What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument?

Harnad, Stevan (2001) What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument? [Book Chapter] (In Press)


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Searle's Chinese Room Argument showed a fatal flaw in computationalism (the idea that mental states are just computational states) and helped usher in the era of situated robotics and symbol grounding (although Searle himself thought neuroscience was the only correct way to understand the mind).

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:Searle, Chinese Room Argument, Turing Test, Symbol Grounding, computationalism, cognitivism, robotics, language functionalism, neuroscience
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science > Robotics
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:1622
Deposited By: Harnad, Stevan
Deposited On:19 Jun 2001
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:54

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