{"id":194,"date":"2018-12-23T18:39:23","date_gmt":"2018-12-23T18:39:23","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/?p=194"},"modified":"2018-12-23T18:39:23","modified_gmt":"2018-12-23T18:39:23","slug":"fruit-flies-feeling-and-willing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/2018\/12\/23\/fruit-flies-feeling-and-willing\/","title":{"rendered":"Fruit Flies, Feeling and Willing"},"content":{"rendered":"
Maye et al<\/a>. have found a neurally (and genetically) based fractal order underlying the generation of spontaneous behavior. Their finding is undoubtedly important in understanding the mechanisms generating adaptive behavior and the authors have been cautious in their interpretations within the article, but less so in discussions with the press. <\/p>\n One co-author writes<\/a>: “the term \u2018will\u2019 would not apply if our actions were completely random and it would not be \u2018free\u2019 if they were entirely determined. So if there is free will, it must be somewhere between chance and necessity – which is exactly where fly behavior comes to lie.”<\/p>\n The findings actually have nothing to do with free will. Free will is a feeling I have (when I do something deliberately) that I am doing what I am doing because I feel like it: a feeling that my willing it is the cause of my doing it. <\/p>\n It is undeniably true that that is what it feels like to do something deliberately. But whether what feels like the cause — feeling — is indeed the cause of my doing is an entirely different matter, especially if we are not ready to believe in telekinesis. The real cause might, for example, be a fractal order mechanism of the kind reported by Maye et al. But that mechanism is the causal mechanism it is irrespective of whether it happens to be accompanied by (or generates) feelings. And it certainly does not explain how or why we (let alone the fruit fly) feel anything at all.<\/p>\n And without feeling there is no free will, just mechanisms, whether deterministic or nondeterministic.<\/p>\n Stevan Harnad<\/p>\n Harnad, S. (2003) Can a Machine Be Conscious? How?<\/a> Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/i> 10(4-5): 69-75. <\/p>\n