Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory

Carruthers, Peter (1996) Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory. [Book Chapter]

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In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency.

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:Simulation, theory-theory, self-knowledge, Gordon, Goldman
Subjects:Psychology > Developmental Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:1194
Deposited By: Carruthers, Peter
Deposited On:09 Jan 2001
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:54


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