Problems in the "functional" investigations of consciousness

Overgaard, Morten (2000) Problems in the "functional" investigations of consciousness. (Unpublished)

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This article presents the view that the “problem of consciousness” – per definition – can not be seen as a strictly scientific or strictly philosophical problem. The first idea, especially, leads to important difficulties: First of all, the idea has in most cases implied some rather superficial reductionistic or functionalistic a priori assumptions, and, secondly, it can be shown that some of the most commonly used empirical methods in these regards are inadequate. Especially so in the case of contrastive analysis, widely used in cognitive neuroscience. However, this criticism does not lead to the conclusion that scientific methods are inadequate as such, only that they always work on a pre-established background of theory, of which one must be explicit.

Item Type:Other
Keywords:Consciousness; science; functionalism; contrastive analysis; scientific explanation; philosophical explanation; methodology
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:1982
Deposited By: Overgaard, Morten
Deposited On:14 Dec 2001
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:54

References in Article

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