Bosco, Francesca M. and Tirassa, Maurizio (1998) Sharedness as an innate basis for communication in the infant. [Conference Paper]
Full text available as:
|
PDF
30Kb |
Abstract
From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. In order to solve the resulting dilemma, we propose that certain specific components of an agent's cognitive architecture (namely, a peculiar version of sharedness and communicative intention), are necessary and sufficient to explain infant communication in a mentalist framework. We also argue that these components are innate in the human species.
Item Type: | Conference Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | Mindreading; Communication; Nativism; Development; Shared mental states; Agency |
Subjects: | Psychology > Developmental Psychology Psychology > Cognitive Psychology |
ID Code: | 3559 |
Deposited By: | Tirassa, Prof. Maurizio |
Deposited On: | 14 Apr 2004 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:55 |
References in Article
Select the SEEK icon to attempt to find the referenced article. If it does not appear to be in cogprints you will be forwarded to the paracite service. Poorly formated references will probably not work.
Metadata
- ASCII Citation
- Atom
- BibTeX
- Dublin Core
- EP3 XML
- EPrints Application Profile (experimental)
- EndNote
- HTML Citation
- ID Plus Text Citation
- JSON
- METS
- MODS
- MPEG-21 DIDL
- OpenURL ContextObject
- OpenURL ContextObject in Span
- RDF+N-Triples
- RDF+N3
- RDF+XML
- Refer
- Reference Manager
- Search Data Dump
- Simple Metadata
- YAML
Repository Staff Only: item control page