Spectacular pehnomena and limits to rationality in genetic and cultural evolution

Enquist, Magnus and Arak, Anthony and Ghirlanda, Stefano and Wachtmeister, Carl-Adam (2002) Spectacular pehnomena and limits to rationality in genetic and cultural evolution. [Journal (Paginated)]

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In studies of both animal and human behaviour, game theory is used as a tool for understanding strategies that appear in interactions between individuals. Game theory focuses on adaptive behaviour, which can be attained only at evolutionary equilibrium. Here we suggest that behaviour appearing during interactions is often outside the scope of such analysis. In many types of interaction, conflicts of interest exist between players, fueling the evolution of manipulative strategies. Such strategies evolve out of equilibrium, commonly appearing as spectacular morphology or behaviour with obscure meaning, to which other players may react in non-adaptive, irrational way approach, and outline the conditions in which evolutionary equilibria cannot be maintained. Evidence from studies of biological interactions seems to support the view that behaviour is often not at equilibrium. This also appears to be the case for many human cultural traits, which have spread rapidly despite the fact that they have a negative influence on reproduction.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:rationality, genetic evolution, cultural evolution, ritualization
Subjects:Biology > Ethology
Biology > Animal Cognition
Biology > Sociobiology
Biology > Evolution
Computer Science > Neural Nets
Biology > Theoretical Biology
Biology > Animal Behavior
ID Code:5277
Deposited By: Ghirlanda, Dr Stefano
Deposited On:08 Dec 2006
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56


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