> From: "Young, Mark" <MYOUNG92@psy.soton.ac.uk>
> Date: Thu, 25 May 1995 17:10:40 GMT
>
> [isn't the] broken wing display... just an example of fixed action
> patterns? If so, the issue of other minds doesn't really enter the
> picture. If it were the case that a bird knows the snake is a predator
> (rather than a landslide), I find it unlikely that ALL birds exhibit
> the same display. They are essentially faced with a problem to solve.
> Surely some creativity would be evident and other ways of protecting
> the nest would emerge. The fact that they don't leads me to think that
> it is just an evolutionary response elicited by an appropriate
> stimulus.
Fixed Action Patterns are not as fixed as once thought -- besides, we
humans have plenty of them too.
Yes, flexibility might be one way of strengthening the cognitive
explanation against the purely behavioural one. Learnability might
be another. Carolyn Ristau
mailto:ristau@spot.Colorado.EDU
thinks (see below) that the broken wing display meets the necessary
objective conditions.
What I asked was: Are there also SUFFICIENT objective conditions -- or
is one of the special features of mental states that, objectively
speaking, they can never be shown to be necessary, that you can always
demote them in the Lubinski/Thompson way?
> Of course, I'm not saying that birds don't have minds, but this
> example doesn't show that they do.
You're mixing up the two things I warned about. At issue here is whether
the wing display implies plovers have a "theory of mind." (If they ever
feel anything at all, then they already have a mind.)
Chrs, Stevan
mailto:harnad@soton.ac.uk
Ristau, Carolyn A., ed. Cognitive ethology: The minds of other animals:
Essays in honor of Donald R. Griffin. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc;
Hillsdale, NJ, US, 1991.
ABSTRACT: (from the preface) This book is dedicated to Donald R.
Griffin.... He created the field of cognitive ethology, an exploration
of the mental experiences of animals, particularly as they behave in
their natural environment in the course of their normal lives....
Recognizing that in new areas of research, there is unlikely to be much
theoretical structure to guide the way, some urge investigation into
unexplored areas, posing new questions of animals, and allowing for the
possibilities that animals may have abilities to experience,
communicate, reason, and plan beyond those usually scribed to them in a
"black box" or "stimulus-response" interpretation.... New endeavors are
underway in the use of what are generally known as folk psychological
terms such as want and belief. In response to these approaches, some
urge us to worry about the possible pitfalls that might emerge with
their use by researchers in other disciplines.... Finally, a number of
researchers have concentrated on reporting new empirical research
findings from laboratory and field work involving animal communication,
cognition, and mental states.
Contents: (Abbreviated). Preface. Reminiscences.
Part I: Theoretical perspectives.
Progress toward a cognitive ethology. Donald R. Griffin. (Chapter record
available).
>From folk psychology to cognitive ethology. Colin G. Beer. (Chapter record
available).
How is cognitive ethology possible?. Jonathan Bennett. (Chapter record
available).
Part II: Evidence from the laboratory and field.
Cognitive ethology and critical anthropomorphism: A snake with two heads
and hog-nose snakes that play dead. Gordon M. Burghardt. (Chapter record
available).
Aspects of the cognitive ethology of an injury-feigning bird, the piping
plover. Carolyn A. Ristau. (Chapter record available).
Truth and deception in animal communication. Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert
M. Seyfarth. (Chapter record available).
A communicative approach to animal cognition: A study of conceptual
abilities of an African grey parrot. Irene M. Pepperberg. (Chapter
record available).
Do animals have the option of withholding signals when communication is
inappropriate? The audience effect. Peter Marler, Stephen Karakashian
and Marcel Gyger. (Chapter record available).
Animal communication and the study of cognition. W. John Smith. (Chapter
record available).
Conscious chimpanzees? A review of recent literature. Alison Jolly.
(Chapter record available).
Human psychology and the minds of other animals. George F. Michel.
(Chapter record available).
Integrating cognitive ethology with cognitive psychology. Sonja I. Yoerg
and Alan C. Kamil. (Chapter record available).
Cognitive ethology: An overview. Carolyn A. Ristau.
Author index.
Subject index.
Species index.
Ristau, Carolyn A.
Aspects of the cognitive ethology of an injury-feigning bird, the piping
plover.
IN: Cognitive ethology: The minds of other animals: Essays in honor of
Donald R. Griffin. Comparative cognition and neuroscience.; Carolyn A.
Ristau, Ed. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Hillsdale, NJ, US. 1991. p.
91-126.
ABSTRACT: (from the chapter) interest in the scientific investigation of animal
mental states has been rekindled recently in several disciplines:
philosophy of mind, experimental and comparative psychology, and Griffin's
creation of the new enterprise of cognitive ethology; as an approach to
this problem, in the present research a low-level intentional stance was
assumed; I suggest that for some species, a bird engaged in injury
feigning wants to lead an intruder away from its offspring and acts as
needed (within limits) to achieve that end... field experiments were
conducted with piping plovers and Wilson's plovers using human intruders
to approach the eggs or young; data were gathered on each bird's direction
of display monitoring of the intruder, and flexibility of behavior in
response to changing behavior by the intruder... other experiments
investigated the birds' responsiveness to attention of an intruder
(interpreted as direction of intruder's eye gaze) and the birds' ability
to learn to discriminate between potentially "safe" versus "dangerous"
intruders.
Ristau, Carolyn A. Before mindreading: Attention, purposes and
deception in birds?
IN: Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development and simulation of
everyday mindreading.; Andrew Whiten, Ed. Basil Blackwell, Inc, Oxford,
England. 1991. p. 209-222.
ABSTRACT: (from the chapter) review my evidence suggesting that plovers exhibit
purposeful behaviour; field studies were undertaken to investigate the
plovers' use of 'injury feigning' or broken wing displays; 'injury
feigning' is among the most intense of a repertoire of anti-predator
behaviours... deception; attentiveness to the gaze of another.
Ristau, Carolyn A. Thinking, communicating, and deceiving: Means to
master the social environment.
IN: Evolution of social behavior and integrative levels. The T. C.
Schneirla conference series, Vol. 3.; Gary Greenberg, Ethel Tobach, Eds.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Hillsdale, NJ, US. 1988. p. 213-240.
ABSTRACT: (from the chapter) anagenesis: some reservations... the concept of
"levels"... what are non reproductive patterns... gaining control...
consider animal learning, particularly discrimination learning as it is
important to animal thinking and possible naming, the transition from
reflexive to voluntary behavior, and finally to how at least some animals
achieve their intentions in social situations, discussing in particular
the use of deception... from reflexes to purposes.
Ristau, Carolyn A. Symbols and indication in apes and other species?
Comment on Savage-Rumbaugh et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1983 Dec, v112 (n4):498-507.
ABSTRACT: Responds to the E. S. Savage-Rumbaugh et al (see PA, Vol 71:22384)
article on nonhuman artificial language learning in chimpanzees. The
present author expresses concern with the experimental paradigm used,
focusing on (a) the naming/request distinction and (b) a need for testing
in nonroutine situations that can permit spontaneous, varied, flexible,
and novel use of symbolic and other abilities. The issues of possible
semanticity in animals other than apes and what might be rudimentary forms
of symbol use are discussed. The question of how one might investigate
meaning in animals' artificial language and natural communication is
raised. The present author suggests a need for contributions from diverse
disciplines and theoretical interpretations. (PsycINFO Database Copyright
1984 American Psychological Assn, all rights reserved).
Ristau, Carolyn A.
Language, cognition, and awareness in animals?
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1983, v406:170-186.
ABSTRACT: Reviews selective evidence for the attributes of awareness,
cognition, and language in animals in research drawn mainly from the
ethological literature, particularly on the communicative dance of the
honeybee and the problem of animal deception. A few aspects of the
experimental work on training apes to use language are also described. The
question is asked whether, given evidence for and acceptance of continuity
between animals and humans in many aspects of chemical composition,
morphology, and development, it is not more reasonable to assume mental
continuity as well. The central issue is whether an animal feels
pain--whether it suffers physically or mentally. It is concluded that
research with animals is still possible, but that it should be done with
restraint and conscientious awareness. (PsycINFO Database Copyright 1984
American Psychological Assn, all rights reserved).
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