Items where author is affiliated with Stanford University

Understanding user intent is key to designing an effective ranking system in a search engine. In the absence of any explicit knowledge of user intent, search engines want to diversify results to improve user satisfaction. In such a setting, the probability ranking principle-based approach of presenting the most relevant results on top can be sub-optimal, and hence the search engine would like to trade-off relevance for diversity in the results. In analogy to prior work on ranking and clustering systems, we use the axiomatic approach to characterize and design diversification systems. We develop a set of natural axioms that a diversification system is expected to satisfy, and show that no diversification function can satisfy all the axioms simultaneously. We illustrate the use of the axiomatic framework by providing three example diversification objectives that satisfy different subsets of the axioms. We also uncover a rich link to the facility dispersion problem that results in algorithms for a number of diversification objectives. Finally, we propose an evaluation methodology to characterize the objectives and the underlying axioms. We conduct a large scale evaluation of our objectives based on two data sets: a data set derived from the Wikipedia disambiguation pages and a product database.

We present a logs-based comparison of search patterns across three platforms: computers, iPhones and conventional mobile phones. Our goal is to understand how mobile search users differ from computer-based search users, and we focus heavily on the distribution and variability of tasks that users perform from each platform. The results suggest that search usage is much more focused for the average mobile user than for the average computer-based user. However, search behavior on high-end phones resembles computer-based search behavior more so than mobile search behavior. A wide variety of implications follow from these findings. First, there is no single search interface which is suitable for all mobile phones. We suggest that for the higher-end phones, a close integration with the standard computer-based interface (in terms of personalization and available feature set) would be beneficial for the user, since these phones seem to be treated as an extension of the users' computer. For all other phones, there is a huge opportunity for personalizing the search experience for the user's "mobile needs", as these users are likely to repeatedly search for a single type of information need on their phone.

Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1. We show that risk-seeking advertisers will choose only a per-impression bid whereas risk-averse advertisers will choose only a per-click bid, and argue that both kind of advertisers arise naturally. Hence, the ability to bid in a hybrid fashion is important to account for the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2. For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, we show that having the extra information from the advertisers in the form of a perimpression bid can result in significantly higher revenue. 3. An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneer’s estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneer’s prior without incurring any extra cost. 4. The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies to deal with the uncertainty in the clickprobability using the same basic auction. The per-click and per-impression bidding schemes can only be used to implement two extreme cases of these strategies. ∗Research supported in part by NSF ITR grant 0428868, by gifts from Google, Microsoft, and Cisco, and by the Stanford-KAUST alliance. †Research supported by NSF via a CAREER award and grant CNS-0540347.

The question of how to publish an anonymized search log was brought to the forefront by a well-intentioned, but privacy-unaware AOL search log release. Since then a series of ad-hoc techniques have been proposed in the literature, though none are known to be provably private. In this paper, we take a major step towards a solution: we show how queries, clicks and their associated perturbed counts can be published in a manner that rigorously preserves privacy. Our algorithm is decidedly simple to state, but non-trivial to analyze. On the opposite side of privacy is the question of whether the data we can safely publish is of any use. Our findings offer a glimmer of hope: we demonstrate that a non-negligible fraction of queries and clicks can indeed be safely published via a collection of experiments on a real search log. In addition, we select an application, keyword generation, and show that the keyword suggestions generated from the perturbed data resemble those generated from the original data.

In this paper, we report on a large-scale study of structural differences among the national webs. The study is based on a webscale crawl conducted in the summer 2008. More specifically, we study two graphs derived from this crawl, the nation graph, with nodes corresponding to nations and edges – to links among nations, and the host graph, with nodes corresponding to hosts and edges – to hyperlinks among pages on the hosts. Contrary to some of the previous work [2], our results show that webs of different nations are often very different from each other, both in terms of their internal structure, and in terms of their connectivity with other nations.