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Psychophysical Nature

Velmans, Prof Max (2007) Psychophysical Nature. [Book Chapter] (In Press)

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Abstract

There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and external world. The chapter goes on to provide grounds for viewing mind and nature as fundamentally psychophysical, and examines similar views as well as differences in previously unpublished writings of Wolfgang Pauli, one of the founders of quantum mechanics.

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:Physical, psychological, psychophysical, consciousness, mind, brain, reflexive model, reflexive monism, dualism, reductionism, dual-aspect, information, Pauli, psychological complementarity, physical complementarity, exclusive, non-exclusive, perception
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
Philosophy > Metaphysics
Psychology > Perceptual Cognitive Psychology
ID Code:6109
Deposited By: Velmans, Professor Max,
Deposited On:27 Jun 2008 01:41
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:57

References in Article

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Velmans, M.(2007a) Dualism, reductionism and reflexive monism. In M.Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell, pp 346-358.

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Velmans, M. (2000) Understanding Consciousness. Routledge/Psychology Press.

Velmans, M. (1998a) Goodbye to reductionism. In S.Hameroff, A.Kaszniak & A.Scott (eds) Towards a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press, pp 45-52.

Velmans, M. (1998b) Physical, psychological and virtual realities. In J.Wood (ed) Virtual and Embodied Realities. London: Routledge, pp 45-60.

Velmans, M. (1998c) Review of D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Consciousness & Experiential Psychology, 1(1), 14-17. Also in Perspectives, 6(1) Jan-March, http://www.cmhc.com/perspectives/books/book1297.htm#c.

Velmans, M. (1996) Consciousness and the “causal paradox.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(3), 537-542.

Velmans, M. (1995) The relation of consciousness to the material world. The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 255-265.

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Velmans, M. (1990) Consciousness, brain, and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology, 3, 77-99.

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