Goodbye to Reductionism

Velmans, Max (1998) Goodbye to Reductionism. [Book Chapter]

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To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited.

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:consciousness, dualism, reductionism, phenomenology, identity theory, perception, reflexive, projection, pain, body-image, Searle, Place, Churchland
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Metaphysics
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
Psychology > Physiological Psychology
ID Code:244
Deposited By: Velmans, Professor Max,
Deposited On:13 Mar 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53


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