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http://www.yorku.ca/dept/psych/classics/Lovelace/menabrea.htm

http://www.yorku.ca/dept/psych/classics/Lovelace/lovelace.htm

On Tue, 15 Feb 2000, Egerland, Matthias wrote:

*> > MENABREA:
*

*> > from the moment that
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*> > the nature of the calculation to be executed or of the problem to be
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*> > resolved have been indicated to it, the machine is, by its own intrinsic
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*> > power, of itself to go through all the intermediate operations which lead to
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*> > the proposed result, it must exclude all methods of trial and guess-work,
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*> > and can only admit the direct processes of calculation.
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*>
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*> Egerland:
*

*> This is the main point about the Analytical Engine. Menabrea says that
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*> the machine needs to be independent from humans to fulfil its main
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*> purpose - being a useful tool by improving correctness and time
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*> efficiency when humans have to deal with complicated mathematics.
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*>
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*> At the same time the author is completely aware of the fact, that this
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*> machine can not make use of intuition. For solving mathematical
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*> equations it has to take a completely different approach than an
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*> 'intelligent' being.
*

This is similar to the mathematician Roger Penrose's recent objections

to AI. He thinks computation cannot capture mathematicians' intuitions.

The Emperor's New Mind

Roger Penrose, Oxford University Press, 1990

http://www.friesian.com/penrose.htm

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/penrose.htm

But what it the evidence, really, that the unconscious processes

underlying intuition are not also computational?

See:

Why Godel's Theorem Cannot Refute Computationalism

Geoffery LaForte, Patrick J. Hayes Kenneth M. Ford

http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~glaforte/papers/whyGodel.ps

Mathematics and the Mind

Edward Nelson Department of Mathematics

Princeton University

http://www.math.princeton.edu.~nelson/papers/tokyo.ps.gz

Have a look at the above, in connection with next weeks Skywriting

assignment, which is:

J.R. Lucas (1961) Minds, Machines and Goedel. Philosophy 36 112-127.

http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/abs/phil/199807022

We will only be quote/commenting Lucas, which is in HTML, but you are

welcome to bring in the other two papers (which are alas in PS, unless

you can figure out a way to convert it to quotable ascii).

*> Egerland:
*

*> So the main goal was finding a possibility to make the machine
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*> calculate without 'thinking'. Hence, the machine could only be as
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*> powerful as its inventor, who had to find this very fundamental way of
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*> solving mathematical equations.
*

Two things here: Is the assumption that thinking is not itself

computational necessarily (or even probably) true? Turing clearly

thinks otherwise.

Second, the "no more powerful than its inventor" argument is Lady

Lovelace's, isn't it. But can't my weak mind find an algorithm that

happens to be more powerful than itself (just as I can build a machine

that's stronger than me?

*> Egerland:
*

*> Here Menabrea says explicitly that the only intelligence in conjunction
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*> with this machine has to be in the head of the designer of the cards,
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*> who can be considered as the 'programmer'. Neither the workman nor the
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*> machine itself need to have a (high level) of intelligence.
*

Is this really a limitation of computers, or a limitation in the

imagination of the early designers of computers? For two possibilities

are surely open: (1) that a human mind can write a programme that can do

things that particular mind alone cannot do and (2) that the human mind

is itself just the implementation of a computer programme (and even a

programme that it is capable of discovering and formulating explicitly).

I am not saying any of this is so, but I am suggesting that no reason

has yet been given why it could not be so.

Thoughts?

Stevan

**Next message:**HARNAD, Stevan: "Re: Charles Babbage's "Analytical Engine""**Previous message:**HARNAD, Stevan: "Re: Turing Test"**Maybe in reply to:**Egerland, Matthias: "Charles Babbage's "Analytical Engine""**Next in thread:**HARNAD, Stevan: "Re: Charles Babbage's "Analytical Engine""**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

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