The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics

Branquinho, Joao (1999) The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics. [Journal (Paginated)]

Full text available as:

[img] HTML


This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:belief, cognitive dynamics, indexicals, demonstratives, propositional attitudes, mental content, mode of presentation, proposition, direct reference, Fregeanism, propositional memory, change of mind, object-tracking
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Language
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:401
Deposited By: Branquinho, Joao
Deposited On:08 Feb 2000
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53


Repository Staff Only: item control page