From: Clark Graham (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sat May 26 2001 - 15:04:58 BST
I have been looking over Searle's paper (Minds, Machines and Programs), and
I am a bit confused by your reading of it. You say that Searle is saying
that because of the CRA, cognition can't be computation AT ALL, but he says
several times that passing the TT can't be SOLELY computation. He does
mention some sort of sensorimotor capabilities (in the "Robot reply"), but
seems to counter this completely wrongly (by ignoring any grounding these
extra capabilities could provide). So although Searle doesn't seem to have
any clues as to what the "something else" (apart from computation) might be,
he does seem to agree that computation could be a part of the mind.
Is this correct? Any feedback would be greatly appreciated.
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