At the Potter’s Wheel: An Argument for Material Agency

Malafouris, Dr Lambros (2007) At the Potter’s Wheel: An Argument for Material Agency. [Book Chapter]

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Consider a potter throwing a vessel on the wheel. Think of the complex ways brain, body, wheel and clay relate and interact with one another throughout the different stages of this activity and try to imagine some of the resources (physical, mental or biological) needed for the enaction of this creative process. Focus, for instance, on the first minutes of action when the potter attempts to centre the lump of clay on the wheel. The hands are grasping the clay. The fingers, bent slightly following the surface curvature, sense the clay and exchange vital tactile information necessary for a number of crucial decisions that are about to follow in the next few seconds. What is it that guides the dextrous positioning of the potter’s hands and decides upon the precise amount of forward or downward pressure necessary for centring a lump of clay on the wheel? How do the potter’s fingers come to know the precise force of the appropriate grip? What makes these questions even more fascinating is the ease by which the phenomena which they describe are accomplished. Yet underlying the effortless manner in which the potter’s hand reaches for and gradually shapes the wet clay lies a whole set of conceptual challenges to some of our most deeply entrenched assumptions about what it means to be a human agent.

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:Agency, material culture, extended and distributed mind, mediated action, embodiment, pottery making, archaeology
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Computer Science > Human Computer Interaction
Computer Science > Dynamical Systems
Computer Science > Robotics
ID Code:6402
Deposited By: Malafouris, Dr Lambros
Deposited On:28 Mar 2009 09:29
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:57

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