How qualia can be physical

Nicholson, Mr Dennis (2006) How qualia can be physical. [Preprint]

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Assume that a quale as we experience it is a perspective on an underlying physical state, rather than the physical state as such – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such. Assume, further, that this inner perspective is integral to, and materially co-extensive with, the physical state itself. Assume, finally, that the physical state in question is known as a brain state of a particular kind by an external observer of the brain in which it occurs. The result is a perspective in which a quale is entirely physical; a position that resolves several known difficulties for physicalism, including those associated with the explanatory gap, Jackson’s knowledge argument, and Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:qualia, mind-body problem, identity theory, hard problem, knowledge argument
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:4786
Deposited By: Nicholson, Dennis
Deposited On:18 Mar 2006
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56

References in Article

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