Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change

Brigandt, Ingo (2004) Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change. [Conference Paper] (In Press)

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The paper discusses concept individuation in the context of scientific concepts and conceptual change in science. It is argued that some concepts can be individuated in different ways. A particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept (which is ascribed to every person from a whole scientific field). But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts (so that each of these concepts is attributed to a smaller group of persons only). The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that underlie a particular study of the change of a scientific term. These interests determine how a concept is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different philosophical studies and interests, its content can be individuated in different ways.

Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords:concepts, concept individuation, holism, conceptual role semantics, conceptual change, gene concept
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Language
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:3934
Deposited By: Brigandt, Ingo
Deposited On:13 Nov 2004
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

References in Article

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