On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions

Branquinho, João (2000) On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions. [Conference Paper]

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The aim of the paper is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it is impossible coherently to take different mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of Leibniz’s Law), this is a synchronic principle, the application of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of attitude-retention, I propose an admissible diachronic extension of the principle.

Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords:proposition, thought, propositional attitudes, mental state, rationality, belief, cognitive dynamics, propositionalmemory, mental content, diachronic identity, mental tokensand types
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Language
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:405
Deposited By: Branquinho, Joao
Deposited On:05 Apr 2000
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53


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