

# Exercise 1

## Railway Safety Invariants

Exercise in UML-B Class and Context Diagram modelling

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# Specification:

## Railway Interlocking Safety Requirements

A Railway interlocking system controls trains passing through a track layout by changing the state of **Signals** which can be **Proceed**, **Warning** and **Stop**.

The signal immediately before another signal is said to be **RearOf** the second signal.

The track layout is divided into **Routes**. Each Route has an **Entry** signal at its start.

Some Routes **Conflict** with others (e.g. use the same section of track). A route is **locked** before it is used and then unlocked again.

The following safety requirements are specified:

SR1 - If a signal shows **Stop**, the signal **RearOf** it must show **Stop** or **Warning**

SR2 - If the entry signal of a route shows **Proceed** or **Warning**, then the Route is locked

SR3 - If a route is locked then no route that conflicts with it is locked

## Instructions:

### Railway Interlocking Safety Requirements (cont.)

Model this domain in just enough detail to be able to express the safety requirements.

Use a UML-B Context diagram for the static parts and a Class Diagram for the varying parts. (Link the Classes to the ClassTypes using the Instances property of the Class).

Add invariants to your model to reflect these requirements.

Add guards to your events to ensure the system does not violate the invariants.

Verify the model using the prover

# Analysis

Our aim is to keep the model as simple as possible. We just want enough detail to be able to express the safety requirements as invariants and no more.

Looking at SR1 we need to model a set of Signals. Signals have exactly one associated **RearOf** signal. This is a constant\* so we should model it in a Context Diagram (That means we will have to make **Signal** a ClassType in a Context Diagram).

We need to talk about the state of Signals (called '**aspect**' in railway jargon) so we will need to define an enumerated type. We can do this with a Class Type that has instances set to **{Proceed,Warning,Stop}**.

Since the aspect of the Signal varies we will need to model that in a Class Diagram. So we need a Class **signal** that is linked to the ClassType Signal . We will need events to set each state. (Note that it is better to model separate setter events for each state so that we can put different guards on each of them)

\* Actually rearOf might depend on the which routes are currently locked but for simplicity we assume it is a constant for now


## Analysis (cont.)

From SR2 we need to model a set of **Routes**. Routes have an associated **Entry Signal** which we can model as an association. Again this is a constant, so we will put it in a **ClassType** on the Context Diagram. Routes can be locked and unlocked. We could model that as a boolean variable attribute, '**locked**', in a linked Class and we will need **lock** and **unlock** events to change it.



Finally, from SR3 routes may be in **conflict** with other routes. This is a constant association from Routes to Routes so we should put it as a 'self' loop in the **ClassType** for Routes. Since each route may have none or many conflicting routes we will make this a multiplicity many association (i.e. relation).

\* Actually rearOf might depend on the which routes are currently locked but for simplicity we assume it is a constant for now



# Context Diagram



# Class Diagram



# Class Diagram with guards and actions





# One proof obligation does not prove automatically

▼ SafetyInvariants.eventB

- ▶ Domain0Ctx
- ▶ Domain0\_implicitContext
- ▼ Domain0
  - ▶ Variables
  - ▶ Invariants
  - ▶ Events
  - ▼ Proof Obligations
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> Invariant\_SR2
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> Invariant\_SR3
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> Invariant\_SR1
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> INITIALISATIO
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> INITIALISATIO
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> INITIALISATIO
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> INITIALISATIO
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> INITIALISATIO
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> lock/lock.Gua
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> lock/locked.t
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> lock/Invariant\_SR2/INV
    - ❓<sup>A</sup> lock/Invariant\_SR3/INV
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> unlock/unlock.Guard\_SR2/W
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> unlock/locked.type/INV
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> unlock/Invariant\_SR2/INV
    - ✓<sup>A</sup> unlock/Invariant\_SR3/INV

lock/Invariant\_SR3/INV


```
lock:  
  ANY thisRoute WHERE  
    thisRoute.type: thisRoute ∈ Route  
    lock.Guard_SR3: ∀cr·cr∈Conflicts[{thisRoute}] ⇒ locked(cr) = FALSE  
  THEN  
    lock.Action1: locked(thisRoute) = TRUE  
  END
```

• Event in Domain0

• Invariant in Domain0


```
Invariant_SR3: ∀thisRoute·((thisRoute∈Route)⇒((locked(thisRoute)=TRUE ∧ this
```

Could the lock event violate the SR3 conflicts invariant



# The Lock event

- locked route
- un-locked route
- changes from un-locked to locked




*the lock event checks that the set of conflicting routes contains no locked routes before locking 'thisRoute'*

# A route that conflicts with itself

- locked route
- un-locked route
- changes from un-locked to locked


What if conflicts *contains* thisRoute?  
then the invariant breaks



# A route that conflicts with itself

- locked route
- un-locked route
- changes from un-locked to locked


*We can disallow this in our definition of conflicts because it is safe to use a route if it is the only conflicting locked route*



# Symmetry


- locked route
- un-locked route
- changes from un-locked to locked

*What if we lock one of the conflicting routes later on in another lock event... then the invariant breaks*




# Symmetry

*We prevent this by insisting on symmetry so that the guard in the lock event prevents us from locking thisRoute2 when thisRoute is already locked. Our real-life' concept of conflicts is symmetric.*



# New Axioms added to ROUTE



The axioms make our definition of Conflicts more precise.

Now everything proves

