A characterization of the one-sidedness fallacy within the framework of the cognitive distortions

Franceschi, Dr Paul (2009) A characterization of the one-sidedness fallacy within the framework of the cognitive distortions. [Preprint]

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In this paper, I propose an accurate description of the cognitive process involved in the one-sidedness fallacy, a widespread type of fallacy. I describe first several characterizations of the one-sidedness fallacy, that are either inductive or deductive, or occurring at a meta-philosophical level. I recall, second, the framework of the cognitive distortions described in Franceschi (2007). I give then a definition of the one-sidedness fallacy, by describing it as a general cognitive distortion: the disqualification of one pole. I show finally how the one-sidedness fallacy distinguishes itself from the confirmation bias.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:one-sidedness fallacy, cognitive distortion, confirmation bias
Subjects:Philosophy > Logic
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
ID Code:6547
Deposited By: Franceschi, Paul
Deposited On:02 Jul 2009 01:52
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:57

References in Article

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