Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism

Tirassa, Maurizio (1999) Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism. [Journal (Paginated)]

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Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Additional Information:This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press. t
Keywords:Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;ä
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
JOURNALS > Behavioral & Brain Sciences
Biology > Theoretical Biology
ID Code:3579
Deposited By: Tirassa, Prof. Maurizio
Deposited On:28 Apr 2004
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

References in Article

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Gold, I., Stoljar, D. (1999) A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 809-869.

Higginbotham, J. (1990) Philosophical issues in the study of language. In: Language: an invitation to cognitive science, eds. D.N. Osherson & H. Laznik. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


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