@J-Wiki<\/a>:<\/span>Your edits have been thoughtful, so I don’t want to dwell on quibbles. Tom Nagel’s remark is correct: No one knows how a physical state can ‘be’ a mental (i.e., felt) state. That is in fact yet another way to state the “hard problem” itself!<\/p>\n But to say instead “No one knows how a physical state can be or yield<\/b> a mental state” is not just to state the problem, but to take a position on it, namely, the hypothesis of interactionist dualism (or something along those lines).<\/p>\n But this is exactly what acknowledging that it is a “hard problem” is meant to avoid. Yes, no one has any idea how a physical state could ‘be’ a mental state, but that already covers the fact<\/i> that no one has any idea how a physical state could cause<\/b> a mental state either!<\/p>\n Singling out that particular symptom of the problem and elevating it to the statement of the (hard) problem itself amounts to giving one particular hypothesis a privileged position among the many (vacuous) hypotheses that have been the symptoms of the (hard) problem itself.<\/p>\n By the same token one might have extended the statement of the problem to include all of the popular hypothetical (and vacuous) non-solutions: (1) the physical is identical with the mental (materialism, identity theory), (2) the physical causes the mental (parallelism), (3) the mental interacts with the physical (interactionism), (4) the physical replaces the mental (eliminativism), (5) there is no mental (physicalism), (6) there is only the mental (mentalism), (7) the mental is our only perspective on the physical (dual aspectism), (8) mental states and physical states are all just “functional” states (functionalism), etc. etc.<\/p>\n All these non-explanatory non-solutions are already implied by the hard problem itself. That P might (somehow) be the “cause” of M is already one of the many inchoate hypotheses opened up by admitting that we have no idea whatsoever as to how P could “be” M (or M could “be” P)<\/i>.<\/p>\n That’s why I think it would have been more NpV to use one neutral copula as the verb-of-puzzlement (“to be”) rather than a neutral one plus an arbitrary choice among the many problematic hypotheses on the market (“to yield” — i.e., “to cause”).<\/p>\n From glancing at (but not reading) other Wp articles you have edited, a hypothesis occurs to me: might your own PoV be influenced by quantum hypotheses…?<\/p>\n As for me: “Hypotheses non fingo<\/i>” —User:Harnad<\/a> (talk<\/a>) 12:47, 10 September 2018 (UTC) —User:Harnad<\/a> (talk<\/a>) 13:07, 10 September 2018 (UTC) —User:Harnad<\/a> (talk<\/a>) 13:10, 10 September 2018 (UTC)<\/p>\n @Biogeographist<\/a>:<\/span> I’m afraid I don’t know of recent, relevant writings on this question. I can only say that I find “dual-aspect” theory as unhelpful as the other 8 nonsolutions listed in paragraph 9 above (or many more that could have been mentioned). I don’t know what Prentner means by “finer temporal resolution” (though I’m pretty sure that by “tantamount” he means “paramount”). My guess is that the “is” ambiguity (“is” as stating a proposition and “is” as making an identity claim) is not really a profound matter. There is always a problem with physical to mental or mental to physical predication because of the (unsolved) “hard problem.” We do not know how (or why) feeling is generated. Dualists insist on reminding us that we don’t even know whether<\/i> feeling is (physically) generated, or somehow sui generis<\/i>. Timing won’t help.<\/p>\n (I assume that the hope is that if the physical (functional) state and the mental (felt) state don’t occur simultaneously, this will somehow help sort things out: I think it won’t. I did note once, in a Ben-Libet context (and Dan Dennett cites it in one of his books on consciousness) that it is impossible to time the exact instant of a mental event: it could precede, coincide with, or follow its physical correlate (and subjective report certainly cannot settle the matter!): there’s no objective way to pinpoint the subjective event except very approximately, not the fine-tuning Prentner seems to want. Saul Sternberg thought it could be done statisticaly, with averaging, as with event-related potentials. But I think it wouldn’t help either way. Whether feeling occurs before, during, or after a neural correlate, it does not help with the hard problem, which is a problem of causal explanation, not chronometry.) —User:Harnad<\/a> (talk<\/a>) 22:01, 12 September 2018 (UTC)<\/p>\n @Biogeographist<\/a>:<\/span> First, “no objective way to pinpoint the subjective event except very approximately” is not the same as no way to pinpoint it at all.<\/p>\n Second, the limits of human timing accuracy<\/a> for detecting felt states or events are pretty well known. I can say whether it felt as if my tooth-ache started a half-second earlier or later but not whether it started a millisecond earlier or later. So the temporal boundaries of felt instants are probably too coarse for pinning them to neural correlates (which can be much finer).<\/p>\n Of course one can always dream of new technology, but that would still only be based on more accurate timing of objective neural events (unless you are imagining either a drug or a form of brain stimulation that increases the limits of human timing accuracy for detecting felt states, which I think is unlikely, though not inconceivable).<\/p>\n But even if subjective detection could be made as accurate as objective (neural) detection, how can that more accurate chronometry help with causal<\/i> explanation? As I said, the felt instant could precede, coincide with or follow its neural correlate, but none of the three options helps explain how or why (or even whether<\/i>) neural events cause feelings.<\/p>\n The causal problem is not in the timing. It’s in the functionality. Neural events can clearly (and unproblematically) cause motor as well as other physiological activity (including “information-processing”), all of which can be objectively timed and measured. No causal problem whatsoever there. Suppose some neural events turn out to slightly precede or even be exactly simultaneous with felt states (within the limits of measurement): How would that help explain how and why the felt states are felt? Even if the felt states systematically precede<\/i> their neural correlates (within the limits of measurement), how does that help explain how and why felt states are felt?<\/p>\n That’s why I think “temporality” is not going to help solve the hard problem. I think the real problem is not in the timing of either firings or feelings. The problem is that feeling seems to be causally superfluous<\/i> for causing, hence explaining, our cognitive capacities — once the “easy problems” (which are “only” about the causal mechanisms of behavior, cognitive capacity and physiology) have been solved.<\/p>\n Even if one imagines a scenario where the feeling precedes its neural correlate, and the neural correlate can also occur without the preceding feeling, but we can show that the neural correlate alone, without the preceding feeling, is incapable of generating some behavioral capacity (i.e., an easy problem), whereas when preceded by the feeling, it can. This sounds like the ultimate gift to the dualist: but what does it explain, causally? Nothing. It is just a just-so story, causally speaking. It leaves just as big a causal mystery as the scenario in which the neural correlate precedes or coincides with the feeling. None of this gives the slightest hint of a solution. Neither monism nor dualism solves the hard problem. It just soothes metaphysical angst, hermeneutically.<\/p>\n Now there could be a form of dualism that does give a causal explanation, hence a solution to the hard problem: If, in addition to the four fundamental forces of nature (gravitation, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces) there were a fifth force<\/i> which corresponded to feeling (or willing), then we would be no more entitled to ask “how and why does this fifth force pull or push” than we are to ask how and why do the other four fundamental forces pull or push. They are simply fundamental forces of nature, as described by the fundamental laws of nature, and as supported by the empirical evidence.<\/i> — But the latter is exactly what feeling as a fifth force lacks. There is no empirical evidence whatsoever of a fifth fundemental force, whereas there is no end of observable, measurable evidence of the other four.<\/p>\n So even on the last hypothetical scenario (feeling precedes neural correlate and some behavioral capacity cannot be generated by the neural correlate alone when it is not preceded by the feeling), the “causal power” of feeling would remain a mystery: a hard problem, unsolved. The only thing I can say in favor of this fantasy scenario (which I don’t believe) is that if it did turn out to be true, it would mean that the “easy problems” cannot all be solved without the (inexplicable) help of feeling, and hence that some easy problems turn out to be hard! —User:Harnad<\/a> (talk<\/a>) 22:48, 13 September 2018 (UTC)<\/p>\n @Biogeographist<\/a>:<\/span> Yes, Dave Chalmers may not have written about explanation or causal explanation in relation to the hard problem, but I have.\u00a0;>) And I don’t think the hard problem has much to do with our subjective perplexities about what it is that we’re feeling: A coherent causal explanation of how and why tissue-damage — besides generating the “easy” adaptive responses (limb-withdrawal, escape, avoidance, learning, memory) — also generates “ouch” would be sufficient to solve the hard problem (without any further existential or phenomenological introspection on the meaning or quality of “ouch”). Best wishes, —User:Harnad<\/a> (talk<\/a>) 12:19, 14 September 2018 (UTC)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" @J-Wiki:Your edits have been thoughtful, so I don’t want to dwell on quibbles. Tom Nagel’s remark is correct: No one knows how a physical state can ‘be’ a mental (i.e., felt) state. That is in fact yet another way to state the “hard problem” itself! But to say instead “No one knows how a physical … <\/p>\n\n
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the “is” we use in any subject\/predicate statement<\/q>.)<\/dd>\n
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