


4. The Bounded Re-transmission Protocol

Jean-Raymond Abrial

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- The Bounded Re-transmission Protocol is a **file transfer protocol**
- This is a problem dealing with **fault tolerance**
- We suppose that the transfer channels are **unreliable**
- We present classical solutions to handle that problem: **timers**.
- We would like to see how we can **formalize such timers**

- A **sequential file** is transmitted from a **Sender** to a **Receiver**
- The file is transmitted **piece by piece** through a **Data Channel**
- After receiving some data, the Receiver sends an **acknowledgment**
- After receiving it, the Sender sends the **next piece of data**, etc.



- **Messages can be lost** in the Data or Acknowledgment channels

The goal of the BRP is to **totally** or **partially** transfer a certain non-empty original sequential file from one site to another.

FUN_1

A **total transfer** means that the transmitted file is a **copy** of the original one.

FUN_2

A **partial transfer** means that the transmitted file is a **genuine prefix** of the original one.

FUN_3

- Messages can be lost in the Data or Acknowledgment channels
- The Sender starts a timer before sending a piece of data
- The timer wakes up the Sender after a delay dl
- This occurs if the Sender has not received an acknowledgment in the meantime

- dl is guaranteed to be **greater than twice the transmission time**
- When waken up, the Sender is then **sure** that the **data** or the **acknowledgment** has been **lost**
- When waken up, the Sender **re-transmits the previous data**
- The Sender sends an **alternating bit** together with a **new data**
- This ensures that the Receiver **does not confuse** (?) a **new data** with a **retransmitted** one.

- The Sender can re-transmit the same data **at most M times**
- After this, the Sender **decides to abort**
- **How does the Receiver know** that the Sender aborted?

- Each time the Receiver receives a **new** piece of data, it **starts a timer**
- The timer **wakes up** the Receiver after a delay $(M + 1) \times d$
- This occurs if the Sender **has not received a new data** in the meantime.
- After this delay, the Receiver is certain that **the Sender has aborted**
- Then the **Receiver aborts** too.

- At the end of the protocol, we might be in one of the **three situations**:
 - (1) The file **has been transmitted** entirely and the Sender **has received** the last acknowledgment
 - (2) The file **has been transmitted** entirely but the Sender **has not received** the last acknowledgment
 - (3) The file **has not been transmitted** entirely

Each site may end up in any of the **two situations**:

- either **it believes** that the protocol has **terminated successfully**,
- or **it believes** that the protocol has **aborted**

FUN_4

When the **Sender** believes that the protocol has **terminated successfully** then the **Receiver** believes so too.

FUN_5

However, it is possible for the **Sender** to believe that the protocol has **aborted** while the **Receiver** believes that it has **terminated successfully**.


FUN_6

When the **Receiver** believes that the protocol has **terminated successfully**, this is because the original file has been **entirely copied** on the Receiver's site.

FUN_7

When the **Receiver** believes that the protocol has **aborted**, this is because the original file has **not been copied entirely** on the Receiver's site.

FUN_8



SND_snd

when

SND_snd is waken up

then

Acquire data from Sender's file;

Store acquired data on Data Channel;

Store Sender's bit on Data Channel;

Start Sender's timer;

Activate Data Channel;

end

```
RCV_rcv
  when
    Data Channel interrupt occurs
  then
    Acquire Sender's bit from Data Channel;
    if Sender's bit = Receiver's bit then
      Acquire Data from Data Channel;
      Store data on Receiver's file;
      Modify Receiver's bit;
      if data is not the last one then
        Start Receiver's timer;
      end
    end
  end
  Reset Data Channel Interrupt;
  Wake up RCV_snd;
end
```

```
RCV_snd  
  when  
    RCV_snd is waken up  
  then  
    Activate Acknowledgment Channel;  
  end
```

```
SND_rcv
  when
    Acknowledgment Channel interrupt occurs
  then
    Remove Data from Sender's file;
    Reset retry counter;
    Modify Sender's bit;
    Wake up event SND_snd;
    Reset Acknowledgment Channel interrupt;
    if Sender's file is not empty then
      Wake up event SND_snd
    end
  end
end
```



```
SND_timer
  when
    Sender's timer interrupt occurs
  then
    if retry counter is equal to M+1 then
      Abort protocol on Sender's site;
    else
      Increment retry counter;
      Wake up event SND_snd;
    end
  end
```

RCV_timer

when

Receiver's timer interrupt occurs

then

Abort protocol on Receiver's site

end

-
- Quite often, protocols are "specified" by such pseudo-codes
 - In fact, such a pseudo-code raises a number of questions:
 - Are we sure that this description is correct?
 - Are we sure that this protocol terminates?
 - What kinds of properties should this protocol maintain?
 - Hence the formal development which is presented now

- (1) FUN_1, FUN_2, FUN_3: **partial transmission** of the file **in one shot**.
- (2) FUN_4 to FUN_8: each participant has **access to the other**
- (3) Introducing **unreliable channels** and **timers**.
- (4) **Optimize** protocol

The goal of the BRP is to **totally** or **partially** transfer a certain non-empty original sequential file from one site to another.

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A **total transfer** means that the transmitted file is a **copy** of the original one.

FUN_2

A **partial transfer** means that the transmitted file is a **genuine prefix** of the original one.

FUN_3

Each site may end up in any of the **two situations**:

- either **it believes** that the protocol has **terminated successfully**,
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FUN_4

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However, it is possible for the **Sender** to believe that the protocol has **aborted** while the **Receiver** believes that it has **terminated successfully**.

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When the **Receiver** believes that the protocol has **terminated successfully**, this is because the original file has been **entirely copied** on the Receiver's site.


FUN_7

When the **Receiver** believes that the protocol has **aborted**, this is because the original file has **not been copied entirely** on the Receiver's site.


FUN_8

INITIAL SITUATION

SENDER




RECEIVER




FINAL SITUATION

SENDER



RECEIVER



- Set D denotes the objects in the files
- Constant n denotes the **size** of the **non-empty** file
- Constant f denotes the **original file**.

set: D

constants: n
 f

axm0_1: $0 < n$

axm0_2: $f \in 1 .. n \rightarrow D$

- Variable i denotes the **size** of file g
- Variable g denotes the **transmitted file**.


variables: i
 g


inv0_1: $i \in 0 .. n$

inv0_2: $g \in 1 .. i \rightarrow D$

$x \in S$	set membership operator
\mathbb{N}	set of natural numbers: $\{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$
$a .. b$	interval from a to b : $\{a, a + 1, \dots, b\}$ (empty when $b < a$)
$a \mapsto b$	pair constructing operator
$S \times T$	Cartesian product operator
$S \subseteq T$	set inclusion operator
$\mathbb{P}(S)$	power set operator

$S \leftrightarrow T$	set of binary relations from S to T
$S \rightarrow T$	set of total functions from S to T
$S \twoheadrightarrow T$	set of partial functions from S to T
$\text{dom}(r)$	domain of a relation r
$\text{ran}(r)$	range of a relation r






$$F = \{a_1 \mapsto b_2, a_3 \mapsto b_4, a_5 \mapsto b_2, a_7 \mapsto b_6\}$$

$$\text{dom}(F) = \{a_1, a_3, a_5, a_7\}$$

$$\text{ran}(F) = \{b_2, b_4, b_6\}$$



$$\text{dom}(F) = A$$

- Event **brp** describes the situation at the **end of the protocol**
- It only says that the file might be **partially transmitted**
- It is made of a **non-deterministic assignment**

init

$i := 0$

$g := \emptyset$

brp

$i, g :| i' \in 0 .. n \wedge$
 $g' = (1 .. i') \triangleleft f$

- Operator **:|** is to be read: "**become such that ...**"


brp

$$i, g : | \left(\begin{array}{l} i' \in 0 .. n \\ g' = (1 .. i') \triangleleft a \end{array} \right)$$


i and g are assigned **any values i' and g'** such that the following holds:

$$i' \in 0 .. n \wedge g' = (1 .. i') \triangleleft a$$


$s \triangleleft r$	domain restriction operator
$s \triangleleft r$	domain subtraction operator
$r \triangleright t$	range restriction operator
$r \triangleright t$	range subtraction operator




$$\{a_3, a_7\} \triangleleft F$$



$$\{a_3, a_7\} \triangleleft F$$



$$F \triangleright \{b2, b4\}$$




$$F \triangleright \{b_2\}$$

init



brp



- They allow to **observe** the (future) system with a **finer time grain**
- Analogies with a **microscope** or a **parachute**
- They **refine** the (implicit) event **doing nothing** (skip)
- They must **not take control for ever** (exhibiting a variant)

set: *STATUS*

constants: ...
working
success
failure

axm1_1: *STATUS* = {*working*, *success*, *failure*}

axm1_2: *working* ≠ *success*

axm1_3: *working* ≠ *failure*

axm1_4: *success* ≠ *failure*

- Variables i and g are replaced by variables r and h
- Variable r denotes the size of the transmitted file
- Variable h denotes the transmitted file
- Variables s_st and r_st denote the status of the participants (Sender and Receiver respectively).

variables:	r
	h
	s_st
	r_st

- Variables h is a prefix of constant f (invariant **inv1_1** and **inv1_2**)

$$\mathbf{inv1_1:} \quad r \in 0 .. n$$

$$\mathbf{inv1_2:} \quad h = (1 .. r) \triangleleft f$$

- The **typing** of variables s_st and r_st is **implicit** (FUN_4)
- Requirements FUN_7 and FUN_8 (Receiver's belief is true) is taken care invariant **inv1_3**
- Requirements FUN_5 and FUN_6 (Sender's status) are taken care by invariant **inv_4**

$$\mathbf{inv1_3:} \quad r_st = success \Leftrightarrow r = n$$

$$\mathbf{inv1_4:} \quad s_st = success \Rightarrow r_st = success$$

- Initialisation

init

$r := 0$

$h := \emptyset$

$r_st := working$

$s_st := working$

- Event **(concrete_)brp** now **does nothing**
- We give **witnesses** for the abstract after values i' and g'

$$\text{(abstract_)}\text{brp}$$
$$i, g : | \left(\begin{array}{l} i' \in 0 .. n \\ g' = (1 .. i') \triangleleft a \end{array} \right)$$
$$\text{(concrete_)}\text{brp}$$

when
 $r \neq \text{working}$
 $s \neq \text{working}$

with
 $i' : i' = r$
 $g' : g' = h$

then
skip

end

```
RCV_rcv_current_data
  when
     $r\_st = working$ 
     $r + 1 < n$ 
  then
     $r := r + 1$ 
     $h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto f(r + 1)\}$ 
  end
```

- This event is "cheating" (accessing constant f)
- This new event maintains invariant **inv1_3** and it refines skip

inv1_3: $r = success \Leftrightarrow r = n$

RCV_success

when

$r_st = working$

$r + 1 = n$

then

$r_st := success$

$r := r + 1$

$h := h \cup \{n \mapsto f(n)\}$

end

RCV_failure

when

$r_st = working$

$s_st = failure$

then

$r_st := failure$

end

- These new events are **cheating** (accessing f and s_st)
- These new events **maintain inv1_3 and inv1_4** and they refine **skip**

inv1_3: $r_st = success \Leftrightarrow r = n$


inv1_4: $s_st = success \Rightarrow r_st = success$


```
SND_success
  when
    s_st = working
    r_st = success
  then
    s_st := success
  end
```

```
SND_failure
  when
    s_st = working
  then
    s_st := failure
  end
```

- Event SND_success is **cheating** (accessing *r_st*)
- Event SND_success **maintains invariant inv1_4**

inv1_4: $s_st = success \Rightarrow r_st = success$






- Variable s is the Sender **pointer** sent to the Receiver
- Variable d is the **data sent** to the Receiver
- Variable w is the Sender **activation bit**
- When w is **TRUE** it means the Sender has **just received the acknowledgement**
- When w is **FALSE** it means the Sender has **sent the information to the Receiver**

variables: \dots
 w
 s
 d

inv2_1: $s \in 0 .. n - 1$

inv2_2: $r \in s .. s + 1$

inv2_3: $w = \text{FALSE} \Rightarrow d = f(s + 1)$



init

$r := 0$

$h := \emptyset$

$r_st := working$

$s_st := working$

$s := 0$

$d \in D$

$w := \text{TRUE}$

brp

when

$r_st \neq working$

$s_st \neq working$

then

skip

end

- **New Events**: the Sender prepares **data d** and **pointer s** to be sent

```
SND_snd_current_data
when
   $s\_st = working$ 
   $w = \text{TRUE}$ 
   $s + 1 < n$ 
then
   $d := f(s + 1)$ 
   $w := \text{FALSE}$ 
end
```

```
SND_snd_last_data
when
   $s\_st = working$ 
   $w = \text{TRUE}$ 
   $s + 1 = n$ 
then
   $d := f(s + 1)$ 
   $w := \text{FALSE}$ 
end
```

- These events clearly **refine skip** and maintain invariant **inv2_3**

inv2_3: $w = \text{FALSE} \Rightarrow d = f(s + 1)$

- The Receiver receives data d and pointer s . It sends pointer r .

RCV_rcv_current_data

when

$r_st = working$

$w = FALSE$

$r = s$

$r + 1 < n$

then

$r := r + 1$

$h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$

end

RCV_success

when

$r_st = working$

$w = FALSE$

$r = s$

$r + 1 = n$

then

$r_st := success$

$r := r + 1$

$h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$

end

- The Receiver **still cheats**: it accesses constant n

```

(abstract-)RCV_rcv_current_data
when
   $r\_st = working$ 
   $r + 1 < n$ 
then
   $r := r + 1$ 
   $h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto f(r + 1)\}$ 
end

```

```

(concrete-)RCV_rcv_current_data
when
   $r\_st = working$ 
   $w = \mathbf{FALSE}$ 
   $r = s$ 
   $r + 1 < n$ 
then
   $r := r + 1$ 
   $h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$ 
end

```

- Observe **guard strengthening**
- This invariant helps proving **event refinement**

inv2_3: $w = \mathbf{FALSE} \Rightarrow d = f(s + 1)$

```

(abstract-)RCV_success
when
   $r\_st = working$ 
   $r + 1 = n$ 
then
   $r\_st := success$ 
   $r := r + 1$ 
   $h := h \cup \{n \mapsto f(n)\}$ 
end

```

```

(concrete-)RCV_success
when
   $r\_st = working$ 
   $w = \mathbf{FALSE}$ 
   $r = s$ 
   $r + 1 = n$ 
then
   $r\_st := success$ 
   $r := r + 1$ 
   $h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$ 
end

```

- Observe **guard strengthening**
- This invariant helps proving **event refinement**

inv2_3: $w = \mathbf{FALSE} \Rightarrow d = f(s + 1)$

- The first event is **new**. It clearly **refines skip**
- The activation bit is set to **TRUE** (activating `SND_snd_current_data`)
- The Sender receives acknowledgment (pointer r)

```
SND_rcv_current_ack
when
     $s\_st = working$ 
     $w = FALSE$ 
     $s + 1 < n$ 
     $r = s + 1$ 
then
     $w := TRUE$ 
     $s := s + 1$ 
end
```

```
SND_success
when
     $s\_st = working$ 
     $w = FALSE$ 
     $s + 1 = n$ 
     $r = s + 1$ 
then
     $s\_st := success$ 
end
```

```
(abstract-)SND_success
when
  s_st = working
  r_st = success
then
  s_st := success
end
```

```
(concrete-)SND_success
when
  s_st = working
  w = FALSE
  s + 1 = n
  r = s + 1
then
  s_st := success
end
```

- The presence of **inv1_3** ensures that the **guard is strengthened**

```
inv1_3: r_st = success  $\Leftrightarrow$  r = n
```

- This new events will receive a full explanation in the next refinement

```
SND_time_out_current
when
    s_st = working
    w = FALSE
then
    w := TRUE
end
```

- **At most** one activation bit is **TRUE at a time**

variables: ...
 db
 ab
 v

inv3_1: $w = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow db = \text{FALSE}$


inv3_2: $w = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow ab = \text{FALSE}$


inv3_3: $w = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow v = \text{FALSE}$


inv3_4: $db = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow ab = \text{FALSE}$


inv3_5: $db = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow v = \text{FALSE}$


inv3_6: $ab = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow v = \text{FALSE}$




















- These invariants define the **last data indicator**

variables: \dots
 l

inv3_7: $db = \text{TRUE} \wedge r = s \wedge l = \text{FALSE} \Rightarrow r + 1 < n$

inv3_8: $db = \text{TRUE} \wedge r = s \wedge l = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow r + 1 = n$

- This bit is sent by the Sender to the Receiver
- When equal to **TRUE**, this bit indicates that the sent item is the last one

- Constant MAX denotes the maximum number of retries
- The sender fails iff the retry counter c exceeds MAX (**inv3_10**)

constants: ...
 MAX

axm3_1: $MAX \in \mathbb{N}$

variables: ...
 c

inv3_9: $c \in 0 .. MAX + 1$

inv3_10: $c = MAX + 1 \Leftrightarrow s_st = failure$

init

$r := 0$

$h := \emptyset$

$r_st := working$

$s_st := working$

$s := 0$

$d \in D$

$w := \text{TRUE}$

$db := \text{FALSE}$

$ab := \text{FALSE}$

$v := \text{FALSE}$

$l := \text{FALSE}$

$c := 0$

brp

when

$r \neq working$

$s \neq working$

then

skip

end

SND_snd_current_data

when

$s_st = working$

$w = \text{TRUE}$

$s + 1 < n$

then

$d := f(s + 1)$

$w := \text{FALSE}$

$db := \text{TRUE}$

$l := \text{FALSE}$

end

SND_snd_last_data

when

$s_st = working$

$w = \text{TRUE}$

$s + 1 = n$

then

$d := f(s + 1)$

$w := \text{FALSE}$

$db := \text{TRUE}$

$l := \text{TRUE}$

end

- Daemons are **breaking the channels**

```
DMN_data_channel
  when
    db = TRUE
  then
    db = FALSE
  end
```

```
DMN_ack_channel
  when
    ab = TRUE
  then
    ab = FALSE
  end
```

- A **failure** is characterized by **all activation bits being FALSE**

SND_time_out_current

when

s_st = working

w = FALSE

ab = FALSE

db = FALSE

v = FALSE

c < MAX

then

w := TRUE

c := c + 1

end

SND_failure

when

s_st = working

w = FALSE

ab = FALSE

db = FALSE

v = FALSE

c = MAX

then

s_st := failure

c := c + 1

end

- Sender aborts after *MAX* tries

Rcv_rcv_current_data

when

$r_st = working$

$db = TRUE$

$r = s$

$l = FALSE$

then

$r := r + 1$

$h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$

$db := FALSE$

$v := TRUE$

end

Rcv_success

when

$r_st = working$

$db = TRUE$

$r = s$

$l = TRUE$

then

$r_st := success$

$r := r + 1$

$h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$

$db := FALSE$

$v := TRUE$

end

Reminder: l is the last data indicator

```

(abstract-)RCV_rcv_current_data
when
   $r\_st = working$ 
   $w = FALSE$ 
   $r = s$ 
   $r + 1 < n$ 
then
   $r := r + 1$ 
   $h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$ 
end

```

```

(concrete-)RCV_rcv_current_data
when
   $r\_st = working$ 
   $db = TRUE$ 
   $r = s$ 
   $l = FALSE$ 
then
   $r := r + 1$ 
   $h := h \cup \{r + 1 \mapsto d\}$ 
   $db := FALSE$ 
   $v := TRUE$ 
end

```

inv3_1': $db = TRUE \Rightarrow w = FALSE$

inv3_7: $db = TRUE \wedge r = s \wedge l = FALSE \Rightarrow r + 1 < n$

```

(abstract-)RCV_success
when
  r_st = working
  w = FALSE
  r = s
  r + 1 = n
then
  r := r + 1
  h := h ∪ {r + 1 ↦ d}
end

```

```

(abstract-)RCV_success
when
  r_st = working
  db = TRUE
  r = s
  l = TRUE
then
  r_st := success
  r := r + 1
  h := h ∪ {r + 1 ↦ d}
  db := FALSE
  v := TRUE
end

```

inv3_1': $db = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow w = \text{FALSE}$

inv3_8: $db = \text{TRUE} \wedge r = s \wedge l = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow r + 1 = n$


```
RCV_rcv_retry
  when
    db = TRUE
    r ≠ s
  then
    db := FALSE
    v := TRUE
  end
```

```
RCV_snd_ack
  when
    v = TRUE
  then
    v := FALSE
    ab := TRUE
  end
```

```
RCV_failure
  when
    r_st = working
    c = MAX + 1
  then
    r_st := failure
  end
```

```
SND_rcv_current_ack
when
  s_st = working
  ab = TRUE
   $s + 1 < n$ 
then
  w := TRUE
  s := s + 1
  c := 0
  ab := FALSE
end
```

```
SND_success
when
  s_st = working
  ab = TRUE
   $s + 1 = n$ 
then
  s_st := success
  c := 0
  ab := FALSE
end
```

```
(abstract-)SND_rcv_current_ack
when
  s_st = working
  w = FALSE
  s + 1 < n
  r = s + 1
then
  w := TRUE
  s := s + 1
end
```

```
(concrete-)SND_rcv_current_ack
when
  s_st = working
  ab = TRUE
  s + 1 < n
then
  w := TRUE
  s := s + 1
  c := 0
  ab := FALSE
end
```

inv3_2': $ab = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow w = \text{FALSE}$

- In order to prove guard strengthening we need invariant **inv3_11**

inv3_11: $ab = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow r = s + 1$

inv3_12: $v = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow r = s + 1$

- Invariant **inv3_12** is needed to prove **inv3_11**

```
(abstract-)SND_success
when
  s_st = working
  w = FALSE
  s + 1 = n
  r = s + 1
then
  s_st := success
end
```

```
(concrete-)SND_success
when
  s_st = working
  ab = TRUE
  s + 1 = n
then
  s_st := success
  c := 0
  ab := FALSE
end
```


inv3_2': $ab = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow w = \text{FALSE}$


- In order to prove guard strengthening we need invariant **inv3_11**

inv3_11: $ab = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow r = s + 1$

inv3_12: $v = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow r = s + 1$

- Invariant **inv3_12** is needed to prove **inv3_11**





- We would like to compute the probability of success
- It is a function of:
 - p : probability of failure for one channel
 - n : size of the file
 - $MAX + 1$: number of re-tries

Failure on one channel

p

Failure on one channel p

Success on one channel $1 - p$

Failure on one channel	p
Success on one channel	$1 - p$
Success on both channels	$(1 - p)^2$

Failure on one channel	p
Success on one channel	$1 - p$
Success on both channels	$(1 - p)^2$
Failure on one try	$1 - (1 - p)^2$

Failure on one channel	p
Success on one channel	$1 - p$
Success on both channels	$(1 - p)^2$
Failure on one try	$1 - (1 - p)^2$
Failure on MAX tries	$(1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$

Failure on one channel	p
Success on one channel	$1 - p$
Success on both channels	$(1 - p)^2$
Failure on one try	$1 - (1 - p)^2$
Failure on MAX tries	$(1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$
Success on MAX tries	$1 - (1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$

Failure on one channel	p
Success on one channel	$1 - p$
Success on both channels	$(1 - p)^2$
Failure on one try	$1 - (1 - p)^2$
Failure on MAX tries	$(1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$
Success on MAX tries	$1 - (1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$
Success for n data	$(1 - (1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1})^n$

Failure on one channel	p
Success on one channel	$1 - p$
Success on both channels	$(1 - p)^2$
Failure on one try	$1 - (1 - p)^2$
Failure on MAX tries	$(1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$
Success on MAX tries	$1 - (1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1}$
Success for n data	$(1 - (1 - (1 - p)^2)^{MAX+1})^n$

$$p = .1$$

$$MAX = 5$$

$$n = 100$$

$$.995$$