A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

Franceschi, Paul (2010) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]

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In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one.

Item Type:Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)
Keywords:Doomsday argument, two-urn case, emerald case, thought experiment, probability theory
Subjects:Philosophy > Logic
Philosophy > Epistemology
ID Code:7044
Deposited By: Franceschi, Paul
Deposited On:18 Oct 2010 11:04
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:57

References in Article

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Bostrom, Nick. 1997. “Investigations into the Doomsday argument.” preprint at

———. 2002. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy New York: Routledge.

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———. 1997. “A Shooting-Room view of Doomsday.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 244-259.

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———. 1996. The End of the World: the science and ethics of human extinction London: Routledge.

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