Cogprints

IS THE WORLD IN THE BRAIN, OR THE BRAIN IN THE WORLD? (A commentary on Lehar, S. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press)

Velmans, Professor Max (2003) IS THE WORLD IN THE BRAIN, OR THE BRAIN IN THE WORLD? (A commentary on Lehar, S. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press). [Journal (Paginated)] (In Press)

This is the latest version of this eprint.

Full text available as:

[img] HTML
38Kb

Abstract

Lehar provides useful insights into spatially extended phenomenology that may have major consequences for neuroscience. However, Lehar’s biological naturalism leads to counterintuitive conclusions and he does not give an accurate account of preceding and competing work. This commentary compares Lehar’s analysis with that of Velmans, which address similar issues but draws opposite conclusions. Lehar argues that the phenomenal world is in the brain, and concludes that the physical skull is beyond the phenomenal world. Velmans argues that the brain is in the phenomenal world and concludes that the physical skull is where it seems to be.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Additional Information:This is a fuller (unabridged) version of an invited commentary on a BBS target article.
Keywords:Lehar, biological naturalism, reflexive monism, visual perception, brain, phenomenal world, spatial
Subjects:Neuroscience > Neuropsychology
Neuroscience > Neural Modelling
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:2798
Deposited By: Velmans, Professor Max,
Deposited On:25 Feb 2003
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

Available Versions of this Item

References in Article

Select the SEEK icon to attempt to find the referenced article. If it does not appear to be in cogprints you will be forwarded to the paracite service. Poorly formated references will probably not work.

James, W (1904) Does 'consciousness' exist? Reprinted in: G. N. A. Vesey (ed) Body and mind: readings in philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970, pp 202-208.

Pribram, K.H. (1971) Languages of the brain: experimental paradoxes and principles in neuropsychology. New York: Brandon House.

Revonsuo, A. (1995) Consciousness, dreams, and virtual realities. Philosophical Psychology, 8(1): 35-58.

Velmans, M (2003) Is the world in the brain, or the brain in the world? (Unabridged version of BBS commentary).

Velmans, M. (2002a) How could conscious experiences affect brains? (Target Article for Special Issue) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (11): 3-29.

Velmans, M (2002b) Making sense of the causal interactions between consciousness and brain (a reply to commentaries) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (11): 69-95.

Velmans, M. (2001) A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. Communication and Cognition, 34(1&2): 39-59.

Velmans, M. (2000a) Understanding Consciousness, London: Routledge/Psychology Press.

Velmans, M. (ed.) (2000b) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Velmans, M. (1996a) Consciousness and the “causal paradox.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(3): 537-542.

Velmans, M (ed) (1996b) The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews. London: Routledge.

Velmans, M.(1993) A Reflexive Science of consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Wiley, Chichester, pp 81-99.

Velmans, M. (1991a) Is human information processing conscious? (Target Article) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4): 651-669.

Velmans, M. (1991b) Consciousness from a first-person perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4): 702-726.

Velmans, M. (1990) Consciousness, brain, and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology: 3, 77-99.

Metadata

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Cogprints is powered by EPrints 3 which is developed by the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. More information and software credits.