Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.

Velmans, Max (1999) Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)]

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O'Brien & Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:neural activation, phenomenal, information, semantic coding, conscious, unconscious, explicit, implicit
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Neuroscience > Neuropsychology
ID Code:104
Deposited By: Velmans, Professor Max,
Deposited On:06 Jul 1999
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53


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