RE: Chalmers on Computation
>HARNAD
>Does it mean that a computer running the right
>programme will have a mind?
Probably not, however there is a spin on this which
I would like to mention.
>HARNAD
>Does a plane simulator that simulates its causal
>structure have the causal power to fly?
Just supposing we discover an implementation
Independent algorithm which we used in creating
T3 robot. It would be the computational part of
our hybrid system. Could we not implement
this algorithm into a virtual world. It would
obviously not pass T3 but if it could be
communicated with, it might pass T2.
Do you think that the algorithm in the virtual
world would be any less of a mind?
(Supposing the virtual world was sufficiently
complex to allow grounding of the fundamental
symbols.)
If so, would not a virtual environment be a
better place to keep an artificial mind?
***********************
Further, another question about the same topic
Why is T3 immune to Searle's Chinese Room argument?
Surely the computational part of the T3 hybrid system
can be isolated as an Implementation Independent
algorithm. The peripheral systems would ground the
percepts into symbols which would be passed to
Searle in his Chinese Room (Searle would perhaps have
his whole family with him and would be dealing with
lots of different I/Os all at the same time). In this way T3
still seems to be an algorithm which is subject to Searle's
argument.
Grady, James
ps i think i asked the same question twice!
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