concrete_)ML_out
when
  ml_tl = green
then
  a := a + 1
end
```


Extending the Invariant (2)



- A green island traffic light implies safe access to the bridge



Extending the Invariant (2)




- A green **island traffic light** implies **safe access** to the bridge

$$il_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow a = 0 \wedge 0 < b$$




Refining Event IL_out



```
(abstract_)IL_out
when
  a = 0
  0 < b
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
end
```



Refining Event IL_out



```
(abstract_)IL_out
when
  a = 0
  0 < b
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
end
```

```
(concrete_)IL_out
when
  il_tl = green
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
end
```



New Events ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green

```
ML_tl_green
when
  ml_tl = red
  c = 0
  a + b < d
then
  ml_tl := green
end
```

```
IL_tl_green
when
  il_tl = red
  a = 0
  0 < b
then
  il_tl := green
end
```

- Turning lights to **green** when **proper conditions hold**



Summary of State Refinement (so far)

variables: a, b, c, ml_tl, il_tl

inv2_1: $ml_tl \in COLOR$

inv2_2: $il_tl \in COLOR$

inv2_3: $ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$

inv2_4: $il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0$



Summary of Old Events (so far)

```
ML_out
when
  ml_tl = green
then
  a := a + 1
end
```

```
IL_out
when
  il_tl = green
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
```

Events ML_in and IL_in are unchanged

```
ML_in
when
  0 < c
then
  c := c - 1
end
```

```
IL_in
when
  0 < a
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
end
```



Superposition

variables: a, b, c, ml_tl, il_tl

- Variables $a, b,$ and c were **present in the previous refinement**
- Variables ml_tl and il_tl are **superposed** to $a, b,$ and c
- We have thus to **extend rule INV**



Superposition: Introduction of a new Rule

```
Abstract_Event
when
  G(c, u, v)
then
  u := E(c, u, v)
  v := M(c, u, v)
end
```

```
Concrete_Event
when
  H(c, v, w)
then
  v := N(c, v, w)
  w := F(c, v, w)
end
```

Axioms
Abstract invariants
Concrete invariants
Concrete guards
 \Rightarrow
Same actions on
common variables

$A(c)$
 $I(c, u, v)$
 $J(c, u, v, w)$
 $H(c, v, w)$
 \Rightarrow
 $M(c, u, v) = N(c, v, w)$

SIM



Proving the Refinement of the Four Old Events

- We have to apply 3 Proof Obligations:

- GRD,
- SIM,
- INV

- On 4 events: ML_out, IL_out, ML_in, IL_in

- And 2 main invariants:

$$\text{inv2_3: } ml_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$\text{inv2_4: } il_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0$$



Proving the Refinement of the Four Old Events

<pre>ML_out when c = 0 a + b < d then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when a = 0 0 < b then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>
<pre>ML_out when ml_tl = green then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when il_tl = green then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>

- SIM is completely trivial since the actions are the same



Proving the Refinement of the Four Old Events

<pre>ML_out when c = 0 a + b < d then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when a = 0 0 < b then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>
<pre>ML_out when ml_tl = green then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when il_tl = green then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>

- GRD is also trivial

$$\text{inv2_3: } ml_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$\text{inv2_4: } il_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0$$



Proving the Refinement of the Four Old Events

<pre>ML_out when c = 0 a + b < d then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when a = 0 0 < b then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>
<pre>ML_out when ml_tl = green then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when il_tl = green then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>

- INV applied to ML_in and IL_in holds trivially

$$\text{inv2_3: } ml_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$\text{inv2_4: } il_tl = \text{green} \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0$$



Proving the Refinement of the Four Old Events

<pre>ML_out when c = 0 a + b < d then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when a = 0 0 < b then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>
<pre>ML_out when ml_tl = green then a := a + 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_out when il_tl = green then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end</pre>	<pre>ML_in when 0 < c then c := c - 1 end</pre>	<pre>IL_in when 0 < a then a := a - 1 b := b + 1 end</pre>

- INV applied to ML_out and IL_out raise some difficulties



What we Have to Prove

- ML_out / inv2_4 / INV
- IL_out / inv2_3 / INV
- ML_out / inv2_3 / INV
- IL_out / inv2_4 / INV



More Logical Rules of Inferences

- Rules about implication

$\frac{H, P, Q \vdash R}{H, P, P \Rightarrow Q \vdash R} \text{ IMP_L}$	$\frac{H, P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \Rightarrow Q} \text{ IMP_R}$
--	---

- Rules about negation

$\frac{H \vdash P}{H, \neg P \vdash Q} \text{ NOT_L}$	$\frac{H, P \vdash Q \quad H, P \vdash \neg Q}{H \vdash \neg P} \text{ NOT_R}$
--	---



Proving Preservation of inv2_4 by Event ML_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of event ML_out
Modified invariant inv2_4

```
d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
```

ML_out / inv2_4 / INV

```
ML_out
when
  ml_tl = green
then
  a := a + 1
end
```



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
├
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

MON

```

green ≠ red
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
├
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

IMP_R ...



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
├
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

MON

```

green ≠ red
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
├
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

IMP_R ...

```

green ≠ red
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

IMP_L

```

green ≠ red
0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

AND_L ...



Tentative Proof (cont'd)

```

green ≠ red
0 < b
a = 0
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
0 < b ∧ a + 1 = 0
        
```

AND_R

```

green ≠ red
0 < b
a = 0
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
0 < b
        
```

MON

```

0 < b ─┬─ 0 < b
        
```

HYP

```

green ≠ red
0 < b
a = 0
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
a + 1 = 0
        
```

EQ_LR

```

green ≠ red
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
0 + 1 = 0
        
```

ARITH

```

green ≠ red
ml_tl = green
il_tl = green
├
1 = 0
        
```

?



Proving Preservation of inv2_3 by Event IL_out

```

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of IL_out
Modified inv2_3
        
```

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
├
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0
        
```

IL_out / inv2_3 / INV

```

IL_out
when
  il_tl = green
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
        
```



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
├ ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

MON

```

green ≠ red
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green
├ ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

IMP_R ...



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
├ ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

MON

```

green ≠ red
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green
├ ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

IMP_R ...

```

green ≠ red
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

IMP_L

```

green ≠ red
a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

AND_L ...



Tentative Proof (cont'd)

```

green ≠ red
a + b < d
c = 0
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ a + b - 1 < d ∧ c + 1 = 0

```

AND_R

```

green ≠ red
a + b < d
c = 0
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ a + b - 1 < d

```

MON

```

a + b < d ── a + b - 1 < d

```

DEC

```

green ≠ red
c = 0
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ c + 1 = 0

```

EQ_LR

```

green ≠ red
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ 0 + 1 = 0

```

ARITH

```

green ≠ red
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ 1 = 0

```

?



The Solution

- In both cases, we were stopped by attempting to prove the following

```

green ≠ red
il_tl = green
ml_tl = green
├ 1 = 0

```

Both traffic lights are assumed to be green!

- This indicates that an "obvious" invariant was missing
- In fact, at least one of the two traffic lights must be red


```

inv2_5: ml_tl = red ∨ il_tl = red

```



Completing the Proof



Going back to the Requirements Document

inv2_5: $ml_tl = red \vee il_tl = red$

This could have been deduced from these requirements

The bridge is one way or the other, not both at the same time

FUN-3

Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one

EQP-3



What we Have to Prove

- ML_out / inv2_4 / INV done
- IL_out / inv2_3 / INV done
- ML_out / inv2_3 / INV
- IL_out / inv2_4 / INV
- ML_tl_green / inv2_5 / INV
- IL_tl_green / inv2_5 / INV



Proving Preservation of inv2_3 by Event ML_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of ML_out
Modified inv2_3

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $0 < d$
 $COLOR = \{green, red\}$
 $green \neq red$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
 $ml_tl \in COLOR$
 $il_tl \in COLOR$
 $ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$
 $il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0$
 $ml_tl = green$
 $ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + 1 + b < d \wedge c = 0$

ML_out / inv2_3 / INV

ML_out
when
 ml_tl = green
then
 a := a + 1
end



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n < d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
├
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧
c = 0
        
```

MON

$$ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$\vdash ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + 1 + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

IMP_R ...



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n < d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
├
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧
c = 0
        
```

MON

$$ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$\vdash ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + 1 + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

IMP_R ...

$$ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$ml_tl = green$$

$$\vdash a + 1 + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

IMP_L

$$a + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

$$ml_tl = green$$

$$\vdash a + 1 + b < d \wedge c = 0$$

AND_L ...



Tentative Proof (cont'd)

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
├
a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
        
```

AND_R

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
├
a + 1 + b < d
        
```

MON

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
├
a + 1 + b < d
        
```

?

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
├
c = 0
        
```

MON

$$c = 0 \vdash c = 0$$

HYP

- This requires splitting the ML_out in two separate events ML_out_1 and ML_out_2

```

ML_out_1
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b < d
then
  a := a + 1
end
        
```

```

ML_out_2
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b = d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_tl := red
end
        
```



Intuitive Explanation

```

ML_out_1
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b < d
then
  a := a + 1
end
        
```

```

ML_out_2
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b = d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_tl := red
end
        
```

- When $a + 1 + b = d$ then only one more car can enter the island
- Consequently, the traffic light ml_tl must be turned red (while the car enters the bridge)



Proving Preservation of inv2_3 by Event ML_out_1

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of ML_out_1
Modified inv2_3

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

ML_out_1 / inv2_3 / INV

```

ML_out_1
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b < d
then
  a := a + 1
end
    
```



Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧
c = 0
    
```

MON

```

ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
a + 1 + b < d
├
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

IMP_R ...



Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧
c = 0
    
```

MON

```

ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
a + 1 + b < d
├
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

IMP_R ...

```

ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
├
a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

IMP_L

```

a + b < d ∧ c = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
├
a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

AND_L ...



Proof (cont'd)

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
├
a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

AND_R

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
├
a + 1 + b < d
    
```

MON

```

a + 1 + b < d
├
a + 1 + b < d
    
```

HYP

```

a + b < d
c = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b < d
├
c = 0
    
```

MON

```

c = 0
├
c = 0
    
```

HYP



Proving Preservation of inv2_3 by Event ML_out_2

```

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of ML_out_2
Modified inv2_3
    
```

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b = d
red = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

ML_out_2 / inv2_3 / INV

```

ML_out_2
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b = d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_tl := red
end
    
```



Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b = d
red = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

MON

```

green ≠ red
├
red = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

IMP_R



Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
ml_tl = green
a + 1 + b = d
red = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

MON

```

green ≠ red
├
red = green ⇒ a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

IMP_R

```

...
├
green ≠ red
red = green
├
a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

EQ_LR

```

├
green ≠ green
├
a + 1 + b < d ∧ c = 0
    
```

NOT_L

```

├
green = green
    
```

EQL



What we Have to Prove

- ML_out / inv2_4 / INV **done**
- IL_out / inv2_3 / INV **done**
- ML_out / inv2_3 / INV **done**
- IL_out / inv2_4 / INV
- ML_tl_green / inv2_5 / INV
- IL_tl_green / inv2_5 / INV



Proving Preservation of inv2_4 by Event IL_out

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of event IL_out
Modified invariant inv2_4

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b - 1 ∧ a = 0
    
```

IL_out / inv2_4 / INV

```

IL_out
when
  il_tl = green
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
end
    
```



Tentative Proof

```

d ∈ ℕ
0 < d
COLOR = {green, red}
green ≠ red
n ∈ ℕ
n ≤ d
a ∈ ℕ
b ∈ ℕ
c ∈ ℕ
a + b + c = n
a = 0 ∨ c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOR
il_tl ∈ COLOR
ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b - 1 ∧ a = 0
    
```

MON

```

il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
├
il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b - 1 ∧ a = 0
    
```

IMP_R

IMP_L

```

il_tl = green ⇒ 0 < b ∧ a = 0
il_tl = green
├
0 < b - 1 ∧ a = 0
    
```


AND_L

```

0 < b ∧ a = 0
├
0 < b - 1 ∧ a = 0
    
```



Tentative Proof (cont'd)



- This requires splitting the concrete IL_out in two separate events IL_out_1 and IL_out_2

```

IL_out_1
when
  il_tl = green
  b ≠ 1
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
end
    
```

```

IL_out_2
when
  il_tl = green
  b = 1
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
  il_tl := red
end
    
```



Intuitive Explanation

```

IL_out_1
when
  il_tl = green
  b ≠ 1
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
end
    
```

```

IL_out_2
when
  il_tl = green
  b = 1
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
  il_tl := red
end
    
```

- When b=1, then only one car remains in the island
- Consequently, the traffic light il_tl can be turned red (after this car has left)



Proving Preservation of inv2_4 by Event IL_out_1

```

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of event IL_out_1
Modified invariant inv2_4

```

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & 0 < d \\
 & COLOR = \{green, red\} \\
 & green \neq red \\
 & n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & n \leq d \\
 & a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & a + b + c = n \\
 & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 & ml_tl \in COLOR \\
 & il_tl \in COLOR \\
 & ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

IL_out_1 / inv2_4 / INV

```

IL_out_1
when
  il_tl = green
  b ≠ 1
then
  b, c := b - 1, c + 1
end

```



Proof

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & 0 < d \\
 & COLOR = \{green, red\} \\
 & green \neq red \\
 & n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & n \leq d \\
 & a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & a + b + c = n \\
 & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 & ml_tl \in COLOR \\
 & il_tl \in COLOR \\
 & ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

MON

$$\begin{aligned}
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

IMP_R

...

$$\begin{aligned}
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

IMP_L

$$\begin{aligned}
 & 0 < b \wedge a = 0 \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

AND_L



Proof (cont'd)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & 0 < b \\
 & a = 0 \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

AND_R

$$\begin{aligned}
 & 0 < b \\
 & a = 0 \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & 0 < b - 1
 \end{aligned}$$

MON

$$\begin{aligned}
 & 0 < b \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & 0 < b - 1
 \end{aligned}$$

ARITH

$$\begin{aligned}
 & 0 < b - 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & 0 < b - 1
 \end{aligned}$$

HYP

$$\begin{aligned}
 & 0 < b \\
 & a = 0 \\
 & b \neq 1 \\
 & a = 0 \\
 & \vdash
 \end{aligned}$$

MON

$$\begin{aligned}
 & a = 0 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

HYP



Proving Preservation of inv2_4 by Event IL_out_2

```

axm0_1
axm0_2
axm2_1
axm2_2
inv0_1
inv0_2
inv1_1
inv1_2
inv1_3
inv1_4
inv1_5
inv2_1
inv2_2
inv2_3
inv2_4
Guard of event IL_out_2
Modified invariant inv2_4

```

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & 0 < d \\
 & COLOR = \{green, red\} \\
 & green \neq red \\
 & n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & n \leq d \\
 & a \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & b \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
 & a + b + c = n \\
 & a = 0 \vee c = 0 \\
 & ml_tl \in COLOR \\
 & il_tl \in COLOR \\
 & ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0 \\
 & il_tl = green \\
 & b = 1 \\
 & \vdash \\
 & red = green \Rightarrow 0 < b - 1 \wedge a = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

IL_out_1 / inv2_4 / INV


```

IL_out_2
when
  il_tl = green
  b = 1
then
  b, c, il_tl := b - 1, c + 1, red
end

```



Proof



What we Have to Prove

- ML_out / inv2_4 / INV done
- IL_out / inv2_3 / INV done
- ML_out / inv2_3 / INV done
- IL_out / inv2_4 / INV done
- ML_tl_green / inv2_5 / INV
- IL_tl_green / inv2_5 / INV



Correcting the New Events

But the new invariant **inv2_5** is not preserved by the new events

$$\text{inv2_5: } ml_tl = \text{red} \vee il_tl = \text{red}$$

Unless we correct them as follows:

```

ML_tl_green
when
  ml_tl = red
  a + b < d
  c = 0
then
  ml_tl := green
  il_tl := red
end

```

```

IL_tl_green
when
  il_tl = red
  0 < b
  a = 0
then
  il_tl := green
  ml_tl := red
end

```



Summary of the Proof Situation

- Correct event refinement: **OK**
- Absence of divergence of new events: **FAILURE**
- Absence of deadlock: **?**



Divergence of the New Events

```

ML_tl_green
when
  ml_tl = red
  a + b < d
  c = 0
then
  ml_tl := green
  il_tl := red
end
    
```

```


IL_tl_green
when
  il_tl = red
  0 < b
  a = 0
then
  il_tl := green
  ml_tl := red
end
    
```

When a and c are both equal to 0 and b is positive, then both events are always alternatively enabled


The lights can change colors very rapidly




ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green can run for ever




ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green can run for ever




ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green can run for ever




ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green can run for ever



ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green can run for ever



ML_tl_green and IL_tl_green can run for ever



Solution

- Allowing each light to **turn green** only when at least one car has **passed in the other direction**
- For this, we introduce **two additional variables**:

inv2_6: $ml_pass \in \{0, 1\}$

inv2_7: $il_pass \in \{0, 1\}$



Modifying Events ML_out_1 and ML_out_2

```
ML_out_1
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b < d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_pass := 1
end
```

```
ML_out_2
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + 1 + b = d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_tl := red
  ml_pass := 1
end
```



Modifying Events ML_out_1 and ML_out_2

```
IL_out_1
when
  il_tl = green
  b ≠ 1
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
  il_pass := 1
end
```

```
IL_out_2
when
  il_tl = green
  b = 1
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
  il_tl := red
  il_pass := 1
end
```



Modifying Events ML_tl_gree and IL_tl_green

```
ML_tl_gree
when
  ml_tl = red
  a + b < d
  c = 0
  il_pass = 1
then
  ml_tl := green
  il_tl := red
  ml_pass := 0
end
```

```
IL_tl_green
when
  il_tl = red
  0 < b
  a = 0
  ml_pass = 1
then
  il_tl := green
  ml_tl := red
  il_pass := 0
end
```



Proving Absence of Divergence

We exhibit the following variant

```
variant_2: ml_pass + il_pass
```



To be Proved

$ \begin{aligned} & ml_tl = red \\ & a + b < d \\ & c = 0 \\ & il_pass = 1 \\ \Rightarrow & \\ & il_pass + 0 < \\ & ml_pass + il_pass \end{aligned} $	$ \begin{aligned} & il_tl = red \\ & b > 0 \\ & a = 0 \\ & ml_pass = 1 \\ \Rightarrow & \\ & ml_pass + 0 < \\ & ml_pass + il_pass \end{aligned} $
--	--

This cannot be proved. This suggests the following invariants:

$ \text{inv2_8: } ml_tl = red \Rightarrow ml_pass = 1 $
$ \text{inv2_9: } il_tl = red \Rightarrow il_pass = 1 $



No Deadlock (1)

$ \begin{aligned} & 0 < d \\ & ml_tl \in \{red, green\} \\ & il_tl \in \{red, green\} \\ & ml_pass \in \{0, 1\} \\ & il_pass \in \{0, 1\} \\ & a \in \mathbb{N} \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ & ml_tl = red \Rightarrow ml_pass = 1 \\ & il_tl = red \Rightarrow il_pass = 1 \\ \Rightarrow & \\ & (ml_tl = red \wedge a + b < d \wedge c = 0 \wedge il_pass = 1) \vee \\ & (il_tl = red \wedge a = 0 \wedge b > 0 \wedge ml_pass = 1) \vee \\ & ml_tl = green \vee il_tl = green \vee a > 0 \vee c > 0 \end{aligned} $



No Deadlock (2)

The previous statement reduces to the following, which is true

$ \begin{aligned} & 0 < d \\ & a \in \mathbb{N} \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ \Rightarrow & \\ & (a + b < d \wedge c = 0) \vee \\ & (a = 0 \wedge b > 0) \vee \\ & a > 0 \vee \\ & c > 0 \end{aligned} $	\sim	$ \begin{aligned} & 0 < d \\ & b \in \mathbb{N} \\ \Rightarrow & \\ & b < d \vee b > 0 \end{aligned} $
---	--------	---



Second Refinement: Conclusion

- Thanks to the **proofs**:

- We discovered 4 errors
- We introduced several additional invariants
- We corrected 4 events
- We introduced 2 more variables



Conclusion: we Introduced the Superposition Rule

<p>Axioms Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guards └ Same actions on common variables</p>	SIM
--	-----



Summary of Second Refinement: the State (1)

variables: $a, b, c,$
 $ml_tl, il_tl, ml_pass, il_pass$

inv2_1: $ml_tl \in \{\text{red}, \text{green}\}$

inv2_2: $il_tl \in \{\text{red}, \text{green}\}$

inv2_3: $ml_tl = 1 \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$

inv2_4: $il_tl = 1 \Rightarrow 0 < b \wedge a = 0$



Summary of Second Refinement: the State (2)

inv2_5: $ml_tl = \text{red} \vee il_tl = \text{red}$

inv2_6: $ml_pass \in \{0, 1\}$

inv2_7: $il_pass \in \{0, 1\}$

inv2_8: $ml_tl = \text{red} \Rightarrow ml_pass = 1$

inv2_9: $il_tl = \text{red} \Rightarrow il_pass = 1$

variant2: $ml_pass + il_pass$



Summary of Second Refinement: the Event (1)

ML_out_1
when
 $ml_tl = \text{green}$
 $a + 1 + b < d$
then
 $a := a + 1$
 $ml_pass := 1$
end

ML_out_2
when
 $ml_tl = \text{green}$
 $a + 1 + b = d$
then
 $a := a + 1$
 $ml_pass := 1$
 $ml_tl := \text{red}$
end



Summary of Second Refinement: the Event (2)

```

IL_out_1
  when
    il_tl = green
    b ≠ 1
  then
    b := b - 1
    c := c + 1
    il_pass := 1
  end
  
```

```

IL_out_2
  when
    il_tl = green
    b = 1
  then
    b := b - 1
    c := c + 1
    il_pass := 1
    il_tl := red
  end
  
```



Summary of Second Refinement: the Event (3)

```

ML_tl_green
  when
    ml_tl = red
    a + b < d
    c = 0
    il_pass = 1
  then
    ml_tl := green
    il_tl := red
    ml_pass := 0
  end
  
```

```

IL_tl_green
  when
    il_tl = red
    0 < b
    a = 0
    ml_pass = 1
  then
    il_tl := green
    ml_tl := red
    il_pass := 0
  end
  
```



Summary of Second Refinement: the Event (4)

- These events are identical to their abstract versions

```

ML_in
  when
    0 < c
  then
    c := c - 1
  end
  
```

```

IL_in
  when
    0 < a
  then
    a := a - 1
    b := b + 1
  end
  
```




Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 The Requirement Document
- 3 Formal Models
 - Initial Model
 - First Refinement
 - Second Refinement
 - Third Refinement



Third Refinement: Adding Car Sensors


Reminder of the **physical system**



Closed Model

-We want to **clearly identify** in our model:

- The **controller**
- The **environment**
- The **communication channels** between the two



Controller Variables

Contoller variables: *a*,

b,

c,

ml_pass,

il_pass



Environment Variables

These **new variables** denote **physical objects**

Environment variables: *A*,

B,

C,

ML_OUT_SR,

ML_IN_SR,

IL_OUT_SR,

IL_IN_SR



Output Channel Variables

Output channels: *ml_tl*,
il_tl




Output Channel Variables

Input channels: *ml_out_10*,
ml_in_10,
il_in_10,
il_out_10

A message is sent when a sensor moves from "on" to "off":



Summary



Constants

carrier sets: ..., *SENSOR*

constants: ..., *on, off*

axm3_1: *SENSOR* = {*on, off*}

axm3_2: *on* ≠ *off*



Variables (1)

inv3_1 : $ML_OUT_SR \in SENSOR$

inv3_2 : $ML_IN_SR \in SENSOR$

inv3_3 : $IL_OUT_SR \in SENSOR$

inv3_4 : $IL_IN_SR \in SENSOR$



Variables (2)

inv3_5 : $A \in \mathbb{N}$

inv3_6 : $B \in \mathbb{N}$

inv3_7 : $C \in \mathbb{N}$

inv3_8 : $ml_out_10 \in \text{BOOL}$

inv3_9 : $ml_in_10 \in \text{BOOL}$

inv3_10 : $il_out_10 \in \text{BOOL}$

inv3_11 : $il_in_10 \in \text{BOOL}$



Invariants (1)

When sensors are on, there are cars on them

inv3_12 : $IL_IN_SR = on \Rightarrow A > 0$

inv3_13 : $IL_OUT_SR = on \Rightarrow B > 0$

inv3_14 : $ML_IN_SR = on \Rightarrow C > 0$

The sensors are used to detect the presence of cars entering or leaving the bridge

EQP-5



Invariants (2)

Drivers obey the traffic lights

inv3_15 : $ml_out_10 = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow ml_tl = \text{green}$

inv3_16 : $il_out_10 = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow il_tl = \text{green}$

Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one

EQP-3



Invariants (3)

When a sensor is "on", the **previous information** is treated

$$\text{inv3_17 : } IL_IN_SR = on \Rightarrow il_in_10 = FALSE$$

$$\text{inv3_18 : } IL_OUT_SR = on \Rightarrow il_out_10 = FALSE$$

$$\text{inv3_19 : } ML_IN_SR = on \Rightarrow ml_in_10 = FALSE$$

$$\text{inv3_20 : } ML_OUT_SR = on \Rightarrow ml_out_10 = FALSE$$

The controller must be fast enough so as to be able to treat all the information coming from the environment

FUN-5



Invariants (4)

Linking the physical and logical cars (1)

$$\text{inv3_21 : } il_in_10 = TRUE \wedge ml_out_10 = TRUE \Rightarrow A = a$$

$$\text{inv3_22 : } il_in_10 = FALSE \wedge ml_out_10 = TRUE \Rightarrow A = a + 1$$

$$\text{inv3_23 : } il_in_10 = TRUE \wedge ml_out_10 = FALSE \Rightarrow A = a - 1$$

$$\text{inv3_24 : } il_in_10 = FALSE \wedge ml_out_10 = FALSE \Rightarrow A = a$$



Invariants (5)

Linking the physical and logical cars (2)

$$\text{inv3_25 : } il_in_10 = TRUE \wedge il_out_10 = TRUE \Rightarrow B = b$$

$$\text{inv3_26 : } il_in_10 = TRUE \wedge il_out_10 = FALSE \Rightarrow B = b + 1$$

$$\text{inv3_27 : } il_in_10 = FALSE \wedge il_out_10 = TRUE \Rightarrow B = b - 1$$

$$\text{inv3_28 : } il_in_10 = FALSE \wedge il_out_10 = FALSE \Rightarrow B = b$$

$$\text{inv3_29 : } il_out_10 = TRUE \wedge ml_out_10 = TRUE \Rightarrow C = c$$

$$\text{inv3_30 : } il_out_10 = TRUE \wedge ml_out_10 = FALSE \Rightarrow C = c + 1$$

$$\text{inv3_31 : } il_out_10 = FALSE \wedge ml_out_10 = TRUE \Rightarrow C = c - 1$$

$$\text{inv3_32 : } il_out_10 = FALSE \wedge ml_out_10 = FALSE \Rightarrow C = c$$



Invariants (6)

The basic properties hold for the physical cars

$$\text{inv3_33 : } A = 0 \vee C = 0$$

$$\text{inv3_34 : } A + B + C \leq d$$

The number of cars on the bridge and the island is limited

FUN-2

The bridge is one way or the other, not both at the same time

FUN-3



Refining Abstract Events (1)

```
ML_out_1
when
  ml_out_10 = TRUE
  a + b + 1 ≠ d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_pass := 1
  ml_out_10 := FALSE
end
```

```
ML_out_2
when
  ml_out_10 = TRUE
  a + b + 1 = d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_tl := red
  ml_pass := 1
  ml_out_10 := FALSE
end
```

```
(abstract-)ML_out_1
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + b + 1 ≠ d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_pass := 1
end
```

```
(abstract-)ML_out_2
when
  ml_tl = green
  a + b + 1 = d
then
  a := a + 1
  ml_pass := 1
  ml_tl := red
end
```



Refining Abstract Events (2)

```
IL_out_1
when
  il_out_10 = TRUE
  b ≠ 1
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
  il_pass := 1
  il_out_10 := FALSE
end
```

```
IL_out_2
when
  il_out_10 = TRUE
  b = 1
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
  il_tl := red
  il_pass := 1
  il_out_10 := FALSE
end
```

```
(abstract-)IL_out_1
when
  il_tl = green
  b ≠ 1
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
  il_pass := 1
end
```

```
(abstract-)IL_out_2
when
  il_tl = green
  b = 1
then
  b := b - 1
  c := c + 1
  il_pass := 1
  il_tl := red
end
```



Refining Abstract Events (3)

```
ML_in
when
  ml_in_10 = TRUE
  0 < c
then
  c := c - 1
  ml_in_10 := FALSE
end
```

```
IL_in
when
  il_in_10 = TRUE
  0 < a
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
  il_in_10 := FALSE
end
```

```
(abstract-)ML_in
when
  0 < c
then
  c := c - 1
end
```

```
(abstract-)IL_in
when
  0 < a
then
  a := a - 1
  b := b + 1
end
```



Refining Abstract Events (4)

```
ML_tl_green
when
  ml_tl = red
  a + b < d
  c = 0
  il_pass = 1
  il_out_10 = FALSE
then
  ml_tl := green
  il_tl := red
  ml_pass := FALSE
end
```

```
IL_tl_green
when
  il_tl = red
  a = 0
  ml_pass = 1
  ml_out_10 = FALSE
then
  il_tl := green
  ml_tl := red
  il_pass := FALSE
end
```

```
(abstract-)ML_tl_green
when
  ml_tl = red
  a + b < d
  c = 0
  il_pass = 1
then
  ml_tl := green
  il_tl := red
  ml_pass := 0
end
```

```
(abstract-)IL_tl_green
when
  il_tl = red
  0 < b
  a = 0
  ml_pass = 1
then
  il_tl := green
  ml_tl := red
  il_pass := 0
end
```



Adding New PHYSICAL Events (1)

```
ML_out_arr
when
  ML_OUT_SR = off
  ml_out_10 = FALSE
then
  ML_OUT_SR := on
end
```

```
ML_in_arr
when
  ML_IN_SR = off
  ml_in_10 = FALSE
  C > 0
then
  ML_IN_SR := on
end
```

```
IL_in_arr
when
  IL_IN_SR = off
  il_in_10 = FALSE
  A > 0
then
  IL_IN_SR := on
end
```

```
IL_out_arr
when
  IL_OUT_SR = off
  il_out_10 = FALSE
  B > 0
then
  IL_OUT_SR := on
end
```



Adding New PHYSICAL Events (2)

```
ML_out_dep
when
  ML_OUT_SR = on
  ml_tl = green
then
  ML_OUT_SR := off
  ml_out_10 := TRUE
end
```


```
ML_in_dep
when
  ML_IN_SR = on
then
  ML_IN_SR := off
  ml_in_10 := TRUE
  C = C - 1
end
```

```
IL_in_dep
when
  IL_IN_SR = on
then
  IL_IN_SR := off
  il_in_10 := TRUE
  A = A - 1
  B = B + 1
end
```

```
IL_out_dep
when
  IL_OUT_SR = on
  il_tl = green
then
  IL_OUT_SR := off
  il_out_10 := TRUE
  B = B - 1
  C = C + 1
end
```



Final Structure of the Controller



Questions on Proving

- What is to be **systematically** proved?
 - **Invariant** preservation
 - **Correct refinements** of transitions
 - **No divergence** of new transitions
 - **No deadlock** introduced in refinements
- **When** are these proofs done?



Questions on Proving (cont'd)

- **Who** states what is to be proved?
 - An automatic tool: **the Proof Obligation Generator**
- **Who** is going to perform these proofs?
 - An automatic tool: **the Prover**
 - Sometimes helped by the Engineer (**interactive proving**)



About Tools

- **Three basic tools:**
 - Proof Obligation Generator
 - Prover
 - Model translators into Hardware or Software languages
- These tools are embedded into a **Development Data Base**
- Such tools already exist in the **Rodin Platform**



Summary of Proofs on Example

- This development required **253 proofs**
 - Initial model: 7 (1)
 - 1st refinement: 27 (1)
 - 2nd refinement: 81 (1)
 - 3rd refinement: 138 (5)
- All proved **automatically** (except 8) by the Rodin Platform



Summary of Mathematical Notations (1)

$P \wedge Q$	conjunction
$P \vee Q$	disjunction
$P \Rightarrow Q$	implication
$\neg P$	negation
$x \in S$	set membership operator



Summary of Mathematical Notations (2)

\mathbb{N}	set of Natural Numbers: $\{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$
\mathbb{Z}	set of Integers: $\{0, 1, -1, 2, -2, \dots\}$
$\{a, b, \dots\}$	set defined in extension
$a + b$	addition of a and b
$a - b$	subtraction of a and b



Summary of Mathematical Notations (3)

$a * b$	product of a and b
$a = b$	equality relation
$a \leq b$	smaller than or equal relation
$a < b$	smaller than relation



Invariant Establishment Proof Rule

- For the init event in the initial model

Axioms of the constants \Rightarrow Modified Invariants	INV
---	-----



Invariant Preservation Proof Rule

- For other events in the initial model

Axioms of the constants Invariants Guard of the event \Rightarrow Modified Invariants	INV
---	-----



Deadlock Freeness Rule

- This rule is not mandatory

Axiom of the constant Invariants ⇒ Disjunction of the guards	DLF
---	-----



Refinement Rules (1): Guard Strengthening

- For old events only

Axioms of the constants Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guards ⇒ Abstract guards	GRD
--	-----



Refinement Rules (2): Invariant Establishment

- For init event only

Axioms of the constants ⇒ Modified concrete invariants	INV
--	-----



Refinement Rules (3): Invariant Preservation

- For all events (except init)

- New events refine an implicit non-guarded event with skip action

Axioms of the constants Abstract invariant Concrete invariant Concrete guard ⇒ Modified concrete invariant	INV
---	-----



Refinement Rules (4): Non-divergence of New Events

- For new events only

Axioms of the constants Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guard of a new event \Rightarrow Variant $\in \mathbb{N}$	NAT
---	-----



Refinement Rules (5): Non-divergence of New Events

- For new events only

Axioms of the constants Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guard of a new event \Rightarrow Modified variant < Variant	VAR
---	-----



Refinement Rules (6): Relative Deadlock Freeness

- Global proof rule

Axioms of the constants Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Disjunction of abstract guards \Rightarrow Disjunction of concrete guards	DLF
--	-----



Refinement Rules (7)

- For old events (in case of superposition)

Axioms of constants Abstract invariants Concrete invariants Concrete guards \Rightarrow Same actions on common variables	SIM
---	-----

